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Cultural Reflexivity in Poland and Beyond

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From the Editors |

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Cultural Reflexivity in Poland and Beyond – Introduction

The notion of reflexivity has been prominent in social science at least since the 1970s and 1980s, when it was brought to the foreground with the 'reflexive turn' in anthropology (Asad 1973; Clifford, Marcus 1986; Geertz 1988; Rabinow 1977). In sociology the surge of theoretical and empirical interest in reflexivity came in the 1990s, when two influential works were published – *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), and *Reflexive Modernization* by Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994). Since then, the number of works on reflexivity has been growing steadily*. With such proliferation, it is easy to understand that the term itself has acquired multiple meanings and to some extent has become one of the 'token terms' in social science – widely used, but often unspecified or under-theorised. Without going into too much detail, we can distinguish between at least three principal aspects or dimensions in which reflexivity has been discussed in contemporary social science.

Reflexivity as a general feature of human practice. From this point of view, reflexivity is seen as inherent in human cognitive processes and, consequently, in all forms of practice involving a cognitive dimension (which virtually means human practice *in toto*). Those who regard human beings as reflexive creatures argue that hardly any form of behaviour is merely 'habitual' or 'culturally determined'; instead, human actions are reflexively monitored at the level of 'practical consciousness' (Giddens 1984: xxiii; 1991:

* For example, a query in Reuter's Web of Science database on the topic 'reflexivity' in social-scientific publications showed no more than 5 records yearly before 1992, 10 in 1992-94, 33 in 2000, 147 in 2010 and as many as 375 in 2016. The query was run on November 20th 2017 and showed the total of 6,614 records on the topic of 'reflexivity'. As the term has other meanings in mathematics and natural science, the query was narrowed down to seven most numerous categories of social science: "sociology", "social sciences interdisciplinary", "education educational research", "anthropology", "communication", "women's studies", "social work" and "political science". The refined query showed 2,543 publications in the years 1957-2016, with the first record from 1977.

36), and if needed, social actors are mostly able to give reasons for what they do or did. In another influential account developed by Margaret Archer (2000), general reflexivity is achieved through 'internal conversation' within human subjects – an incessant flux of 'emotional commentaries' on 'ongoing or potential commitments'; only due to this affective feedback can individuals evaluate different courses of action and prioritise some of them against others (Archer 2000: 228).

Reflexivity as a specific cultural phenomenon. In this account, reflexivity is understood as a defining feature of a specific category of human actions – ones that are not sufficiently 'scripted' by existing cultural patterns or models, and therefore have to be continually reinvented or reframed by social actors. These open-ended forms of practice are always prone to risk and uncertainty, but also – according to some scholars (e.g. Giddens 1991: 78 ff) – allow for a greater degree of personal autonomy, authenticity and self-actualisation. Reflexive practice may be found in all social circumstances, but historically it was mostly available to specific categories of social actors, such as prophets, artists, thinkers or scientists. Only with the advent of 'late', 'second' or 'high' modernity does reflexivity become a widespread phenomenon that pervades all spheres of social life, including those previously governed by 'tradition', 'custom' or 'common sense' (see Giddens 1990: 38-39; Lash 1993, 2001, 2003; Lash and Urry 1994). Thus understood, it is inextricably bound to processes of individualisation, the reconfiguration of individual lifeworlds based on the principle of 'do-it-yourself' (Beck, Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 3) – becoming a designer and manager of one's own lifestyle, intimate relations, biography and identity.

Reflexivity as an attitude and approach in social research. In the most specific sense, reflexivity is part of the research process, based on the researcher's awareness of their positionality and the modes of involvement in the social world that may influence research procedures and their outcomes. This understanding refers to the aforementioned 'reflexive turn' in anthropology in the 1980s (Clifford, Marcus 1986), but also to Gouldner's plea for a 'reflexive sociology' (1971: 481-512) and the approach developed by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), further elaborated in feminist and postcolonial scholarship (Ahmed 2000; Bhabha 1994; Haraway 1988; Mohanty 1994; Reinharz 1992). According to Bourdieu, social-scientific descriptions and explanations are always to some extent biased by the researcher's social background, their position within the academic field and the discipline's 'unthought categories of thought' – general presuppositions inscribed in the ways of imagining and analysing the social world (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 39-41). Therefore, social scientists have to remain vigilant and systematical-

ly check their own claims for the effects of habitus and *doxa*, both general and professional.

The focus of this volume is reflexivity in the second sense (except for the contribution by Świrek, who discusses Freud's account of the self as posing a particular challenge for reflexivity). To delineate this meaning from the other two, we have decided to use the term 'cultural reflexivity'. A detailed discussion of this concept can be found in Tomanek's paper; for the time being, suffice to say that by cultural reflexivity we mean a certain relationship between social actors and cultural objects remaining at their disposal. These objects may include different forms of knowledge produced and distributed in a society, as in Giddens' account of 'institutional reflexivity' (1991: 2, 187), but also texts, images and material items experienced in aesthetic rather than cognitive ways (Lash 1993, 2001, 2003; Lash and Urry 1994). The relationship in question is one of active choice and appropriation, creative adjustment and attribution of an individualised meaning. Thus cultural objects employed in a 'reflexive mode' not only serve as social markers of a pre-established personal or social identity, but more importantly, they become involved in the process of self– or identity-formation, providing a specific medium through which individuals (and groups) can relate to themselves and to the social world.

The authors of this volume set out to establish how contemporary reflexivity manifests itself in various fields of social practice, especially those connected to leisure time and individual aesthetic self-expression. Most of the empirical contributions pertain to cultural practices in Poland, with one exception – an anthropological account of religious reflexivity in Buryat society in Siberia. Four of the contributors refer extensively to their own systematic research on specific cultural phenomena. We consider this a particularly valuable aspect of this volume, as the discussion on reflexivity has long tended to revolve around theoretical issues, and empirical evidence has frequently been used merely as an illustration for general claims or models of reflexive practice.

In his introductory paper, Tomanek makes an attempt at defining cultural reflexivity as a form of social practice. He departs from a purely psychological concept of reflection to show that cultural reflexivity is a socially emergent phenomenon, a specific relationship between human agents and cultural objects. His main goal is to provide criteria for distinguishing between cultural reflexivity and two other forms of social practice commonly recognised in sociology – traditional and rationalised. Especially the latter can be easily – and often is – confused with reflexivity, as both involve the dissolution of taken-for-grantedness inherent in traditional worldviews. Ra-

tionalised forms of behaviour, however, are based on explicit and (possibly) universal rules of correctness and coherence, allowing for a sense of certainty, whereas reflexive practice is more open-ended, and reflexive agents strive for a sense of personal authenticity. Also the media of cultural reflexivity to some extent differ from those of rationalised practice, as they include not only cognitive verbal information, but also sensual particulars, such as images, songs or clothing. In the final part of the paper Tomanek discusses the social conditions conducive to cultural reflexivity or, conversely, reducing the potential for reflexive practice.

Świrek in his essay outlines the boundaries to individual reflexivity, understood here – in a more psychological vein – as a "possibility of performing conscious insight". Through a detailed analysis of three classic texts by Freud, he investigates the process of subject-formation to show that the psychoanalytic account of the self is based on a profound tension. Freud and his followers have systematically undermined the individual capacity for autonomy and self-determination as a 'façade' for the predominance of unconscious mental processes. Thus, what appears to the subject as a result of reflexive insight may in fact be "an answer that is already prepared and comes from our history". On the other hand, psychoanalysis itself is an emancipatory project, as it involves a promise of deeper self-understanding and "freeing oneself from the grasp of illusions". In therapy, the patient has to fully realise his or her mental structure and internal limitations; however, they are not subjected to intellectual scrutiny, but unravelled through specific procedures reaching beyond the realm of the rational, such as the method of free associations. 'Psychoanalytic reflexivity' is therefore a peculiar one, being based on a theory which dismisses conventional forms of reflection as invalid means of self-cognition.

Połeć examines how cultural reflexivity operates in the Russian Republic of Buryatia, embodied in modern forms of shamanism. He shows how contemporary Buryat shamans, rather than simply following traditional precepts of their practice, accommodate it to the changing social and cultural circumstances. The very phenomenon of the 'shaman revival' in the Republic of Buryatia results from the fact that shamans have managed to establish themselves as 'cultural experts', whose field of expertise is not confined to magic or traditional medicine. After the collapse of the USSR the Buryats found themselves in a situation of massive disembeddedness as previous, state-sanctioned ways of establishing group identities and dealing with everyday problems became obsolete. Thus there emerged a profound need for an 'expert system' to master insecurity, and shamanism fitted the bill. Połeć argues that the reflexive modernisation approach largely ignores the return to tra-

ditional religious beliefs as a possible response to late-modern life conditions, whereas the Buryat case shows the opposite – that the second modernisation and the emergence of risk society may bring about a re-enchantment of the world in the form of a 'reflexive religion', drawing on local traditions, but reoriented towards specifically modern issues.

Mroczkowska addresses the practice of going to fitness clubs as a form of modern preoccupation with bodily aspects of the self. Based on in-depth interviews with fitness club members, she outlines the fundamental dialectic of freedom and discipline inherent in fitness activities. On the one hand, her interviewees consider the gym to be their space of personal freedom where they can shake off other concerns, relax, and focus on themselves, finding immediate pleasure in physical effort or exhaustion. On the other, systematic exercise is a form of self-discipline, adopted instrumentally to achieve further goals – a sense of control over one's body, physical fitness, health and better looks. Thus exercise may not be pleasurable in itself, but following a physical regime brings a delayed gratification, that is, the possibility to "shop for a newly fit body". The struggle to discipline oneself and shape one's body becomes a display of individual agency, but at the same time it fosters dependence on experts (gym trainers) and expert knowledge. This is yet another dialectic of reflexivity, explored by many scholars (Beck and Giddens among others) and is neatly illustrated in this paper.

In her article, Żuchowska-Zimnal critically engages with the notion of cultural reflexivity to explore the role of 'trivial' acts of everyday consumption in communicating meanings and the construction of one's self-identity in late modern reality. While pointing out the proliferation of meanings, aestheticisation of everyday life and consumerist 'coercion to choose' as the main parameters for the process of identity formation in the context of fluid modernity, she posits that late modern individuals/consumers increasingly invest in self-formation and self-communication through clothing and sartorial strategies. These investments, she argues, can be best captured through Lash's conceptualisation of 'aesthetic reflexivity' and Willis's concept of symbolic creativity. In her own research she explores how young urban adults with high cultural capital make their sartorial decisions, and what kinds of effect they intend to achieve. The bulk of her research participants display a strongly critical attitude toward fashion and a preference for more personalised styles of dress. Interestingly enough, only some of them are able to verbalise an overall self-image behind their choices; for others, sartorial reflexivity works at the level of visual codes that are not readily translated into discourse. Moreover, many participants, while declaring independence from fashion trends and external pressures, remain deeply aware of what their

clothing communicates to other people and adjust the impression to get positive feedback on their aesthetic decisions.

The aesthetisation of everyday life is also addressed by Wyrzykowska in her paper on the musical practices of Warsaw adolescents. Discussing the results of her extensive research, she describes the variety of ways in which music mediates experience. Among the most interesting ones is listening to music as a soundtrack to everyday activities, such as commuting to school, doing homework, gaming or falling asleep. In such cases music often serves as a mood regulator, helping individuals to calm themselves or, conversely, boost their energy. Consequently, the author distinguishes between two opposite modes of music reception: hearing music, when it is used as a background for other activities, and listening to music, when it is focused upon and engaged in a more reflexive manner. Music intended to serve as a background largely differs (in terms of music genres) from that to be 'listened to'; however, it is actively chosen to perform its function, and therefore this kind of hearing cannot be regarded as an instance of 'passive' reception. Later in her paper, drawing on de Nora's concept of music as a cultural vehicle, Wyrzykowska shows how it mediates individual experience and memories and can thus be used to (re)organise one's biography, either through facilitating the recollection of past episodes, or by providing a reference point to narrate them as a coherent whole.

Finally, Nóżka and Smagacz-Poziemska explore the possibilities of a dialogue between various approaches to designing urban space. The authors argue that reflection on space is usually developed within 'reflexive communities' representing different scientific disciplines and professions, such as architecture, design, art, sociology and philosophy. These communities are characterised by their own (often implicit) assumptions, standards and rules of practice, based on specific ontologies of space. Thus, professional reflection on space, even though performed consciously, is always to some extent limited in its scope and outcomes. To overcome these limitations and incorporate different forms of reflexivity into one project was the goal of interdisciplinary spatial design workshops, embracing students of architecture, interior architecture, sociology and philosophy. The authors, who led two editions of the workshops, found the participants largely entrenched in their professional perspectives, which made it very difficult to elaborate shared understandings of what space is and how it should be designed and used. An especially profound rift could be seen between the aesthetic perspective of architects (focused on the artistic value and 'personal mark' of the design) and the cognitive approach of sociologists (concerned foremost with the functional aspects of space and the expectations of its prospective users).

Also the media of reflexivity differed – for sociologists these were mostly narratives, whereas architects worked directly with pictures or graphics, with little need to translate them into words. Consequently, the authors recommend that such collaboration, constituting a challenging attempt at combining different forms of reflexivity, should be organised on a prolonged basis to give participants more opportunity to negotiate meanings and perspectives.

It goes without saying that such a selective survey cannot answer any general questions concerning the pervasiveness of reflexive practice in Polish society or the socio-structural conditions enabling reflexivity. In Western countries such questions have been asked by many scholars (e.g. Lash 1994; Atkinson 2010), and the diversity of answers indicates that this issue is far from being settled. Another important and unresolved question concerns the outcomes of reflexivity: the extent to which it fosters individual autonomy and coherent self, or – alternatively – contributes to its fragmentation and discontinuity. The papers in this volume suggest both; perhaps this paradoxical nature of reflexivity is what makes it such an engaging subject of social-scientific attention.

We hope that these and other questions will be addressed in further research, both empirical and theoretical. What we have in mind is not necessarily research *on* reflexivity, but rather incorporating this notion as an important vector in studying contemporary cultural phenomena. To acknowledge general reflexivity of human agents is one thing, but to analyse specific forms of reflexive practice is quite another. If this volume somehow manages to inspire Polish and foreign scholars to follow this path, we will be more than satisfied.

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Articles and Studies

PAWEŁ TOMANEK

The Tree, the Cage, and the Mirror: Cultural Reflexivity vs. Tradition and Rationalisation

The paper discusses the concept of cultural reflexivity as a distinct type of social practice. Cultural reflexivity is defined as an open-ended form of using cultural objects to mediate the self, and then compared to other types of practice – traditional and rationalised. The comparison proceeds in three dimensions: the criteria of validity, the mode of meaning, and the attitude of the acting subjects. Subsequently, the media of cultural reflexivity are discussed with a focus on the difference between cognitive and aesthetic reflexivity. Finally, the social conditions for cultural reflexivity are analysed, both at the structural and personal level.
Keywords: cultural reflexivity, cultural object, mediation of the self, tradition, rationalisation

The notion of reflexivity acquired a wider presence in sociology in the 1990s, in the wake of the rising popularity of the 'reflexive modernisation' theory (see Beck, Giddens and Lash).[1] The term has often been used to highlight certain phenomena of our times that are supposedly new, unprecedented and of key importance. Not only 'late' or 'high' modernity itself has been dubbed 'reflexive', but so too have various fields of practice and social life – from business, management, and politics to shopping, eating, and tattooing. In effect, the notion of reflexivity has lost some of its analytic potential and become yet another catchword in the modernity/postmodernity debate. The meaning of the term, as it is used by many scholars, often remains somewhat obscure. Furthermore, the founding fathers of 'reflexive modernisation' – Beck, Giddens and Lash – have used the term in quite different ways, and as a result every scholar may choose a version to his or her liking.

In this paper I shall not discuss specific differences between various understandings of reflexivity. This has been done to good effect by other schol-

[1] Earlier in the 1980s, with the 'narrative turn' in cultural anthropology, the term made its way into research vocabulary as one of the (postulated) features of the research process. This methodological meaning of reflexivity has been most famously brought to sociology by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992), but I will not discuss this here, as my focus is on reflexivity as a feature of social practice in general.

ars (Pellizzoni 1999; Pels 2000). Instead, I shall propose a concept of 'cultural reflexivity', drawing on 'reflexive modernisation' but also striving to avoid some of its theoretical drawbacks. In short, I will define cultural reflexivity as a particular way of using cultural objects, or a particular relationship between acting subjects and the cultural means of their action. This understanding aims both at broadening the scope of the notion and investing it with an accurate meaning, to better distinguish cultural reflexivity from two other forms of social practice – traditional and rationalised. In order to do this, I shall compare them in three respects: the criteria of validity, the mode of meaning, and the attitude of the acting subjects. My ultimate goal is to show how cultural reflexivity has transformed social life, but also to highlight its structural constraints and unequal opportunities for reflexive practice.

From reflection to cultural reflexivity

What is reflexivity? The word derives from the adjective 'reflexive', which in turn originates from the verb 'to reflect' or the noun 'reflection'. In English they have two distinct sets of meanings. The first is purely physical and concerns the phenomenon of reflecting light or an image by a reflexive surface. The second is psychological and refers to a mental process by which an object of thought (a thing, a person or an idea, etc.) is brought into the full light of consciousness and subjected to reasoned scrutiny. As we can see, these two meanings concern different levels of reality, but the second is – semiotically – derivative of the first: the optical process serves as a metaphor for the mental process. The common ground is of course the association of reason with light, easy to find in everyday expressions (an 'illuminating' thought, 'to shed some light' on a topic) and in philosophical thought (the Enlightenment).

But this metaphor suggests another important similarity: both in reflecting *something* and reflecting *upon something*, a mediating element is involved. An image we see in a mirror is not the thing itself – we do not perceive it *directly*. The same applies to reflection in the mental sense: when reflecting upon something, we lose the *immediacy* of lived experience and introduce a mediating element: language and its cognitive categories. Of course, in the real mental process the difference is not that simple and straightforward (does unmediated experience even exist?), but for the sake of our discussion, which will not focus on psychological issues *per se*, suffice to say that reflection is arguably the most mediated form of cognition, in which the gap between the knowing subject and the object of thought opens wide, even if the two are one and the same.

One could assume that social or cultural reflexivity is simply a collective term for individual processes of reflection, and thus when we speak of unprecedented 'reflexive' society, we imply that there are now more individuals who reflect on a broader range of issues. But this is not the main point of difference. Reflection, as I have pointed out before, is a *mental* process, whereas reflexivity is a form of social *practice*. By social practice I mean any form of human action involving other human beings or man-made objects. Hence, reading a book, or reading books in general, is a social practice, while thinking about a book I read a week ago is 'merely' a mental process. The difference may seem blurry, but it is nevertheless crucial for a social scientist. Our mental processes are inaccessible to other people, whereas social practice is always – at least potentially – intersubjective. Furthermore, mental processes may be constrained in many ways – most importantly, by cognitive categories inscribed in our languages and cultural codes – but they are not patterned by our social resources the way social practice is. To put it simply: it is one thing to fail to understand the content of a book, but quite another to not have access to books or a reading habit.

Thus, reflexive practices may – and often do – involve reflection, but this is not what distinguishes them. What does? At this point, the optical meaning of the verb 'to reflect' comes back on the scene. Reflexive practices, as I understand them, have much in common with the 'mirror situation' described above. We are being culturally reflexive whenever we voluntarily use cultural objects[2] – haircuts, tattoos, clothes, novels, songs, movies, hobbies, ideologies – as a reflexive surface, a mediating device through which we relate to ourselves and other people.[3] Every reflexive action in this sense aims at establishing a connection (at least momentary) between a self and a cultural object allowing for its expression, interpretation and (re)construction. Such

[2] By cultural object I mean any object (a thing, an idea, a combination of sensual qualities) aimed at influencing the state of mind of experiencing subjects. Such an understanding is much broader than the symbolic model of culture, developed by many scholars (most famously Geertz 1973), as it allows objects which do not 'mean' in the strict sense of the term (i.e. they do not refer to anything beyond themselves), but are meant to act exclusively as sensual stimuli or 'signals' in Leach's terms (1976) – to inspire emotions, evoke memories, or simply influence one's perception or self-perception. This is what distinguishes cultural objects from technical objects which are aimed at transforming physical reality. Of course, in the real world these two kinds of properties can perfectly coexist in one object (e.g. in a car designed not only to move, but also to have a particular 'look').

[3] Agata Dziuban (2013: 48) has similarly distinguished between two aspects of late-modern reflexivity: self-reference and mediation. I agree with the latter, but the former can be misleading, if we understand self-reference literally ('the self referring to itself'). In my understanding, cultural reflexivity encompasses also all open-ended forms of cultural mediation between the self and the 'external world' (e.g. other people's selves). In later chapters of her inspiring book, Dziuban seems to assume a similar perspective, for example when she writes about tattooing as a medium of creating and sustaining personal relationships or a form of 'cultural commentary' on wider social phenomena.

actions may be performed consciously – or, as Giddens puts it, at the level of 'discursive consciousness' – but probably most of them are carried out at the level of 'practical consciousness' or 'practical monitoring' (Giddens 1984: 41-45; 1991: 35-36). This is because language is not the only medium of our communication with other people and ourselves. We may just as well (even if not just as often) communicate with gestures, clothes, music and other cultural objects, and in the process we do not always translate their expressive and impressive value into words. Social practice is hardly ever 'subtitled', and cultural reflexivity is not switching these subtitles on.

What distinguishes reflexive practice from any other form of cultural mediation is the *open* character of both the self and the cultural object in question. Reflexive practice is not a social realisation of a predetermined self by means of generally acknowledged cultural markers. Instead, it is a circular process of constructing, expressing and interpreting the self (one's changing identity, interests, ideas and feelings) through cultural objects specifically created to this purpose or 'appropriated' from the common resource which itself constantly changes.[4] Thus, neither the self nor the means of its expression and construction are given once and forever, or – as has been more often the case – once for a socially defined period of life. This is the most important difference from the so-called traditional societies, where both identities and the means of their cultural re-production remained fairly stable and were already fitted to each other, with no need to 'try them on'.

Of course, cultural reflexivity in this sense has existed since long before the advent of 'reflexive modernity'. We may find many examples of historical contingencies calling into question existing identities and patterns of action, even in 'tribal' or 'primitive' societies. For one, Native Americans threatened by the expansion of the 'whites' could either adapt to the changing world, or remain faithful to their old ways – and become extinct or exterminated. Those who chose the former had to reinvent themselves and find new ways of being 'Crows' or 'Crees', and in some cases they succeeded due to the reflexive adjustment of the whole tribe (Lear 2008). Also, in many pre-modern societies there existed social positions and roles enabling cultural reflexivity – of 'cultural experts', sorcerers, prophets, artists and philosophers, creating new cultural objects and reinterpreting the old ones. In all these cases, however, reflexivity remained rather an exception or an emergency than an inherent element of social practice.

[4] A reflexive subject often resembles an artist using *objets trouvées* that he or she fits into the emerging structure, providing that every element can be dislocated or removed at will, and some of them will fall off by themselves.

The change brought about by modernity has been twofold. Firstly, it has greatly increased the number of people acting reflexively, or – to be more precise – finding themselves in need of doing so. Secondly, it has broadened the range of practices subjected to reflexive organisation, including those that seemed to be the last stand of tradition or common sense – religion, marriage, child rearing, and so forth. As a result, reflexivity has become an ordinary feature of social practice. This has been aptly put by Giddens: "In all cultures, social practices are routinely altered in the light of ongoing discoveries which feed into them. But only in the era of modernity is the revision of convention radicalised to apply (in principle) to all aspects of human life, including technological intervention into the material world" (1990: 38-39).

Of course, Giddens's understanding of reflexivity is broader than the one I develop in this paper. For him reflexivity is not necessarily connected to individual selves or group identities, even though many of his examples – especially those drawn from the fields of therapy and self-help – pertain exactly to the kind of reflexivity I am pointing at. But more importantly, the definition of modern reflexivity as a "radicalised revision of convention" or "susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relations with nature, to chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge" (Giddens 1991: 21) may suggest that reflexivity equals detraditionalisation, or its latest, most widespread and consequential stage. Such an understanding is also suggested by the title of Giddens's contribution to *Reflexive Modernization* – 'Living in a Post-Traditional Society' (1994: 56-109).

My point is that such a definition runs the risk of conflating reflexivity with at least one other form of detraditionalisation, namely, rationalisation. Both rationalisation and reflexivity can be regarded as 'revision of convention', but they follow different logics and lead to quite different outcomes. In social practice they may coincide, intertwine and complement each other, but for the sake of clarity they need to be distinguished at the analytical level. Therefore, in the next paragraphs I will explore how cultural reflexivity relates to tradition and rationalisation, to highlight some of the differences between them. Only then will I proceed to discuss in detail how cultural reflexivity transforms social practice and what social factors shape opportunities for reflexivity.

The milk tree of tradition

It would be misleading to say that cultural reflexivity or rationalisation have led to or stemmed from the demise of tradition, even in Western countries. After all, cultural objects and forms we call 'traditional' are still in

abundance, and new ones constantly appear, which may violate our sense of what tradition is.[5] These 'new traditions' are themselves reflexive in nature, and this is arguably the most widespread outcome of 'detraditionalization'. But in order to tell how it came to be, we have to first describe tradition in a traditional way, as a form of practice that dominated in pre-modern societies and still dominates today in some social settings (even if being more and more an endangered species).

For the sake of our discussion, to ensure analytical symmetry with the notion of cultural reflexivity, we should define tradition as a particular way of using cultural objects. As I have already pointed out, the 'traditional' relationship between a self or identity and a cultural object is the one of pre-established harmony: both the self and the cultural means of its expression and reproduction are predetermined in a given social context and cannot be changed at will. This does not mean that they cannot be changed at all – traditional frames of practice, as has been emphasised by many scholars, are flexible and adjustable to new circumstances, and a resourceful social actor may 'work' them to achieve his or her particular goals (Geertz 1973). It does mean, however, that they constrain any social action undertaken within their scope of validity. The actor may choose among a limited number of cultural objects as a valid means of expression, and, on the other hand, not all actors will be entitled to use a particular object. Thus, wearing the wedding ring – a traditional token of being married – may be very much expected in some settings (during a family dinner) and optional in others (during labour), but the ring itself cannot be freely replaced with, say, a woollen cord (unless there appear some circumstances justifying the replacement – for example, when a 'proper' cultural object is lacking or unavailable). Conversely, an unmarried person wearing the ring could be accused of 'mocking the tradition', which is still better than being accused of blasphemy or profanation, when the object in question is considered sacred.

Thus, the traditional way of using a cultural object is based on the *appropriateness* of the object to the social actor and the context of its use. These three elements have to be closely fitted to each other: the object cannot be properly used by other actors and outside the context, and its meaning and purpose are utterly contextual and particular. From this it also follows that the object cannot be exchanged for a different object of equivalent meaning or value, because they are incommensurable – there is no intercontextual semantic ground on which to compare them. In this respect, the traditional cultural code remains a form of the restricted code (Bernstein 1971; Dou-

[5] See the discussion about 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm, Ranger 1983).

glas 1996: 20-36), in which all fundamental assumptions are already inherent in the code and need not be clarified by the communicating parties. The meaning of all cultural objects thus encoded (not only verbal statements) is *implicit* and usually not reflected upon by social actors. Only when the match between the object and the actor becomes problematic – when one of the sides of this relationship falls out of joint – does the need appear to scrutinise it and clarify its meaning, purpose, and social status.

The question of implicit meanings and beliefs has been extensively discussed in anthropological literature.[6] The greatest problem of an anthropologist trying to interpret a traditional practice, such as a ritual, has been precisely what constitutes its nature: the fact that most actors do not consciously perceive or verbalise its meaning.[7] Moreover, one cultural object can have many different meanings, supporting or contesting each other, as has been famously described by Victor Turner in the case of the milk tree and female initiation rites among the Ndembu (1967: 19-47) or by Ernest Gellner in the case of the notion of *baraka* among the Berbers (1969: 77). An explicit, discursive expression of these meanings could result in exposing the self-contradictory nature of an idea or a belief, and thus in diminishing its practical value. In another case, the contradiction or ambiguity may be removed, and the meaning clarified, but the very need to do so means that the cultural object has already lost its self-evident status and become an object of deliberate scrutiny. The sense of *certitude* – the conviction that things are right just *the way they are* – may be thus replaced with the sense of *certainty* – the conviction that we know exactly *how* things are – but this already takes us away from tradition towards more rationalised forms of practice.

The iron cage of rationalisation

Rationalisation, at least since Weber, has been considered one of the founding processes of modernity, along with secularisation, democratisation and individualisation (Giddens, Sutton 2014: 10). The advent of modernity has been equated with the demise of traditional worldviews and the rise of instrumental rationality, or – in Weber's terms – the prevalence of purposive-rational actions. The 'iron cage of modernity' thus understood seems to be

[6] For a recapitulation of the problem, see Gellner (2003).

[7] On this account there has been some disagreement – for example, according to Edmund Leach (1976: 37-41), in 'ritual condensation' abstract concepts and ideas are projected on sensual objects and qualities (such as colours) to replace pure reflection with physical operations, whereas for Victor Turner (1967: 103-105) the goal of many rituals is to encourage social actors to reflect on the most important aspects of their world.

made not so much of iron as of numbers: instrumental rationalisation has been associated with a quest to transform all social practice into 'data', to quantify it, calculate it, and ensure its maximal efficiency through carefully designed managerial practices. This Taylorian strand of rationalisation has been vividly depicted by the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer 2012; Horkheimer, Adorno 2002), and later by Georg Ritzer (2009), one of the most recognised heirs of Weber.

However, Weber's understanding of rationalisation and rationality was much broader than Ritzer's. Already in his typology of social action he famously distinguished between purposive-rational and value-rational actions, the latter being free from instrumental calculations and directed towards non-negotiable ends (Weber 1947: 115-118). Furthermore, in many of his works Weber discussed various types of rationality and rationalisation. Of interest to us here are three of the four types distinguished and compared by one of Weber's commentators, Stephen Kahlberg (1980): theoretical, formal, and substantive rationality (the fourth type being practical rationality involved in much of human activity). In short, theoretical rationality is "a conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly precise abstract concepts" (Kahlberg 1980: 1152), formal rationality "legitimates a rational means-end calculation by reference back to universally applied rules, laws, or regulations" (1980: 1158), whereas substantive rationality "orders actions into patterns (...) in relation to a past, present or potential 'value postulate'" (1980: 1155). When 'value postulates' constitute an entire system of interconnected and hierarchised values, substantive rationality assumes the form of 'ethical substantive rationality' or simply 'ethical rationality' (Kahlberg 1980: 1165).

Unlike practical rationality, these three types of rationality are historically specific. From this it follows that we can observe processes of theoretical, formal and substantive (ethical) rationalisation, which may or may not coincide with each other. In modernity, theoretical rationalisation is mostly the development of modern philosophy and empirical science, formal rationalisation is the rise of formal law-making and the bureaucratic form of power and administration, while ethical rationalisation is the 'de-magification' of religious beliefs and ordering everyday practice along ethical lines. As we can see, of all the three only formal rationalisation pertains directly to instrumental reason, whereas the other two processes have very little to do with means-end calculation. Admittedly, since the 19th century science has been harnessed to serve technological development (Habermas 1974: 254-55), but it has not lost its distinctiveness as an emanation of theoretical reason.

Nevertheless, all these types of rationality and rationalisation have much in common. Every form of modern rational thought or behaviour (as opposed to everyday practical rationality) makes sense only insofar as it constitutes a part of a wider frame, be it a theoretical, legal, or ethical system. Furthermore, all elements of this frame have to be *explicitly* stated, so that – ideally – each one of them can be discursively related to each other. Any element (an idea, an action, etc.) that cannot fulfil this requirement has to be taken out of consideration.[8] Finally, every modern rational rule or principle raises a claim to *universality*, that is, it should be applied to all situations within its scope of validity. The scope obviously varies depending on the type of rationality and the field of practice: natural sciences aspire to formulate laws and rules applicable to all empirical reality, while social sciences may find their subject matter more space– and time-specific, and lawmaking is limited in scope to a political or administrative unit (a state, municipality, or international governmental organisation, etc.).

All these features of modern rationality contribute to the modern quest for order and certainty (Bauman 1991). Independently of the type of rationality, every action performed (or intended to be performed) within a modern rational frame may be analysed against explicit, unambiguous and universal criteria, which allows for its evaluation in terms of *correctness* (theoretical, moral and legal, etc.) and its comparison with other actions of the same kind. Thus, operating within this frame of reference, we may assess which actions (or which types of practice) are more rational than the others, and – possibly – which one of them is the most rational and should be treated as a model. This kind of hierarchy is hard to imagine in traditional societies, where every form of practice is justified in relation to its immediate context. As we have seen, traditional practices cannot be subsumed under one explicit principle, nor can they be compared in terms of their traditionality (Easter vs. Christmas, for example). To rationalise them is in fact to detraditionalise them, to translate them into the elaborated code in which they lose the contextual, irreplaceable meaning of the 'original' practice.[9]

[8] This is close to the perspective of Jürgen Habermas (1984: 339-41), for whom the 'rationalization of the lifeworld' begins when the analytically distinct 'validity claims' – for truth, rightness, and truthfulness – are no longer intertwined and form bases for separate discourses (scientific, moral, and aesthetic).

[9] A case in point is the transformation of Friday abstinence in 20th-century England, as analysed by Mary Douglas (1996: 37-46). Originally, Friday abstinence functioned as a 'pure' ritual action, that is, it did not involve explaining what it meant (for the vast majority the practitioners). However, in the mid-1900s English Catholic clergy began to seek an explanation and justification for the practice, to escape accusations of 'hollow ritualism'. Eventually, they redefined the abstinence as an ethical deed that could be replaced with other actions of the same basic meaning, such as charity. As a result, the obligation of Friday abstinence was lifted in 1967. It was reestablished in 2011, but its meaning has been once again

Rationalisation is therefore *not an open-ended process*: it undermines various forms of social certitude – tradition, common sense and so forth – only to replace them with a *certainty* of its own, or at least to make a promise that such certainty is at hand. The 'iron cage' of modernity is steel-hard, because the bars should not and will not bend to whimsical changes of opinion and opportunity. If an individual or group practice is to be ordered according to a general rule (ethical, theoretical, or technological in a broad sense), then the individual or group has to simply *adjust the practice to the rule*, as it has been defined by 'lawmakers' in Bauman's sense (1989). This adjustment is one-sided: the rule cannot be adjusted to the practitioner, if not for some other rule, taking into account his or her special features and limitations. These features, however, also have to be generic in kind. For example, in rationalised nutrition there are rules determining what can, and what cannot be considered a 'healthy regimen'. These may be, and often are, modified according to a person's age, gender, occupation, state of health and so forth, but should not take into account his or her idiosyncratic taste. One's sweet tooth cannot be justified from a rationalised dietary perspective, and this would not change unless there appeared new evidence from which it would follow that eating large amounts of chocolate is in fact good for your health.

The looking glass of reflexivity

The question of certainty and open-endedness is where cultural reflexivity parts ways with rationalisation. Whereas rationalisation results in limiting acceptable patterns of practice for the sake of strengthening social and personal certainty, cultural reflexivity does no such thing. It is an open-ended process in which the social actor's self or identity and the meaning of the cultural object are constantly open to interpretation, negotiation and reconstruction. Cultural reflexivity means the loss of some form of social certitude or certainty *with no other form to replace it*. Reflexive subjects do not seek unalterable rules to guide their behaviour, nor do they believe that such rules are attainable and applicable. Instead, they live their lives (by choice or by default) as 'works in progress', accommodating to every twist and bend in their biographies and social environment. They do not seek knowledge in

stated in an ethical-rational vein, and the Bishops' Conference has allowed other forms of abstinence to attain the same general purpose: "Those who cannot or choose not to eat meat as part of their normal diet should abstain from some other food of which they regularly partake" (the statement available at: http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2011/05/16/the-restoration-of-the-friday-fast-is-a-historic-day-for-english-and-welsh-catholics/; date of access: 11-05-2014)

the strong sense of the word, implying universality and certainty. What they do need is some framework in which to fit their experience, sentiments, hopes and wishes, but this framework resembles a looking glass more than an 'iron cage'. This has been nicely captured by Scott Lash:

> The 'roles' of the first modernity depended very much on what Kant called determinate judgement; on prescription, on determinate rules. Now the individual must be much more the rule finder himself. Determinate judgement is replaced by 'reflective judgement'. Reflective judgement is not reflection because *there is now no universal to subsume the particular* (italics added). In reflective judgement the individual must *find the rule* (italics added). Reflective judgement is always a question of uncertainty, of risk, but it also leaves the door open much more to innovation (2001: xi).

The reflexive relationship between the social actor and the cultural object is neither strictly contextual and based on appropriateness, as in the case of traditional practice, nor decontextualised and based on correctness, as in the case of rationalised practice. Instead, it is deeply *personal* – its main criterion is *authenticity* of the object for the social actor – the feeling that the object somehow captures an important aspect of the actor's self (Giddens 1991; Lindholm 2008; Taylor 1992). This sense of 'fitting' is much more individual than the traditional 'befitting', as it does not imply any external point of reference. It is up to the actor to judge what feels 'authentic' at the moment and therefore may be used as a valid means of self-expression and self-construction. Of course, not always may this feeling translate into actual practice, because of social pressures and constraints that the actor has to take into account. Nevertheless, the *choice* of not expressing the self remains reflexive and is different from the *lack of need* to do so, which constitutes the 'zero point' of reflexivity.

As I have pointed out before, the reflexive practice hardly ever remains fixed, and the stimulus to change may come from both sides of the relationship. The general semantic value of a cultural object (its positioning within a wider cultural matrix) may change and the object therefore may cease to fit the projected self, or conversely, the actor may find the self altered and abandon its previous means of expression. This distinction is, of course, purely analytical, as in real practice the two processes (cultural recoding of the object and personal reconstruction of the self) may coincide and intertwine. For example, one's decision to stop attending church or to convert to another religion may stem from the realisation that his or her religion has become more 'mundane', *and* from the feeling of personal growth and the emerging need of a deeper or different religious experience. Let us stress once more that the reflexive nature of this decision does not depend on its explicit ar-

ticulation in these terms: my awareness of *why* I decide to give stop going to church may be vague, but I am nevertheless adjusting my practice to my present self – to what 'feels authentic' at the moment. The self in turn is adjusted to the new situation and re-evaluated (for example, from the perspective of my former religion some of my deeds, thoughts or inclinations might have been considered sinful; what are they now?).

This circular movement may never end, or it may lead to some point of equilibrium, where the self and its cultural media remain stable for a longer time. This equilibrium, however, is precarious, as it is not rooted in contextual appropriateness or sheer prescription. It does not mean that there are no external points of reference to validate the self, but these are also a matter of choice – we decide who is to judge our practice, where to seek feedback, whose perspective we adopt as our own. Therefore, reflexive practice may not be as individualised as it seems, and there exist 'reflexive communities' where the very sense of belonging is based on the congruence between the selves of the group members (Maffesoli 1992; Hetherington 1998; Lash 1994: 157-68; Lash, Urry 1994: 50). In such communities, cultural objects play the role of double mediators: they not only participate in individual self-reference, but also constitute and mediate relationships with other people. Thus a group of capoeira practitioners or role-playing gamers is properly constituted by a shared cultural object, and the decision to join and remain in the group has no other background than the feeling of authenticity of oneself sharing a particular kind of experience with other people.

Media of cultural reflexivity

When we speak of reflection or reflexivity in a broad sense, we usually assume that the mediating element is some form of *knowledge* or *information*, as in Giddens's definition cited above ("chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge"). Examples of reflexivity presented by Giddens, such as looking up and reading popular expert literature about marriage and relationships (1991: 13-14), also suggest that it is mostly a *cognitive* phenomenon, based on acquiring new information about the facts of life and modifying one's practice accordingly. Such forms of reflexivity involving conceptual knowledge can be easily traced in many spheres of practice, such as health, raising children, career, and so forth. This knowledge, however, is not treated as certain, as there are many competing sources, including those who do not derive their authority from their institutional status – self-appointed healers, therapists and so forth. This type of reflexivity often coexists and intersects with various forms of rationalisation, and there-

fore, the very label of 'expert knowledge' does not tell much until we inspect the nature of the knowledge in question (its explicitness, prescriptiveness etc.) and the way in which it is used by social actors. Only then can we ascertain to what extent a given form of practice can be called reflexive, and to what extent it follows the logic of rationalisation.

According to Scott Lash, Giddens's (and Beck's) perspective represents a significant narrowing of the notion of reflexivity. He accuses both authors of holding on to the post-Enlightenment concept of human agents, in which their rational and discursive cognitive powers come to the fore. To Lash, this 'cognitive reflexivity' is only one type of contemporary reflexivity, the other types being 'aesthetic reflexivity' and 'hermeneutic reflexivity' (1994: 158-59; 204). This observation is all the more important since it takes us even further away from the notion of rationalisation. As Lash points out, reflexive practices may not involve any kind of knowledge in the 'modern' sense, and yet allow for expressing and reconstructing the self:

> [...] not only does knowledge flow through... information and communication structures, not only do conceptual symbols function as structural conditions of reflexivity in modernity, but so does an entire other economy of signs in space. This other semiotic economy is one of not conceptual but mimetic symbols. It is an economy that opens up possibilities for not cognitive but aesthetic reflexivity in late modernity... This second, not cognitive but aesthetic, moment of reflexivity is fundamentally mimetic in nature, and as such is very much in the tradition not of Enlightenment high modernity but of modernism in the arts... This aesthetic dimension of reflexivity finally is the grounding principle of 'expressive individualism' in everyday life of contemporary consumer capitalism (Lash 1994: 135).

Aesthetic reflexivity is of key importance to the concept of cultural reflexivity, as it cannot occur in any other way than by means of a particular, sensual object – an image, a song, a verse. It does not mean, however, that a reflexive agent has to 'contemplate' the cultural object to grasp its inner or deep meaning, and it certainly does not mean that the relationship between the object and the self has to be made discursive. This may be the case, but the relationship may equally as well be established and maintained at the level of practical consciousness. In the reflexive mode, cultural objects (not only aesthetic ones) are employed to influence and frame experience and the self, not to make them explicit. For example I may get a tattoo to display my feelings, my self-image, my attitude towards the world and other people, or simply my taste (see Dziuban 2013). In all these cases, the tattoo may result from deliberate, discursive reflection, but once it has been done it acts as a sensual 'shortcut' to the self and does

not necessitate discursive elaboration. As such, it constitutes a form of the restricted code, in which all the main assumptions and categories are inherent in communicating subjects' knowledge about each other. On the other hand, with every act of restricted communication this implicit knowledge is actualised and reinforced. This applies as well to self-communication or self-cognition – my understanding of who I am, what I like and what I want.

Social conditions for cultural reflexivity

Social conditions in which cultural reflexivity may develop and flourish are 'non-linear systems', where "system dis-equilibrium and change is produced internally to the system through feedback loops" (Lash 2001: ix). This is also the understanding of Beck and Giddens: in late-modern societies there are no 'points of equilibrium' in which a social system can safely rest and reproduce itself. The system produces outcomes going beyond its coping capacities or indeed its cognitive frames, and therefore new frames and new methods have to be invented, as in the case of climate change or modern terrorism. The same applies to late-modern individuals: they cannot remain safely 'fitted' or 'adapted' to their social environment, nor can they envision and prepare for the coming changes, because the nature and direction of the changes is beyond their grasp (this is what constitutes 'risks' in Beck's understanding [1992]).

These social conditions have often been linked to the process of individualisation. In public discourse the term has been mostly associated with the disruption or weakening of social bonds and a sort of 'individualistic hedonism'. The notion of individualisation, however, is much richer theoretically, and it cannot be reduced to social atomisation (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 1-20). There are at least three levels or dimensions of individualisation explored by social scientists – structural, cultural, and personal (Dziuban 2013: 24-25). On the structural level, it is the 'uprooting' of individuals from traditional and (early) modern social structures, such as family, local community, class and the nation state, which no longer provide a secure, stable and risk-free environment for social action. On the cultural level, it is the rise of new discourses and imageries, promoting individual authenticity and self-fulfilment as dominant values and life goals. Finally, on the personal level it is the disentangling of individual identities from collective frames of reference and turning them into projects that individuals have to design and carry out on their own. Therefore, cultural reflexivity can be understood as an outcome of structural and cultural individualisation and as a vehicle of personal individualisation – the way of constructing individual identity in the society in which ready-to-wear identities are in short supply:

People therefore end up more and more in a labyrinth of self-doubt and uncertainty. The (infinite) regress involved in this self-questioning – 'am I really happy?', 'am I really fulfilled?', 'who exactly is the I saying and asking this?' – leads to ever new kinds of response, which then often provide a market niche for experts, industries and religious movements. In their quest for self-fulfilment people scour the travel brochures and go to the four corners of the earth; they throw away the best marriages and rapidly enter new ties; they undergo retraining, diet and jog; they shift from one therapy group to another and swear by quite different therapies and therapists. They pull themselves up by the roots, to see whether the roots are really healthy (Beck, Beck-Gernsheim 2001: 38).

Thus, cultural reflexivity – along with individualisation – is not necessarily a blessing, but in modern social conditions it is more and more a necessity. It would be erroneous, however, to claim that all individuals are equally individualised, and therefore equally prone to be culturally reflexive. Even if we limit our discussion to Western countries, where individualisation supposedly took root the earliest and has done so the most profoundly, we will conclude that the need of and opportunities for cultural reflexivity are socially patterned, just like other cultural phenomena. First of all, the level of structural uprooting varies greatly, depending on factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, religion, habitation, and occupation. For example, a farmer in the French countryside, settled there for several generations, acting deacon in the local parish and subsidised by the French state, may be much less 'structurally individualised' – and therefore feel less need to find strictly personal markers of his identity – than a British expat working in his corporation's division in Prague. Secondly, social position may enhance or limit access to cultural resources allowing for cultural reflexivity. It is much easier to engage in personal 'identity politics' in bigger cities, especially when earning enough to buy and consume whatever commodities the city has to offer. Finally, cultural reflexivity, as an open-ended way of using cultural objects, often involves some proficiency in combining forms and meanings, and this in turn necessitates a basic level of cultural capital, which also depends on and contributes to our social position (Bourdieu 1986).

This does not mean that cultural reflexivity is a 'privilege' that only the most well-off can experience. Cultural resources available via popular media are rich enough, and access to these media is easy enough to provide almost everyone with the possibility of choosing. Also, we must not let ourselves think that cultural reflexivity involves only the 'luxury' level of individual practice, aestheticisation of the self and 'pure' identity politics, with no mundane life pressures getting in the way. If this were the case, then the

'reflexivity losers' evoked by Lash (1994: 130) would indeed have more urgent things to attend to than the 'reflexive construction of the self'. However, culturally reflexive practice may also concern basic issues of everyday life, such as raising children and constructing relationships. For example, Polish parents using web forums to compare their ways of parenting with those of other parents are not exclusively upper or upper middle class (Tomanek 2010: 196-198). Parenting models have become less obvious in general, and the feelings of uncertainty and being 'not a good enough parent' may concern people from all social strata.

Conclusion

Cultural reflexivity is not a genuinely new form of social practice – it has existed ever since people learned how to use cultural objects to relate to themselves and the external world. In the last several decades, however, it has spread among wide segments of the population and has transformed a variety of practices that were previously governed by traditional frameworks or rationalised worldviews and prescriptions. Therefore, to fully appreciate its distinctiveness, we have to discuss it against those two other forms of social practice, as I have attempted to do in this paper.[10] The main differences between them can be summarised in the form of a table:

Table 1. Three types of social practice and their distinctive features

	Traditional	Rationalised	Culturally Reflexive
Criterion of validity	Contextual appropriateness	Normative correctness	Personal authenticity
Mode of meaning	Implicit	Explicit	Implicit/Explicit
Attitude of acting subjects	Certitude	Certainty	Engagement

Cultural reflexivity is arguably the most open-ended form of social practice. It is certainly the only one which has its validity assessed on the basis of its authenticity – subjective congruence with the acting person's self. That

[10] Of course, these three types of using cultural objects are not exhaustive. For instance, drinking alcohol can be neither traditional (unless there are social circumstances in which some individuals are expected to drink), nor rationalized (unless somebody is aware of 'scientific proofs' that one glass of wine a day is healthy), nor reflexive (unless drinking is a lifestyle, and not an addiction or occasional form of recreational activity). Nevertheless, alcohol remains a cultural object, as it is produced and consumed to influence the state of mind of drinking individuals.

does not mean that in other forms of practice the selves are not involved, but the mode of their involvement is different. In traditional practice, the self is part of the context and cannot be transformed at will. In rationalised practice, the self becomes decontextualised – it is taken into account only insofar as it pertains to impersonal characteristics of human agents, the ones that they share with other people, such as sex/gender, health condition, occupational role, or rationality itself. In reflexive practice, the self is neither strictly contextual, nor impersonal – it is instead shaped to a greater extent by the subject and mediated by cultural objects of his or her choosing. Hence, it is less predetermined than in traditional and rationalised practice, and more open to changes, even if most people retain the basic feeling of continuity of their selves over time (Giddens 1991: 53-55).

Openness is also the feature of reflexive practice where *mode of meaning* is concerned. In traditional practice, meanings are but implicit, and an attempt at their explicit formulation indicates that the practice in question is already heading towards rationalisation. In rationalised practice, explicitness is a rule, or – to be more precise – *the* rule: no cultural object can enter the realm of the rationalised unless its meaning is discursively articulated and related to the meanings of other objects. In reflexive practice, the meaning can be explicit as well as implicit; the change in one's practice may originate from *reflection* and appropriation of conceptual knowledge, but also from sensual stimuli and discoveries which are not processed at the level of discursive consciousness, and yet 'mean' something to human subjects (for example, they evoke particular feelings, emotions or memories).

These two dimensions of social practice translate into the third – the attitude of acting subjects towards the cultural objects they use. In traditional practice, people undertake their actions with *certitude* – the conviction that the self and the cultural object simply belong to each other, with no need to give explicit reasons for this. In rationalised practice, the relationship between the self and the cultural object needs to be thoroughly explained and justified, and thus people act with *certainty* that they know *why* they use this particular cultural object instead of any other. Finally, in reflexive practice subjects assume the attitude of *engagement* in cultural objects – they invest themselves and voluntarily (although not always self-consciously) choose to establish and sustain the relationship between them and the object. When this engagement is lacking, the relationship cannot survive, as it is not embedded in the immediate context or in an impersonal frame of reference. As a result, reflexive practice may be contingent and changeable, but on the other hand, it leaves more space for individual agency than any other form of human action.

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Articles and Studies

KRZYSZTOF ŚWIREK

Boundaries of Reflexivity
Freud's account of the subject's autonomy

This article deals with various forms of boundaries of reflexivity, as established in the three classic works by Sigmund Freud. These limits are related to the theory of the subject and its history, to the origins of symbol and prohibition, narrativised by Freud in the myth of the 'primal horde', and with distrust in conventional reflexive practices. It shows that Freud's project does not aim to show the impossibility of insight and reflection, but rather that standard forms of reflexivity are illusory, because they do not take into account the structure of the subject. It is argued that psychoanalysis offers its own, emancipatory form of reflexivity, submitted to theoretical rigour.
Keywords: Reflexivity, psychoanalysis, modernity, culture, subject.

Psychoanalysis, as a theory of subjectivity and a therapeutic practice, is an example of a typically modern, ambiguous position toward reflexivity. Typically, because modernity itself can be seen as founded on a double basis, meaning the belief in human autonomy and the possibility of critical insight, and – simultaneously – on undermining this very belief, by showing the social embedment of thinking and the frailty of individual reasoning. Both beliefs are inseparable, they imply each other, but tend to form a spectrum of positions. In every one of these positions the two options (belief and its refusal) are joined, but in unequal proportions.

The works of Freud not only draw heavily on this ambiguity, but seem to be organised around it, since what is at stake in them is the proper understanding of reflexivity. Or, putting it more precisely, defining boundaries, conditions of possibility and proper techniques of reflexivity. In this short essay I shall trace this ambiguous position inscribed in Freud's theory, showing both reservations about the possibility of performing conscious insight that can transform the situation of the subject, and the emancipatory project that regards reflexivity as its condition and aim.

I will focus my interpretation on three classic works by Freud: *Totem and Taboo* (published in 1912-1913, further referred to as TT), *Civilization*

and its Discontents (1930, CD) and *The Future of an Illusion* (1927, FI). All three of them clearly present how Freud's psychoanalysis links subjective and institutional order; moreover, two of them (TT, CD) relate the theory of subjectivity to 'mythological' content (the myth of the 'primal horde' and the problem of parricide), and two of them (CD, FI) contain an emancipatory vision of the transformation of culture. These three features, in my opinion, make them worth re-reading in every discussion regarding modern positions on the problem of reflexivity. In general, I will follow Freud's works, relating them to secondary literature (mainly on the Lacanian variant of psychoanalysis) only in cases when it adds important insights to Freud's original ideas.

1. Subject-formation according to Freud

One of the most important aspects of psychoanalysis is undermining one's feeling of autonomy and self-determination. As Freud famously puts it in *Civilization and its Discontents*, the 'I' is a 'façade' for the "unconscious mental entity which we designate as the id" (CD: 66). A façade, then, covers up that which is repressed, and plays an important role in the relations with the external world, but the whole construction of the subject is based on something else. The 'I' perceives itself as the centre of an autonomous action, but that which it chooses to be 'its own' (opinion action and so on) is defined, at the same time retaining its hidden status, by rules from a different order.

The first form of the 'I' is the ego that cannot demarcate between itself and an external reality (CD: 66-67). Then the child observes that some sources of pleasure are not constantly available to it: in this way the first form of the reality principle shapes itself. The child is left bereft of some sources of pleasure, and there are unavoidable sources of pain which the child cannot control. In the course of time, this denial of pleasure and imposition of pain becomes instituted in the life of the subject. Therefore, the foundations of the second ego, which perceives itself as differentiated from reality and autonomous in its actions, are 'frustration', 'prohibition' and 'privation' (see FI: 10).

Subjectivity, then, is rooted in the sensations of pleasure and pain and the affects attached to them. The formation of the ego (and the object) is satiated with feelings of loss and fragility, when the subject is denied some portions of pleasure and subjected to the pain of privation. There is yet another crucial institution participating in this process, namely, the prohibition. It occurs as a threat, no matter if the parent (or any other important

figure) puts it explicitly, or just alludes to it. Prohibition institutes the lack of certain pleasures as a rule, enforcing it with the possibility of pain invoked by punishment. That is how certain renounced wishes become the source of constant frustration, and come to be excluded from conscious motivations. Of course, the denied wishes for various forms of gratification, which are forced by the prohibition to become withdrawn, live on in the subject, and remain a source of misery for the ego.

At the same time, feelings of enmity to the source of the prohibition (the father, or its stand-in in the process of subject formation), are the basis for the institution of super-ego. The latter has its own dynamics, constantly fed by the severity of prohibition and by aggressive impulses, that arose from it and became channelled towards the ego as the nearest object of possible punishment (see: CD: 129; see also on super ego as 'mental advance in human history', see also FI: 11; further on the relation between drive, desire and guilt: see Fink 1999: 534-535).

Thus, what Freud proposes in his theory is the genealogy of the ego, and shows that the feeling of autonomy and self-determination is the effect of a construction, which takes place in time (has its beginning), and in which various forces – affects, wishes, drives, and external influences – take part in its formation. Moreover, this process of formation does not end in a definite manner, because its various stages and moments live on in the subject: for instance, the unconscious wishes play a great role in the subject's thoughts and actions, even if they cannot be present in the consciousness of the agent in an undeformed state. An even better example is the super-ego, in which different aspects of the prohibition are constantly present (for instance, the form of prohibition, feelings toward it and its source, etc.).

What we should add here is the peculiarity of psychic formations that Freud tackles in *Civilisation and its Discontents*: "the general problem of preservation in the sphere of the mind" (CD: 69). The shortest definition is provided by Freud himself: "in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish" (CD: 69). Old formations of libido are constantly present, even if the subject cannot be conscious of it. This problem is one of the fundamental ones for psychoanalysis, as it shows not only the impact of the subject's past on him or her, but also that the elements of this past are always present as a possibility for present action of the psychic apparatus.

The importance of the problem of preservation can be understood more thoroughly if we relate it to some examples. One of them comes from the passages in the *Totem and Taboo* where Freud argues that the 'indestructibility' of the 'unconscious processes' can result in some impulses literally travelling through time: from the remote period, when they were proper wishes,

to a time in the present, when they are experienced in "manifestations" that "seem strange" (TT: 71). For instance the wish of another person's death, although relegated from consciousness of the subject and repugnant if manifested in imagination, can become present in the subject as "obsessive self-reproaches" (TT: 60) after the death of this person. That is why in mourning we often find the feeling of 'self-reproach': the feeling that one is responsible for somebody's death is a manifestation of a wish that is no longer present in the consciousness, but still present in the unconscious processes.

Another example of preservation can be found in the way in which Freud interprets religion in *The Future of an Illusion*. The crucial point of Freud's argument is that religion, as a form of reaction towards man's helplessness, is a continuation of the situation found in the "helplessness of a child", who perceives the father as a defence against the hostile world (FI: 23-24). The figure of God in religion is a prolongation of the role played by the father in the psychic economy of the child. This is how the father figure, imagined as the beloved donor of care and feared source of punishment, is constantly present in the life of a religious individual. And we can add that not only in him, as history provides us with various examples of such 'god-figures', socially constructed as the answer to the feeling of helplessness.

If psychoanalysis famously states that the ego is not a "master in its own house" (Freud XVI: 285), then preservation is one of the ways in which it is realised: by the constant presence of history of the subject in its functioning. Those formations from the past are often not remembered, but may be opened up under certain circumstances. In this way, the problems posed for our reflexivity will often find their solution by way of a short-cut, which omits the process of conscious elaboration with an answer that is already prepared and comes from our history (but may appear as an effect of reflexive insight).

In this way much of the options that seem to be opened to us are never really considered. It may seem that what is offered here is a banal conclusion, that habits and automatisms have great power over our reflection, but I would rather argue that the true meaning of Freud's theory leads us to the opposite: in the light of it, we are invited to perceive even trivial habits of thought or actions as complex formations that must lead us to certain forms of gratification, often constituting unapparent choices.

This brings to mind the formula of fetishism, reconstructed by Octave Mannoni: "I know well, but all the same..." (see Mannoni 2003), the formula, that Mannoni sees as operating in every superstition and various forms of widely spread (and "irrational" or unmotivated) folk beliefs. In this formula, as Mannoni analyses it, the first part of the phrase gives voice to our best

knowledge, while the second one (but all the same...) represents the uncanny feeling that the irrational belief is somehow valid (Mannoni 2003: 70, 77-78). The problem lies not in getting to know that 'superstitions are false', because fixations on those long repudiated beliefs circumvent rational reasoning.

Thus there are traces of past sensations (of pleasure and pain), affects or identifications present in our reflection in every possible moment of it. The subject does not have to take them into conscious account for them to operate. Moreover, they are present even in the construction of instances of psychic life, in formations of ego and superego – active monuments of the subject's history. It is obvious that this history does not form simply an option, a path that we can take in the reflexive process: it is rather a frame for it, sometimes an invisible obstacle, that prevents us from trespassing into unknown territory, sometimes – the hidden agent that guides us right to some recurring point of destination.

2. *Parricide* – violence at the heart of symbolisation

Various aspects of subjectivity, as seen by Freud, can be further dramatised by narration, which Freud uses as an explanation for the question of origins of the totem and taboo: of symbolisation and prohibition as the two institutions that constitute culture. This narration is known as the myth of the primal horde – a specific "modern myth" (see Lacan 1992: 176) that places dissolution of the Oedipal complex as a foundation of the first social pact.

The main motives of this narrative are well known. The 'primal horde' is the simplest form of sociality, based on familial ties, that are not yet organised by social but natural rules: the 'primal father' reigns absolutely, knowing no restriction to his will. Sons, who envy him his power and pleasures, are thrown out of the group – not in the name of some law but thanks to the physical advantage of the strongest male. One day, they have their revenge, when they kill the father; but this does not lead to them pursuing their wishes further: they renounce the horde's women to stop further killing (TT: 141-143, see also CD: 131, FI: 42).

It was maintained that the myth of the primal horde contained the same vicious circle that characterises all theories of social contract: the contract – understood as the zero-point of sociality – in fact presupposes some kind of social order: for instance, an ability to "hold to one's promises" (see Roazen 1999: 154), or a mutual understanding of the necessity for certain collective actions (see also: Dybel 1991: 17). The contract placed by Freud at the origins of culture would be an effect of the reasoning on the part of the sons, who make a pact of transition to a non-violent social order.

But Freud's account of the myth does not necessarily lead to such circularity, especially when we try to see the 'first pact' of culture as an exception, just in the way Freud wants us to see the relation between the primal father and his sons. The first pact is not the same as those ones that are made after it, because it produces the symbol, not the other way round. The origins of the pact between brothers, who refrain from further killing (and from incest) could be located not in some kind of previous understanding, but in a double trauma: of the father's excessive and unrestrained pleasure (possession of all of the women, brutally imposing his dominance over the sons) and of violence against him (which is some sort of crime of passion on the part of the sons). That is why Freud writes of 'exceptional killing' that stops further actions (FI: 42)

Those two forms of traumatic encounter with the paternal other are of course parallel to the two wishes (of incest and murder) that are repressed by the father – a living obstacle. Then, the killing of the father is an expression of those wishes, but is not a path towards realising them; rather it is a road to their transformation into taboos – which comes by way of elevating the paternal presence into symbolic form (of the totem). As Freud observes, the content of the two taboos are of course in accordance with the "crimes of Oedipus" (TT: 132), so the source of anguish connected with the taboos lies in the renounced sexual and aggressive impulses.

The origin of the primordial symbol – the totem, which is a stand-in for the killed father – has its roots not in some forms of reasoning, but in the pure shock of the other's (father's) pleasure and consecutive murder. The symbol as a re-enactment of relation to the father develops not out of some kind of cohesive set of attitudes to him, but around the trauma of the encounter with the father, an encounter that was too destructive to maintain. Its violent final has, after a while, a paradoxical effect: it unravels love toward the killed. This brings the feeling of remorse, which evolves into sense of guilt, the kernel of super-ego formation (CD:132-133). Another element of the symbol, then, is guilt, which takes the form of a forever-unresolved debt on the part of the sons. That is why, as Freud observes, the father is even more powerful after his death – in the symbolic form of totem his presence is made permanent, and internalised (TT: 143). This is why, for psychoanalysis, as one commentator observes, the father is "essentially the dead father" (Regnault 1995: 67) – the father is crucial as a bearer of symbolic prohibition, and as such he functions, to some extent, as always-already-dead (as presence of symbolic norm).

Freud insists that we should read his reconstruction as an account of actual origins of culture. That is why it is important for him to describe the

killing of the father as an actual event: as a singular occurrence, which is the setting point of human history (see FI: 42). This origin develops 'out of nothing', out of a state of zero-symbolisation, of the sheer immanence of an unmediated bundle of love and fear affects, from frustration of the wishes caused by paternal violence, and from the shock of the murderous act.

What is important in it for the problem of reflexivity is the way in which Freud tries to think of the culture and symbolisation in terms of its starting point, in terms of something that is different than the symbol. If, in such a case, symbols have an origin, there is something in them that is their own internal boundary: the affects of love and hate, the trauma of 'the deed', which was, according to Goethe's words cited by Freud, "in the beginning" (TT: 161).

Using the mythical narrative from *Totem and Taboo*, we can think of 'the deed' as the obverse of the symbolisation. Similarly, the 'primordial symbol' (totem) places itself in the place of renounced wishes (of incest and murder), and is therefore the same as repression. But where there is repression, there must of course be the repressed: so although the murderous deed of the brothers was singular, the wish continues, immortalised by the prohibition, symbolised after the death of the father, and so – by the same token – elevated to the form of universal law.

Jacques Lacan will draw here a parallel between this construction and the formulas of Saint Paul, locating the origin of sin in the Law (Lacan 1992: 177), seeing prohibition as the basis of the subject's desire. Freud developed the same idea when he compared the workings of the taboo and of prohibitions in obsessional neurosis. He observed that "the prohibited desire in the unconscious shifts from one thing to another" (TT: 35) through the mechanism of "displacement" (TT: 70), and that prohibition and the desire to violate it are strictly correlated (see TT: 34). That is why the symbolic formulas of prohibitions are closely tied to desire, to the repressed. As Freud put it, "where there is a prohibition, there must be an underlying desire" (TT: 70).

Psychoanalysis could be seen as a technique of interpreting material, which develops as an effect of various unconscious symbolisations: conversions of deeds and wishes into a peculiar symbol – in the form of somatic symptoms, slips of the tongue, dream wishes and so on (see, for instance, the lecture on symptom-formation in Freud XVI: 358-377). Here we encounter again the same boundary, as with the history of the subject: the presence of something other at the heart of reflexive processes. This boundary is, as should be stressed, internal: because a symptom is a symbol and a form of "substitutive satisfaction" (CD: 108) at the same time.

It is a special kind of boundary though – an enabling one, I would say, because it ensures that reflexivity does not get caught within a bad circular-

ity or infinite regression, in which one meaning always sends us to another. When Freud opts for a real (and not phantasmatic) character of the parricide, he sends us to the sources of symbolisation, some kind of an assumed first repression. The traces of this repression can be found in various 'symptoms' of culture that reveal domination of a violent, non-symbolic character at the heart of civilizing institutions. As is the case in relation to the father figure, which still bears the traces of the ambiguous affects toward the brutal, repressive 'primal father', the father outside any (cultural) law (on primal father as an exception, the only man outside of the law of castration, see also Reinhard 2005: 44, 53).

Of course, Freud warns his reader about drawing too far-reaching conclusions from the analogy between the development of the individual and the development of culture, nevertheless he proposes some ways of analysing symbolic material (such as ethical formulas) in terms of its implications for culture and individuals alike (see CD: 141-144). And if psychoanalysis treats normality as a question of measure rather than a different quality, then, at least to some extent, all people share the quality of the psychic life of neurotics: as Freud writes, in their world only "neurotic currency" has value (TT: 86): only that which is charged with libidinal impulses is of any importance.

What is important here, though, is that one should not think about this 'other side of symbolisation' in terms of a relation of a reflexive medium to some positive content outside it: for instance, 'natural' instincts at work under the layers of social conventions. What Freudian myth deals with is rather the incompleteness of language, as a medium of reflexivity; it is pointing at something that does not have its proper place (on the "structural necessity" of such an element see Shepherdson 2008: 26). In the case of parricide, Freud tries to show that taboo points at a deed that was 'at the beginning', but that is nevertheless impossible to locate inside history, although (and because) it is its founding point.

The relation between the totem and parricide is perhaps the most evident example of certain aspects of the symbolic medium of reflexivity. But we can find many other examples of similar relations between symbol and 'the deed' throughout Freud's works. One of them is fetish, which could be described as a form of 'sexual totem'. In this case, the libidinally charged object, chosen by the fetishist, is sending us not to some 'deed' of the subject but to a specific traumatic encounter in his past (on this mechanism see the short, classic essay *Fetishism*, Freud XXI: 152-158). What is similar in fetish and totem is the peculiar situation of the zero point of symbolisation: totem and fetish are both stand-ins for something else (totem is a substitute of the

father, fetish – of female genitalia), but the operation of substitution is initiated by something that is not only not symbolical, but which in fact resists symbolisation, is beyond description through symbolic means – two traumas: killing of the father in the case of totem, and the child's discovery of sexual difference in the case of fetish.

According to psychoanalytical theory, the symbolic medium of reflexivity is not neutral and transparent, but shows traces of something different that cannot be properly put in symbolic formulas. There is no proper account of traumatic events. Those events shape the subject's reflexivity rather than take part in reflexive formulations. The status of those traces is not self-evident, they are problematic from the start and that is why they could be seen as another form of boundary of reflexive practices.

3. Freud's emancipatory project

Psychoanalysis is a powerful tool of reflexivity, and the extent to which it influences the way people think of themselves is probably impossible to measure. Its importance lies of course not only in the therapeutic effect in the treatment of cases of psychical disorders (such as various forms of neurosis), but also in more general promises of the effects it can have on self-understanding. In other words, Freud's project left the confines of medical expertise, and the works cited in this essay are among those in which this broader vocation of psychoanalysis is expressed in its boldest form. The promise of understanding is an emancipatory project offered to everyone, the project of widening the scope of autonomy, of freeing oneself from the grasp of illusions, of elucidating the sources of cultural pressure.

In *The Future of an Illusion*, a text predominantly concerned with the ongoing role of religious beliefs, Freud speaks of the necessity of leaving one's childlike wishful thinking in the process of the "education to reality" (FI: 49). We find here another version of the enlightenment programme, a continuation of gradual steps, that put men further and further from the imagined centrality of man's existence in the universe. Freud, as is well known, saw himself here as an heir of tradition that spans from Copernicus through Darwin, striking another blow to man's narcissism (Freud XVI: 284-285).

The core of Freud's programme seems to be growing in acceptance: of one's fragility and the contingency of life's occurrences, of the necessity for repression, of the inevitability of one's fate (see FI: 36, 49). A reader of Nietzsche will note similar overtones in the work of Freud, as both authors stress acceptance of one's fate as an important element of autonomy. But at the same time, Freud's project does not exhaust itself in a plea for 'mature'

adaptation to one's fate. For instance, he stresses that man's reason is feeble, but it does not have to be so forever (FI: 47).

Freud insists on this realistic position, but his awareness of the suffering of man in culture seems to differentiate him from the variety of conservative praises of renunciation and submission to cultural authority. For instance, Freud calls the taboo of incest "the most drastic mutilation which man's erotic life has in all time experienced" (CD: 104), and that's just one example of the phrases that must have had made psychoanalysis seem to Freud's contemporaries a rather provocative advocate for the repressed. The conservative reading of psychoanalysis would not take into account the fascinating tension between the acceptance of man's situation in culture, and the bold vision of overcoming some of its problems that reveals itself to the reader of Freud.

For instance, repression is treated by Freud as inevitable, but at the same time the author of *Totem and Taboo* does not adopt an all-or-nothing position: in fact, the whole psychoanalytic endeavour aims at making repression more bearable, which would be impossible without some modification as regards the position of the subject towards it. Freud also sees culture in a dynamic way: not evolutionist (Freud explains that the vision of civilisation as a process of 'perfecting' is a prejudice, CD: 96), but nevertheless as a process of change in man's dispositions, in which development can be brought by forms of protest against the taming of freedom (see CD: 96).

If someone contents himself with an oversimplified reading of Freud's work, the effect can become paradoxical. One of the examples could be Franco Berardi's treatment of psychoanalysis in his suggestive sketch on development of emancipatory thought in the West, *The Soul at Work*. The author subscribes to Freud's opinion that alienation (renunciation) is inevitable (see Berardi 2009: 173-175), and advocates a critique of this paradigm as leading to an impasse. But when he diagnoses the major malaise of a subject in contemporary culture as 'obsessional refrains' (various forms of automatisms imposed by culture on the subject) (Berardi 2009: 130-131), and proposes a therapy in the form of freeing the subject's energy and opening it to different directions (Berardi 2008: 138), he in fact roughly, although in a more careless fashion, reiterates the opinion of Freud from *Civilization and its Discontents*, that fixations of the libido are an obstacle to the development of human culture (see CD: 108). These fixations are of course dealt with in psychoanalytic therapy.

One of the lessons of Freud's theoretical project is the necessity of understanding that the subject's autonomy is possible only via renunciation and prohibition: to paraphrase a classic author, only 'animals and gods' could

live without the law. But at the same time, Freud's project is devoted to broadening the space of this autonomy and freedom. It is clear especially in works that deal with the problems of culture.

In the case of neurotics it could be argued that therapy is just enabling them to pursue a 'normal life' in accordance with the norms of culture – for instance, freeing the subject from anguish that makes social interaction impossible or extremely difficult. The case is clearly different with works like those cited in this essay: in them the question is not of adaptation to the norms of culture, but these very norms are seen as a source of conflict, often putting the subject under almost unbearable pressure. In this way the norms themselves, the 'normality' as perceived by the common sense of people living in accordance with these norms, can be seen as split and internally conflicted. Freud restrains his idea of delineating the 'neurosis of culture' by formulating it as a question only, but at the same time his theory gives a conceptual framework for developing this possibility further.

In this problem of incongruence of cultural norms we see clearly how psychoanalysis mirrors the emancipatory ambitions of modernity as such – it does not oppose change and culture, but shows how change is inherent to culture, how it comes as a solution to inconsistencies that are inherent to traditional norms. But at the same time, Freud shows us that projects of change in people's dispositions would be impossible if one were not to consider theoretically the structure and mechanisms of law and prohibitions working at the heart of subjectivity. Without attention paid to the necessity of repression, there can be no proper theory of emancipation.

Psychoanalytic theory, in this way or another, constantly stresses the problem of the relation of the subject to its surroundings, to that which is external to his powers, so psychoanalytic theory cannot be reduced to a plea for maximising one's potential: Freud clearly stresses that one's most intimate problems always involve relations with human and non-human powers outside the subject. Consequently he is also showing that this exterior is present inside the subject, as I was trying to stress in the first part of this essay. Also because of that, with the question of the possibility of change we encounter one of the most complex problems associated with psychoanalytical theory to this day.

Psychoanalysis nevertheless offers not only an understanding of one's situation, but also a change of this situation thanks to analytical practice, in the centre of which is a peculiar form of reflexivity. However, this reflexivity differs greatly from our daily life practice of thinking about our choices and ourselves. Freud states this openly in one of his *Papers on Technique*:

"mental activities such as thinking something over or concentrating the attention solve none of the riddles of a neurosis; that can only be done by

patiently obeying the psycho-analytic rule, which enjoins the exclusion of all criticism of the unconscious or of its derivatives" (Freud XII: 119)

Standard reflexive operations are not sufficient because they remain trapped in the fundamental illusion, described above: an illusion of ego as an autonomous and rational agent. Psychoanalysis, as we recall, puts the broadened theory of subject – a subject in which several forces operate – in place of this illusion. The ego is just one of them, and it would never be in the place of uncontested domination.

Psychoanalysis offers reflexive intervention based on specific methods, methods that would give voice to that which remains present in the subject, but of which the 'I' is not aware. As is widely known, in this process special attention is given to specific formations, such as dreams, slips of the tongue, or symptoms. The material supplied by those formations is used to illuminate structures of the subject, but only according to very specific and limited sets of interpretative rules. Methods of analysis and the rules of its practice are, accordingly, another enabling boundary of reflexivity: they exclude the standard practices of individual reflexivity – for instance, "thinking something over and concentrating" on some problem, as Freud puts it in a passage cited above – as insufficient, and they treat some contents of psychic processes as irrelevant, to ensure the enforcement of their own theoretically grounded model of reflexivity. The clearest example of specific reflexive practice used in psychoanalysis is of course the method of free associations: the analysand is expected to bring into analysis everything that comes to mind. The analytic is not interested in the analysand's rationalisations, but specifically in the material that is not controlled by conscious insight.

What is important to me in the context of this essay is not the question of the therapeutic efficacy of this or that method, but the modern idea of rejection of well-established and traditional practices, of judging them as insufficient or even misleading. For instance, "thinking something over" by way of distancing oneself to the problem and judging it in terms of intellectual scrutiny is highly valued as a reflective practice in almost all moral thought – inspired religiously or philosophically. And in the place of this well-established practice, psychoanalysis offers its specific and new technique, far from everyday experience and based on the complex and controversial theory of the human psyche.

Someone keen on using the psychoanalytical theory to gain some insight would have to sacrifice much of that which he (and most of cultural tradition) perceives as most valuable: a previous image of oneself, the fantasy of one's own uniqueness, but also the broad frames that he used to interpret his psychic life. In place of this, analysis offers a method that guarantees that

one will gain knowledge of oneself that otherwise was impossible to acquire (and nothing more).

This is yet another trace of the ambiguity that makes psychoanalysis a great example of the modern attitude towards reflexivity. It states the importance of insight in a task of overcoming impasses and pressures that subjects have to deal with in their lives. On the other hand, it renders much of the standard reflexive practices as of little value. Reflexivity here is, at the same time, something necessary and something under suspicion, a way of possible emancipation and an illusory practice. That is why it was crucial for Freud to distinguish between common-sense reflexivity (that exhausts itself mainly in conscious 'thinking something over'), and that illuminated by theoretical insight, which is why he insisted on strict rules of interpretation as the only way to gain proper insight into the workings of the psyche.

4. Conclusions

Psychoanalysis reveals a series of boundaries of reflexivity: those related to the process of subject formation, of its structure and history, those related to the boundaries of symbolisation as such, to insufficiency and the paradoxical character of repression, and lastly to the illusory character of standard reflexive practices. Nevertheless, revealing those boundaries would be impossible without the emancipatory, enlightening project that uses specific methods of reflexivity as its vehicle, offered to the subject as a method of insight.

Another point that should be stressed here is that the situation of 'post-traditional' society, in which we are invited to reflect on our practices and life choices, is not equal to the situation of individual freedom: our reflexivity would nevertheless always be guided by an historically grounded, more or less stable order of individual paths of recurring fixations that are not transparent to the conscious self. According to psychoanalysis, many of the outcomes of our standard reflexive practices are predetermined by forces that are present in the subject, but remain opaque for his consciousness. It is, of course, a source of great tension for the self, which is ordered to make conscious choices and enjoy its freedom, but remains caught in an illusory form of autonomy.

The answer to this situation is not the return of traditional authority (which is impossible, and currently can only be reconstructed in the form of various fundamentalisms), but 'even more Enlightenment' – a radicalisation of reflexivity by submitting it to a series of strict theoretical rules. What is offered as an outcome, or as an ideal to which the process of insight amounts? It seems that in the works cited above the closest to it is a vision of man

devoid of religious illusions: someone who has enough strength to bear the renunciation of illusory wish-fulfilments and accept his own helplessness in the face of reality (FI: 49). The process of abandoning illusions would never be completed, but Freud presents it as work that is worth conducting even in the face of uncertain outcomes (see FI: 47-48). Of course, almost ninety years after the first publication of Freud's work on the future of religion, we can assume that the main source of illusion is no longer a vision of paternal providence, but rather the vision of a fully autonomous individual who can invent him/herself again and again from scratch.

As Slavoj Žižek argues, we should not interpret the Unconscious as a "prereflexive substance" that "resists reflexive mediation", but rather as a part of a different kind of reflexivity "at the core of the Freudian subject" (Žižek 2000: 345). I have attempted to follow a similar path in this essay, by showing, firstly, that there is no zero-point of reflexive consciousness, but that our reflexive processes are always already shaped by our history and formations operating in our psyche. Secondly, by showing that there is no clear medium of reflexive insight, because that which enables it (symbol and prohibition) is necessarily tied to something else – that which is renounced and repressed. But as I have tried to stress, those boundaries of reflexivity are treated in psychoanalysis as enabling ones, because acknowledging them is already a part of a different reflexive process, that of a psychoanalytic method, offered as a tool of performing a specific and transforming insight into our past and present engagements.

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Articles and Studies

WOJCIECH POŁEĆ

Shamanism and Cultural Reflexivity

In the paper, the author proposes a reflection on contemporary Buryat shamanism in the framework of cultural reflexivity. The text is based on fieldwork in the Republic of Buryatia and the Baikal region (from 2000, 2010, 2013 and 2014). The author argues that the Buryat shaman can be seen as a 'cultural expert' building a system of cultural reflexivity by drawing from cultural heritage and accommodating it to the new, changed cultural, social and political circumstances. The author examines the hypothesis of the 'adaptiveness' of shamanism to the changing social conditions.
Keywords: Buryat shamanism, cultural reflexivity, Buryat ethnic traditions, religion and ethnic identity, Siberia.

Introduction

When you travel across Siberia, you are certain to encounter places called 'oboo', 'burkhan' or 'barisana'. If you travel with local people, no matter their nationality, they stop there for a while and probably bring some food, drink, a cigarette maybe or even a bottle of vodka. If it is the first time you see this kind of place, it brings to mind a picnic, and the place looks for you like a wild rubbish dump for bottles and other things clattering around. The last thought in your mind is that it is a sacred place, a kind of sanctuary of the local spirits, gods, and that the garbage is a sign of the worship of these spirits. Any person passing this kind of place is required to leave a gift for its host spirit, to celebrate it through a ritual sprinkling of alcohol or other drink, preferably milk. Habits connected with these places are very diverse, but are usually scrupulously observed. If you really are in a hurry, just throw a coin or cigarette through the open car window. If you have time, stop the car and make a greater sacrifice.

One of the reasons for observing this custom is the belief that neglecting the host spirit will bring misfortune to the passenger, that the host spirit will seek revenge, which could lead the offender to a car accident or some other misfortune. You hear plenty of stories of that kind. The magical nature of this type of belief means that they are respected not only by the Buryats or

representatives of other indigenous peoples of Siberia, but also by local Russians. These customs are also often respected by foreign visitors. Quite another matter here is to accept the fact that you are dealing with a living form of shamanism, even if you see no shaman.

Nevertheless, shamanism seems to be a self-explanatory notion. Everybody understands who the shaman is, and what he is supposed to do. I am not using the notion of shamanism we know from classic anthropological works here, but emic Buryat categories of shamanism – according to which shamanism is a kind of ethnic religion, or at least ethnic beliefs. From this point of view, we can speak here about shamanistic religion. Often the term shamanism is simply used as a synonym of the Siberian, 'root', ethnic religion. In that sense, a shaman is not only a medicine-man, but also, and perhaps even primarily, a priest who prays to the gods. That definition of shamanism covers not only the activities of the shaman, but also the whole traditional religious system of the Buryats.

Nowadays, we can speak about a kind of renaissance of shamanism among Buryats and other Siberian ethnic groups. For some scholars this process is a return to ethnic traditions following the years of communism, for others it is a typical example of an 'invented tradition'. In this paper, I propose to interpret the phenomenon in the light of the theory of reflexive modernisation (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003), which allows a third, more equilibrated way of understanding the process. One of the key notions in this theory is that of cultural reflexivity. If we define cultural reflexivity as awareness of the fact of having culture and its contents, and the manipulation of cultural elements to achieve different benefits (including constructing ethnic, national identity), then we can assume that this manipulation entails change in the culture, which in turn affects other participants of this culture. Some questions emerge in this context. 1) What is the social role of shamanism in contemporary society? 2) How is shamanism possible in a 'hot' society? Is it the same thing now and in the past? Is it 'true', 'authentic' or maybe only an 'exotic' attraction for tourists? The two questions above focus on shamanism, and ask how it 'fits' modern society. If we assume that modern society is changing, we can pose another question: 3) How is the re-appearance of shamanism answering the problems and changes taking place in modern society?

There are two main arguments for the analysis of Siberian shamanism in connection with the theory of reflexive modernisation, which focuses on the changes in modern societies. The first is 'globalisation'. Even if the first modern society is 'Eurocentric', the second is cosmopolitan – and reflexive modernisation is *volens nolens* a global theory, a theory that has to embrace

the consequences of modernisation not only for Europe and 'the West', but also for the rest of the globe. An important point in which the Siberian shamans and European sociologists have common or at least similar opinions is the question of 'nature' or the ecological threats resulting from human activities. To some extent they even give an impression of playing the same role, that of Cassandra. The difference lies in how the Siberian shamans have always emphasised what European sociologists have only recently begun to notice (Giddens, 1990). The idea of the human being as a part of 'nature', but "not in the meaning of Western philosophy" (Хагдаев, 1998) as the shamans emphasise, and the human responsibility of the dangers, of the 'side effects' of human agency or 'reflexivity' in Urlich Beck's vocabulary was always crucial in Buryat shamanism, even if it was expressed by the conception of gods and host spirits of the natural localities. The shamans do not forget to stress this (Гомбоев, 2010). The ethics of self-restraint, of a balance between the past and future, is a key concept here. The Buryat shamans explicitly raise the issue of global (including ecological) problems and say that shamanism has the appropriate answers. The rituals connected with 'oboo' are one of the examples of the respect for 'nature', for the environment, even if their form may look bizarre to us.

The second argument is specific to Siberian shamanism. There is of course some hesitation regarding whether Russia belongs to Western civilization (see for instance Huntington 2007), but if we admit that the West is present in the Siberian East, within the framework of Russian culture, state and power, then we should also consider admitting that the 'shamanistic' cultures of Siberia are in the modern day a part of our 'Western', meaning global, society. The main line of change examined by the theory of reflexive modernisation is the transformation from a 'stable system of coordinates' connected with the nation-state and its institutions to boundless uncertainty, in which the fundamental distinctions and criteria no longer apply. According to Beck, Bonss and Lau the key clear distinctions identified with modern societies were the distinctions "between society and nature; between established knowledge and mere belief; and between the members of society and outsiders" (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003, p. 2). Without these distinctions, modern institutions have problems making decisions, planning the future. They act in the space of uncertainty, and this 'uncertainty' is an unfamiliar, even hostile environment for modern institutions.

What is interesting is that suspension of these oppositions is crucial for shamanistic thinking. At the most superficial level it is understandable only by the fact that shamanism is a pre-modern conception, but a holistic view of the world is a key idea in shamanistic ideology. Shamans perceive the

main problems of the modern world as resulting from the separation of nature and culture, and the only solution for the modern man is, according to them, a return to the traditional, holistic understanding of the world. Modern shamans actively present themselves as experts who have solutions to the problems and ills of the modern world. But there are also some more specific reasons why shamanism may fit better to the 'late modern' than to the 'simple modern' times. The shamans are sometimes called the 'masters of chaos', their vocation is a reduction, a mastering of the 'uncertainty' (Hell, 1999). Perhaps this is why shamanism and 'shamanism-like' philosophies are so vivid in late modernity.

Shamanism in contemporary society: a sketch of the sociology of shamanism

In the foreword of his famous book *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, first published in French in 1951, Mircea Elide (1964) drafts a program of research into shamanism for different disciplines of social science. Among others, he writes about the sociology as follows: "The sociologist, for his part, is concerned with the social function of the shaman, the priest, the magician. He will study prestige originating from magical powers, its role in the structure of society, the relations between religious and political leaders and so on. A sociological analysis of the myths of the First Shaman will elicit revealing indications concerning the exceptional position of the earliest shamans in certain archaic societies. The sociology of shamanism remains to be written, and it will be among the most important chapters in general sociology of religion" (Eliade, 1964). Today, sixty years later, the program of that kind of sociology of shamanism seems to be still unaccomplished. Of course, we can see plenty of books on shamanism in different parts of the world, both analytic and empirical, in which those subjects are partly analysed, but we still lack an overall view of shamanism from a sociological perspective.

One of the reasons here is, perhaps, the conviction that the problems in the understanding of shamanism are more the problems of social anthropology and not problems of sociology as such. Shamanism is seen as a topic of sociological interest only as a part of social anthropology understood as a branch of sociology. Such a conviction emerges from the assumption saying that shamanism is a phenomenon observed in 'anthropological' rather than 'sociological' societies; it is, in the words of Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss & Charbonnier, 1969), a phenomenon of 'cold' rather than 'hot' societies. Yet in the 'division of labour' between disciplines, the former are the domain of anthropology.

The second reason is perhaps the program of the sociology of shamanism that Eliade proposes. This kind of program is very restricted, and does not fit the core of sociological interest either in the past or today. If we look closer at Eliade's program for the sociology of shamanism, we see that it focuses on the person of the shaman, his social role, prestige and power. These problems are a part of anthropological and historical interest in shamanism, and some interesting works on the topic are to be found in literature (Siikala & Hoppál, 1998; Hamayon, 1990). What is lacking, in my opinion, is a broader sociological insight into shamanism. The majority of researchers focus on the shamans, their performances, habits, and sometimes their biographies. From that point of view shamanism seems to be only the 'world of shamans', regardless of the social context of their work. Only shamans' 'patients' are a point of interest in some works, although they treat shamanism as a kind of system of 'natural medicine'. Shamanistic societies, the believers of the shamanistic faith, and the ideology and ethics of shamanism are absent or at least underestimated in the majority of works, even good ones, based on fieldwork. Of course, when we see in the shaman a magician, a sorcerer or a 'medicine man', it is quite obvious and understandable that the focus is on him, but when we try to see in the shaman a priest (*nota bene* Eliade also admits this) the shortage of believers in this kind of (quoting Eliade) sociology of religion may be surprising, even if we agree with the opinion that shamanism is a fact of 'past' or 'anthropological' societies only.

All in all, we do not have to follow that point of view, and there are some good reasons for not doing so. For instance the French scholar Roberte Hamayon proposes to see shamanism not from the point of view of 'society', but from the point of view of 'culture', meaning that shamanism is more connected with specific 'mental' and symbolic phenomena, and not with institutions and social organisation (Hamayon, 1990, p. 22). From this point of view, shamanism can 'survive' change in the economy, meaning change in the form of society, e.g. from hunter-gatherers to a pastoral, even sedentary society. The assumption that shamanism should be connected only with archaic societies emerges from the definitions of a shaman, stressing the most 'exotic' features of the shaman's role; these are the trance (ecstasy), the medicinal activities, and the prophet-like characteristic of the shaman as a trickster, or (in a more positive light) as a one-man religion maker (Znamenski, 2003).

If we see in the shaman the first, generalised, 'non-specialised' specialist, then the diversification of society and the diversification of specialists within it will cause the disappearance of shamans or rather sorcerers, who were

the first surgeons, scientists, metallurgists and so on (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). If we see in shamanism mostly the magic, then we presuppose that it will vanish in rational, modern society. However, if we notice that shamanism is an ethnic religion or at least a characteristic part of Siberian ethnic religion (as some researchers want), then we see no convincing reason why it should disappear with change in the economic structure of a given society. Quite another question is if and how ethnic religion may evolve over time and with the changes in a given society, including external influences.

Another reason for the sociology of shamanism is the fact that nowadays shamanism is becoming not only a point of interest in sociology, but also a phenomenon within the societies that we usually call 'sociological' societies. The most visible sign of change here is the rise and development of 'neoshamanistic' or 'neopagan' movements in 'Western Civilisation'. We can find some splendid works dealing with 'Western' shamanism that also discuss the connections, similitudes and breaks with traditional shamanism (Boekhoven, 2011; Wallis, 2003; Znamenski, 2007).

Nevertheless, the 'neoshamanistic' movements in the West are not the only way in which shamanism is crossing the borders of complex, differentiated societies. There is also another process: the traditional societies we usually connect with shamanism, such as the societies of Siberia's aborigines (among whom are the Buryats), are changing and becoming (a part of) 'hot', contemporary societies (Belyaeva 2009, Głowacka-Grajper, Nowicka, Połeć 2013).

I do not want to return here to the big discussion about what shamanism exactly is, what its proper definitions are, or where we can encounter shamans (Hutton, 2007; von Stuckrad, 2005; Siikala & Hoppál, 1998; Znamenski, 2007). Instead I shall focus here on the example of the contemporary Buryat shamanism that I know from my fieldwork, and examine it in the light of the theory of reflexive modernisation.

Methodological note

The paper is based on material from fieldwork conducted with Ewa Nowicka, Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper (in the years 2000, 2010, 2013, and 2014), which covered the majority of the Buryat territories in the Russian Federation, that is the Republic of Buryatia and the two autonomous (till 2008) Buryat regions of Ust-Orda and Aginsk, as well as the neighbouring territories of the Irkutsk and Chita oblasts in the Baikal region. At this point I must emphasise that in the framework of our fieldwork, shamanism was only one of many aspects of the 'revival' of Buryat culture, and I could not devote my attention exclusively to shamanism. However, it is important

to notice that when conducting all the interviews we tried to ask about and probe the issues of shamanism in greater depth, even where the subject did not appear spontaneously.

What seems to be the most important from the point of view of further analysis is that we gathered two kinds of data: observations and interviews with shamans themselves, and interviews with followers of shamanism as well as with people not considering themselves shamanists, but having opinions on the matter.

While in the part of our research with shamans themselves our material is not exceptional in comparison to other studies of shamanism, the attempt to balance the ratio between emphasis on the shamans themselves and on the people coming into contact with them is a relatively rare approach in such studies.

As a part of a 'hot society', shamans use the opportunity to write themselves. In my analysis I use not only scholarly works dealing with the issues of contemporary Buryat shamanism, but also books written by contemporary shamans as well as newspapers and internet articles on shamanism, including interviews with shamans.

Re-programming society

The collapse of the communist regime in the USSR and the collapse of the USSR itself made new conditions for the peoples living in the countries established in the aftermath. This is the case not only of the peoples of the 'new countries', but also the small peoples of the contemporary Russian Federation (Humphrey, 2002). The collapse of the USSR was also the collapse of the communist ideology, which united all nations of the USSR with the Russian nation (and language) as an 'Older Brother', the dominant culture for the smaller nations (Humphrey, 1998).

One could view this collapse as a catastrophe or a new chance, an opportunity or a danger, as a new opening or a time of darkness, anomy and anarchy. We can use many metaphors for describing this social process, and every single metaphor will fit certain aspects of the situation, but also the different actors involved in the changes. Needless to say, the picture will be different from Moscow's point of view and as seen from the 'glubinka' – a remote village somewhere in Russia – but in addition the same actor may see the situation using different metaphors depending on the circumstances, depending on the situation. So what constitutes the common denominator of these metaphors? It is the end of the 'great narrative', or of the program of modernisation.

It is obvious that the case of the USSR and its ideology was an exceptional one from the point of view of the strength of the 'program'. The 'will' of the creation of a 'coherent whole' was exceptional, as were the measures used for it. The effects of this program cannot disappear in a moment. In the case of post-communist Russia we can intentionally misread, cited by Victor Turner, Harold Rosenberg arguing that "the culture of any society at any moment is more like the debris, or 'fall-out' of past ideological systems, than it is itself a system, a coherent whole" (Turner V. W., 1975, p. 14). No matter whether this is always true, it is true for the small peoples of post-USSR countries. That 'past ideological system' is firstly the communist ideology dominating in the USSR, but also, in many cases, the ethnic culture of 'minority groups' that was devastated in a planned way by the former ideology. For those groups, also true is what Turner says as an implication of Rosenberg's reasoning: "human social groups tend to find their openness to the future in the variety of their metaphors for what may be the good life and in the contest of their paradigms. If there is order, it is seldom preordained (though transiently bayonets may underpin some political schema); it is achieved – the result of conflicting or concurring wills and intelligences, each relying on some convincing paradigm" (idem). Discussing the problem of the detraditionalisation, Anthony Giddens gives a very similar image of 'little traditions', which may be portrayed as a 'living museum' or 'relics' (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994, p. 102). Even if the traditions of the ethnic groups do not have to be 'reinvented', they do have to be discursively articulated and defended on their own terms; in other words, the traditions have to become 'reflexive'. However, in the case of the peoples of Siberia we have to deal with a situation of disembedding, and the search for new metaphors may only be made by some type of expert system. One such system is Shamanism, which suggests interpretation of the contemporary world within the framework of traditional concepts, while at the same time modernising these concepts in such a way that they fit contemporary challenges and problems.

Although there is no room here to discuss the entirety of literature on the dissolution of the USSR, we should be aware of the possibilities of different points of view. From a European perspective, the 'collapse' was the end of a 'kingdom of darkness', the end of an unwanted and unjust system, but for many people in Russia and other counties it was a surprise at the very least, if not a genuine tragedy. For the small peoples in Russia, especially in Siberia, it was a new chance from an 'objectivistic' point of view, but the powerful nostalgia for the former system (if we do not want to see it simply as irrational) emerged from the breach of the universalistic, maybe utopian,

but egalitarian ideology with no changes in the social condition of dependence and power. Instead of the ideology of a better tomorrow in a society of equal brothers, the dominant (Russian) culture proposed the better tomorrow of the capitalistic society, which – until the day before – had been the greatest enemy. There was no longer a place for a 'simple Soviet people'. Beyond the faded red flag there was a place for the 'new Russian', but was there a place for others? With the end of the Soviet Union, I would argue, the program of 'simple modernisation' also came to an end. Of course, Soviet modernisation was not the same as in the West, but it was still modernisation and had the same goals, but not always by the same means or with only 'not the same' ideology. Now without the bayonets, every group of the former USSR has to make decisions about 'the colour of the flag' for the unpredictable future.

Re-birth of shamanism and cultural reflexivity

The end of the modernistic ideology of the USSR was also the time of the re-birth of shamanism and other religious and ethnic traditions (Balzer, 2011). The common view of this matter is that the end of the USSR was simply the end of the suppression of religion, while religions began flourishing following the collapse of the communist system in a quite natural way. In other words, the end of the suppression of religion is a sufficient explanation of this process. However, the situation of the different faiths and traditions differs significantly. The Russian Orthodox church is not only the religion of the majority of the population, or to be more precise of the dominant group in the Russian Federation, but also obtains substantial support from the state. Other religions are the religions of the minorities.

The Buryats have two traditional religions: the eastern Buryats are Buddhists, while western Buryats are Shamanists. We very frequently encountered such assertions during our research. These categories are treated by Buryats as a basic characterisation of their ethnicity, and they are not in the slightest way regarded as controversial. However, the situation of shamanism is more complex because not everyone considers shamanism a religion. Nevertheless, among western Buryats in particular, we are observing a 'revival' of shamanism at least where declarations of identity are concerned. The majority of western Buryats claim to be shamanist, and even if they do not practise shamanism, they do claim to be shamanists 'by roots'. Shamanism is a 'titular' religion for them, so the return to shamanism as a return to the 'ethnic' religion may be considered 'natural' rather than reflexive in a situation where atheism is no longer *in vogue*, but where there is a need for

some declaration of religious identity. However, we can observe this 'revival' of shamanism not only among the 'shamanistic', western Buryats, but also among the 'Buddhists', the eastern Buryats. As I shall show below, in some sense the centre of the revival of shamanism is Ulan Ude, the capital of the Republic of Buryatia, but also a 'Buddhist' city (Jastrzębski, 2014).

As we can see, the situation of shamanism and its 'revival' and growth in the milieu where shamanism is in some respect privileged (among western Buryats), – facing only weak competition from Buddhism, the Russian Orthodox Church, and other Christian denominations – is different to its situation in the milieu (among eastern Buryats) where the majority of the population is Buddhist and shamanism has only a marginal or auxiliary role. Religion is becoming an important determinant of identity among the Buryats, and the issue of 'typically Buryat' religion is becoming part of the cultural reflexivity. The controversy, which appears here, is that of whether it is possible to determine (to introduce) one religion that would consolidate all the Buryats. In the context of our research conducted among the western Buryats, one may conclude that the dominant point of view, functioning almost as a cliché – a typical way of presenting the situation – is to determine the existence of two traditional religions as presented above, namely Buddhism, as traditional for eastern Buryats, and shamanism for western Buryats. Likewise, the role of religion is so visible that the shamans spoke openly about the fact that the rebirth of shamanism is intended not only as a religious, but also an ethnic revival.

The researchers of contemporary Siberian shamanism give supplementary arguments for explaining the revival of shamanism following the change in the ideological but also the economic system. These arguments were recently gathered by Manduhai Buyandelgeriyn in a very interesting article for *American Ethnologist*, in which she presents her fieldwork with Buryats from "the other side of the border", that is, from Mongolia. In this approach, the return to ethnic traditions, to beliefs or even to magic is connected to "the feelings of uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety that result from the dangerous volatility, disorder, and opaqueness of the market" (Buyandelgeriyn, 2007, p. 127). In the 'post-socialist' countries, this uncertainty and insecurity is linked mostly to the new, incomprehensible and unpredictable market economy plus the demolition of the social security system formerly provided by the USSR. Putting it briefly, contemporary shamanism is dealing with the problems of the 'risk society'. In this approach, a shaman can be seen as a 'master of chaos', and shamanism as an 'abstract system' helping one deal with the insecurity. This seductive vision of shamanism brings us close to the conceptions of Anthony Giddens (1991) and Ulrich Beck (1992). Shaman-

ism seems to be a system helping in cases of uncertainty or risk, and the only difference is that this system is 'traditional' rather than modern. A closer look at the ideology and ethics of shamanism exposes some interesting similitudes with the reflexivity of modernity. From this point of view, the shaman, just like the contemporary expert, has knowledge inaccessible to the layman. People turn to the shaman as to an expert, who has to explain the cause of an illness or other misfortune. He also has to propose a method of preventing misfortune in the future. The difference lies in the fact that the shaman has also to help himself by acting on spirits, and not only by giving advice as a 'modern expert'. The similarity lies in turn in the fact that in both cases the key category is trust in the expert, and the knowledge they represent. Of course, the knowledge of which we speak is of a different kind every time. For a layman, however, the most important feature of knowledge is its effectiveness (Giddens, 1990).

Incidentally, in Giddens' conception there is room for a return to a traditional, religious or esoteric system in 'late modernity'. The entire reasoning given by Giddens, especially in the chapter 'The contours of High Modernity' of his *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (1991), but also in *Reflexive Modernization* (1990), is based on the opposition of pre-modern cultures and 'modern standards'. The image of the 'pre-modern' in the above comparison is of course inevitably simplistic, but the return of shamanism, in the reasoning of Buyandelgeriyn and others, may be seen as a return of 'superstition', of 'magic', in the face of the weakness of modernity. Or, in a less normative way, when the promise of modernity seems to be betrayed, the only way is to use the old 'folkways'. On the 'market' of expert systems, the peoples of Siberia have the imported, Western ones, but they also have local ones that – for a long time – have been neglected. When the imported ones turn out unsuccessful, they have to turn back to local knowledge, which at least offers holistic and understandable answers to existential questions. The Buryats are beginning to turn consciously to their cultural traditions with the idea that their own culture may be a better solution than the foreign models previously adopted. Their culture is turning out to be reflexively adopted and accepted.

Do we now understand why Buyandelgeriyn writes: "In Mongolia, among ethnic Buryats, previously suppressed shamanic practices have proliferated, at least in part as a means of dealing with the anxieties and uncertainties brought about by the collapse of socialism and the incipient market economy" (Buyandelgeriyn, 2007, p. 127)? The same reasoning may be used for explaining the popularity of shamanistic practices understood as 'natural medicine'. Nothing easier than showing that the popularity of shamanism is

a function of the weakness of 'Western' medicine in both dimensions, as the weakness of the local conditions of medical care such as hospitals and the competences of the doctors, but also as the weakness of medicine as such in the shape of incurable illnesses, such as cancers. Unfortunately for the aesthetical dimension of the reasoning, we have to stop here.

In the above picture, shamanism is indistinguishable from magic, superstition or natural medicine. Of course, one needs trust in the actions of shamans, and the trust relation is a kind of 'faith', as Giddens says, but we misapprehend at least Buryat shamanism when we treat it as a magic. We do not have the right key for understanding it. The Buryat shamans themselves deny this type of explanation. They emphasise that they are not a substitute for traditional medicine. They require that patients first seek medical advice, and only if doctors are unable to help should they come to them (Хагдаев, 1998). The shamans, in their own eyes, are more priests or at least psychotherapists, and not doctors or medicine men. A good question here is why the illness, why chaos and misfortune, happens? Buyandelgeriyn answers this question by saying that "The Buryats attribute their current misfortunes to their origin spirits (*ug garval*), who have returned to seek revenge against their descendants for abandoning them during the time of the socialist state's suppression of religion" (Buyandelgeriyn, 2007, p. 127). So, the help that shamanism is giving is religious. It is not a magical technique, but the answer to the spirits' requests for worship, gifts or simple memory. Misfortune happens when the spirits are angry, and the shaman helps to appease their anger firstly by delivering the knowledge about which spirit is angry, and then by carrying out the appropriate rituals.

But Buyandelgeriyn's article is interesting also from another point of view. Her point is the reverse of the argument that shamanism is helping with anxieties. She argues that maybe the shamans help with the problems their customers approach them with, but they create new, this time metaphysical problems. Her reasoning is very close to what Bauman writes of expertise: "The expertise enters the life-word of the individual already at an early stage when diffuse and vague personal unease – uncertainty, ambivalence of experience – is articulated in the *interpersonal* language of *individual* problems demanding the application of *supra-individual* (i.e. 'objective' – authoritatively endorsed) solutions. In defiance of this ostensible logic, however, the availability of solutions more often than not precedes the articulation. Indeed, life experience is seen as ambivalent only if life without ambiguity is offered as a feasible option; personal discomfort is interpreted as a set of unresolved *problems* in as far as socially approved solutions are available and on offer" (Bauman 2013 p. 209). In Giddens' vocabulary, we may put

the problem as follows: shamanism tends to be compulsory. It may turn out to be an addiction. The first visit to the shaman's house starts the sequence of other visits. The mechanism Buyandelgeriyn shows is typical of addictions. The angry spirit was the cause of the misfortune, the shaman helps with the spirit, but the problem remains, and one has to go back to the shaman in the quest for help. What are the possible causes of the inefficiency of the shaman's work? They are plenty of possibilities: there are other forgotten spirits, or the shaman may be too weak, or even a fraud. The only solution is another, stronger shaman. The paradox that Buyandelgeriyn shows consists in the fact that the more sceptical the customer, the more he supports the shamanistic system by cross-checking between different shamans or between written documents and the facts that the spirits are talking about. A very similar situation, but in the context of 'western medicine', is described by Giddens in *Modernity and Self-Identity* (1991; 139), when he recounts a person with a back problem and the difficulties in diagnosing the problem: "Investigating a little more deeply, the patient would discover that a variety of other modes of back therapy, held by their proponents to cover ruptured discs as well as many other transitory and more chronic back conditions, are available". Reading this passage from Giddens, we see as less surprising that back problems constitute one of the specialties of the shamans. Giddens (but also Beck) in many places highlights the problems of estimating the reliability of experts and expertise. The same problems arise in the case of shamans.

Another paradox is that the less we know about shamanism (and our ancestors), the more anxious we are about the shaman's activities, the more problems we have with the distinction between the 'true' and 'false' shaman. Here we have the same kind of reasoning as in the case of the modern 'expert systems'. Late modernity may look strangely like the pre-modern order we know for instance from the works of Lévi-Strauss (2008), Evans-Prichard (1991) or Ruth Benedict (1973).

On the ground of my own fieldwork I would put the emphasis on other things, also implicitly expressed by Buyandelgeriyn. Two problems seem crucial for contemporary Siberian shamanism as consequences of the break in the tradition during the communist years; the shortage of shamans, and the lack of knowledge regarding this tradition. The interruption in the tradition is usually interpreted within the framework of 'clerical' or 'ecclesiastic' interpretation, meaning that the main problem is the discontinuity in the shamans' teaching, in their rituals, in their knowledge of the shamanistic pantheon, and in general in their religious knowledge. The period of transition was hard because 'supply did not match demand' for shamanistic practices and rituals. In the same framework, there was the problem of the 'proficien-

cy' of shamans, the level of their knowledge, their stages of initiation and their renown and reputation. Traditionally shamans were strictly connected with a given territory and, as perhaps even more important, with a given group, a tribe or an extended family. In the situation of the revival of shamanism after the collapse of the USSR, there were problems with 'imported' shamans, but also with shamans who helped 'strangers', members of other groups or tribes, but also 'foreigners' – meaning non-Buryats.

The initial state of the revival of shamanism was not the same for all the different groups and regions. Taking into account the communist ideology claiming that the last 'true', pre-revolutionary shamans (often called 'former shamans'), ceased their activity in the nineteen-thirties, many people were suspicious about the 'authenticity' of the contemporary shamans. One way of resolving this problem was the claim that 'somewhere else' the true shamans had survived. In Russia, the shamans often say that it was easier to preserve true shamanism (and survive the persecution) in Mongolia. Some Buryat shamans were initiated (consecrated) in Mongolia, and certain Buryat shamans help in the initiation of shamans from smaller groups. So in the transition period some 'import of shamans' was essential.

The second major problem is the destruction of the very notion of shamanism among 'ordinary people', among believers. Even if the 'ecclesiastic' knowledge survived clandestinely, after being passed down the generations during the communist times (Siikala & Hoppál, 1998), or at least has been reconstructed using written, ethnographical materials, there is a serious problem of legitimisation among those people who often watched a shamanistic ritual for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 'indigenous' people are often in the same situation as the Western 'stranger'; they lost their knowledge of the 'distinction' between true and fake shamans and, as a consequence, between true and false spirits.

Let us take the example of the 'oboo', the sacred places I mentioned at the beginning of this paper. In our fieldwork we came across several different interpretations not only of the meaning of such places, but also contradictory opinions about the garbage we usually see next to them. The common opinion is that one is forbidden to take any object from there, even something that is evidently trash, because it belongs to the host spirits of the given place. Others say this is a misinterpretation of the tradition, and that the garbage at these sacred places is a sign of the loss of tradition. The same phenomenon is visible in the discussions (even academic ones) about the distinction between 'white' and 'black' shamans. Many people simply say 'white' shamans are connected with 'white magic', while the 'black' shaman is (at least potentially) a harmful one, and so they use categories similar to

the categories of white and black magic. Some scholars, e.g. Znamenski (2003; 17), argue that the entire distinction between black and white shamans is a kind of 'invented tradition'. The 'import of shamans' entails other problems. The local shamanistic traditions of respective groups or tribes of Buryats always had certain specific features, while the inner differentiation of shamanism was always high, but the process of revival is bringing with it a diffusion of the different traditions. For example, a shaman instructed in Mongolia may use more 'Mongolian' than 'Buryat' rituals, incantations, even clothes characteristic of different groups and regions. The same problem is visible in the hesitation regarding the shamans' usage of the drum and the trance. For the Western imagination, the drum and trance make the shaman, and when not particularly knowledgeable of Buryat tradition we see a shaman without a drum or not going into a trance, we become suspicious. The other Buryats, on the other hand, become suspicious when they see the shaman with a drum or entering a trance in circumstances where, according to tradition, this should not take place.

With time, of course, the situation is changing. More than twenty years since the collapse of the USSR, we are seeing more and more shamans who are 'expert' in Buryat tradition, and they are propagating the knowledge about religious as well as the broader ethnic traditions of the Buryats. Comparing the situation for the western Buryats from the year 2000 and 2010, we can discern an increase in interest, but also growth in their knowledge of shamanism; this is also coupled with growing acceptance for shamanism among the Buryats. The traditions (e.g. festivities, public worship ceremonies) that seemed 'new' or 'artificial' at the turn of our century, are now once again 'weathered' in the manner so needed for any tradition.

The other side of the coin is, however, that the 'anxiety', the uncertainty about shamanism as a whole but also about the ancestors, whose good knowledge is needed for shamanistic practice, is pushing the Buryats to search their origins. Sometimes we can even speak about a feedback process. Shamanistic practice requires good knowledge of ancestry (at least seven generations back), and this is motivating the Buryats to remember or to search for their ancestors. If familial tradition is lacking, they often search in the archives, but when the archives are missing or there are gaps in the documentation, they ask a shaman to fill it by asking the spirits. This is of course a risky affair when you go about it in the wrong way, when you 'wake' the spirits. Once wakened, the spirits must be honoured perpetually, so in some conditions it is better not to annoy them.

Not only shamans, but also 'ordinary people' are starting to discuss the details of local traditions, and the search for one's ancestors is often the only

occasion for bringing back the memory of past persecutions and to attempt a reevaluation of the communist times and other difficult moments in the Buryats' history.

At a 'materialistic level', the interest in the 'spirits' is certainly awakening interest in the local, ethnic tradition (and in the case of the Buryats of Russia, also in the ethnic language indispensable for the communication with the ancestors' spirits, who naturally do not have to speak Russian).

Adaptiveness of shamanism and the modern world

Roberte Hamayon (1990), just like many other researchers, connects shamanism with hunter societies, but she emphasises that the connection is not historical (emerging from the assumption that both hunter societies and shamanism are archaic), but rather 'structural'. According to her, the life of the hunter is unpredictable in regard to the unpredictability of the appearance of the hunted animals, while shamanism is a mastery of this unpredictability, it is a kind of symbolic management of it (Hamayon, 1990, p. 26). From this point of view the essence of shamanism is the management of the unpredictability, and the implication of that reasoning is that with the changes in society, and change in the genre of the 'risks' of the unpredictability emerging from the changes in society, that shamanism will change, will 'evolve'. Let us note that the shamanism we know from most of the ethnographic literature is rather connected with treating diseases, with searching for the missing or guaranteeing luck, but not with hunting. This is why it is often identified with folk medicine or magic.

If we accept the reasoning saying that change in the form of risk does not change the way shamanism is dealing with any risk, we can derive two conclusions from it. The first is rather obvious, and says that shamanism – besides helping with problems occurring in all societies, such as health problems – also has the potential of adapting to different types of society, and will solve different specific problems characteristic of the shape and structure of a given society. It also means that shamanism is following the problems of society and, for example, in Soviet times the shaman would have 'helped' the young man leaving for the Red Army, whereas nowadays he would help a businessmen with a risky contract. This conclusion is present in many works (Hell, 1999). In the case of Siberian shamanism, two factors are at work simultaneously: the re-birth or re-appearance of shamanism in 'public' (Hoppal, 1996) thanks to the "opening of the religious scene" after the collapse of the USSR, and the changes in shamanism aiming to adapt to the new social, economic, but also political conditions. A 'side effect' of these

changes is questions about the 'authenticity' of shamanism and regarding its 'nature'. We should not forget that shamanism is primarily a religious system.

The second conclusion is that shamanism should 'grow' during insecure times and unpredictable societies, and, in the same way, will fade in stable, well-established societies. As we see nowadays, with the growth of unpredictability the growth of shamanism is quite predictable. The implication of this reasoning is that contemporary shamanism may be more an ephemeral phenomenon dealing with the new problems that Siberian societies encounter than an ethnic religion of the Siberian peoples, and that it will vanish or at least lose its momentum with the re-establishing of the social order. The dynamics of change in the Buryat shamanism seems to contradict assumptions of this type. One might ask here whether the increasing reflexivity is not always associated with an increased level of uncertainty; life always becomes more problematic when we think about it than when we take it for granted.

However, another point of view is possible. Maybe the Buryat shamanism we are talking about here is not at all traditional? The dynamics of change within it seems to indicate that it is becoming more and more a modern institution. One of the factors here is the growing institutionalisation of Buryat shamanism, not only in the western 'pure shamanistic' regions, but also in the 'traditionally Buddhist' milieu. The second one is the appearance of 'city shamans', first described by Caroline Humphrey in her paper *Shamans in the City* (1999), in which she describes the shamans working in the city of Ulan-Ude. For the traditional understanding of shamanism, the connection of the words 'shaman' and 'city' sounds like an oxymoron. For example, for the Polish scholar Veronika Belyaeva (2009) the opposition between 'city shaman' and 'rural shaman' is crucial in establishing the analytical line between 'traditional shamanism' and 'neoshamanism'. Any 'city shamanism' seems here to be suspect of 'unauthenticity'. The 'city shamans' also appear in another context. Valentin Chagdayev, a shaman of Olkhon Island on lake Baikal, writes in his book: "Undeniably, there are in shamanism, in the same way as in other belief systems, limitations and minuses, especially in the behaviour of some contemporary 'city' neoshamans, but I think that from them one should not draw conclusions of all shamans and of shamanism on the whole" (Хагдаев, 1998, p. 20). However, a more friendly look at city shamans may admit that the shamans only follow the Buryats as they change the places (and conditions) of their lives. But the changes in the phenomenon we call shamanism are going further still.

Nowadays, there are not only 'individual' shamans working in Ulan-Ude, but entire organisations (or 'centres') of shamans. According to the Buryat

scholars Irina Garri and Enche Tsydenow (Гарри & Цыденов, 2013) in the year 2012 there were seven shamanistic organisations and two shamans' religious groups in the Republic of Buryatia. The most active religious community is, according to the authors, the religious organisation 'Tengeri' in Ulan-Ude. The city's local newspapers have even published news regarding plans for the centralisation of these organisations (see also: Jastrzębski 2014). The organising of shamans and the establishing of formal, stationary centres is an another step in the changes in Buryat shamanism, which today needs organisations that can contact authorities at various levels, even on the occasion of organising public ceremonies. Ultimately such a body can attempt to expose impostors, 'false' shamans in a diverse society in which the only traditional social control ceases to be sufficient. The leader of one such organisation, a shaman, talks about its goals as follows: "We have created a Shamanic Community Council. I believe that in the future we will do a lot for our nation. For not getting lost in this big world, not forgetting our language, culture, religion and deities. [...] So we would not get lost in this big world. [...] The state authorities now take us seriously. We cannot be circumvented. They respect our opinion". The most interesting in the above statement seems to be its ethnic, national overtones. The chairman of the shamanists' association draws attention not so much to the religious aspects of shamanism as to the national, cultural and even political aspects. The association is not so much a religious community as a national community, while its purpose is primarily to protect the Buryat culture, to protect the interests of the Buryat population within the Russian Federation. Perhaps the religious aspect is treated as obvious, but what we can say with confidence is that shamanism plays an outstanding where Buryats' identity is concerned. This statement clearly reveals the role the shamans have as cultural leaders, and the role of shamanism as cultural reflexivity.

The creation of formal organisations of shamans is another step in the contemporary changes of shamanism, but we can expect further changes. A good example of changes that are hard to accept in the light of the traditional notion and the traditional (maybe stereotypical) understanding of shamanism is the design of the 'world's first' shamanic temple in Ulan-Ude. The temple is to be in the shape of a three-storey yurt, measuring 18 meters in diameter. The first level will be for administration, the second for prayers and rituals, while the highest level will be the place for thirteen statues of the gods (khats), 'the sons of heaven' from the shamanic pantheon.

According to the shaman head of the Tengeri organisation, the temple's construction is the answer to the changing times, no matter that the traditional equivalents of the temple in shamanism were always 'natural' places,

such as mountains, forests, rocks, or other elements of the landscape. From the 'outside' point of view, the construction of the temple is a clear example of the changes in Buryat shamanism, but in these changes we can see a sign of adaptation to the changing social conditions, hence the argument for the hypothesis of the adaptiveness of this shamanism.

In the quotation from Eliade from the beginning of this paper, we read: "the social function of the shaman, the priest, the magician". Perhaps the need for formal organisations and the temple is the need for showing that a shaman is more a priest, and not a magician. Buryats living in the city need a certain sacralisation of the city landscape, and as such they need a temple. From another point of view, building the temple is breaking with tradition. The natural 'temples', such as mountains or rocks, are a part of the shamanistic ideology in which shamanism is presented as the first, natural, and true faith and religion. From this point of view, the absence of an 'artificial temple' is a kind of choice, a decision within the framework of shamanism, while the temple's construction kills this reasoning. It is also a break with the 'ecological discourse' of shamanism. In that discourse, shamanism does not need a special temple because the whole of nature is its temple. The opposite argument here is that this no longer works in the city. Maybe only the city generates a need for the division of the *sacrum* and *profanum*, in order to protect the sacrum.

We should also pay attention here to the relations with other religions. They have temples, so shamanism also needs a temple for showing that it is a 'living religion' and not only a kind of magic or a traditional medicine.

The head of the Tengeri organisation also displays a political context. Shamanism is mentioned in the constitution of Buryatia as one of the traditional religions of the Republic. As such, the need for a temple is also a need for showing this fact in the public sphere of Ulan-Ude, the capital city of the Republic of Buryatia.

Shamanism is often presented as a religion without a church. Hamayon writes that shamanism has at the same time a religious character, but does not have the properties characteristic of other religions – such as the elaboration of doctrine, organisation within the church, a tendency to form alliances with the political power, and the tendency to propagate itself. The contemporary changes in Buryat shamanism are taking the direction shown above, characteristic of other religions. Contemporary Buryat shamanism (or at least part of it) is changing, becoming increasingly similar to other religions, and less and less similar to the western definitions (imagination) of shamanism.

Conclusions

As I have attempted to show, contemporary Buryat shamanism is becoming a genre of cultural reflexivity. The shamans stress the need of remembering the past, of knowing Buryat ethnic traditions and of 'connecting the past with the present', of using the cultural heritage in present life orientations. A similar statement is presented by Mihály Hoppál, who writes: "As a matter of fact, shamans have assumed new roles in the cultural integration of their peoples. With respect to the relationship between native religion and ethnic identity, the former plays an exceptionally important role in the preservation of the traditional system of values and beliefs, or, in the broader sense of the word, in the preservation of a culturally distinctive way of life" (Siikala & Hoppál, 1998, p. 128).

Shamanism is, without a shadow of doubt, a part of the cultural memory of the Buryats – responding to the existential questions that Anthony Giddens is writing about. As a part of cultural memory, shamanism is creating the Buryats' collective identity in the modernity of heterogeneous Russian society. The anger of the gods, of the spirits, is also an old and good way of social control, of exerting influence at a moral and ethical level. For instance the shamans stress the immorality and injuries caused by excessive drinking of alcohol, at the same time emphasising that the Buryats did not traditionally drink a lot, and that the drinking of vodka was allowed only for men over forty years old. At the same time, the case of the traditional Buryat pattern of drinking alcohol shows well how fluid the boundary is between what is shamanistic, and what is simply Buryat tradition.

Often, a good occasion for this regulatory role of shamanism is a visit to a shaman in the event of illness, although shamans also take an active part in the public life of the local community, and they are invited for festive and public ceremonies. Thus understood, shamanism has no apparent connection with any type of society. It fits traditional just as well as modern society; perhaps it even fits modern society better, with its anxieties and ambiguities – at least the shamans want us to believe this. If there is some ambiguity in what shamans say, this lies in the fact that we do not know exactly whether they are proposing their vision of the world only for Buryats, or for the whole of humanity. Depending on the occasion, they present shamanism as a religion grown from local environmental conditions, or as the primary religion of all of mankind. The re-appearance of shamanism may be seen as an answer to the need for formulaic truth. At the same time the shamanistic view of the world is far from fundamentalism, and upon a closer look seems to be very modern.

The common opinion is that modern Buryat shamanism is a kind of neoshamanism, since it is an 'invented tradition', while most (if not all) shamans are tricksters or impostors. I do not share such an opinion. As Giddens shows (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994), nothing is less traditional than tradition that is aware of the fact that it is a tradition. The shamans are not naïve, and they know that they are working in different conditions than their predecessors had. A simple return is not possible, while a reflexive one needs a re-thinking of the meaning of traditional knowledge and patterns. The most important thing for me in the hypothesis of the adaptiveness of shamanism is that it does not assume that shamanism is unchangeable, it assumes that the relation of shamanism to the social order is constant, meaning that the essence, the authenticity of shamanism lies not in the constant form of the rituals, cosmology or any beliefs, but in the constant relation to the world and the problems we encounter in our lives; as such it assumes that shamanism has to change in form when the conditions of life change, if it wants to keep the same (traditional) role (function) in society.

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Articles and Studies

DOROTA MROCZKOWSKA

Fitness Clubs and the Dynamics of Reflexivity of Leisure

The aim of this paper is to examine how fitness centres fall in line with the reflexive projects of the self and active policy of choice and lifestyle, and how people create, reflect and are influenced by the foundations of the late-modern order. Such a perspective makes the gym a processual, dynamic category involved in a number of individual and social processes.
At the research level the main goal was to observe how individuals negotiate fitness activities into their everyday life, what fitness means to them and why they exercise, and to explore the ambivalence on the basis of a complex interplay of tension and release.
Through empirical discussion I show that the reflective attitude is rarely a matter of choice, but rather a result of pressure or social-cultural obligations.
Keywords: fitness, reflexive project, paradoxes of reflexivity, leisure, freedom, discipline, power, commercialisation

'Fitness clubs', 'health clubs','studios' and 'gyms'are grounded in the preoccupation with the ills of sedentariness and the ensuing trends of preventive medicine. The arrival of aerobics in Europe, as one of the core components of active fitness, took place almost two decades after its American launch – in the early to mid-1980s. Since then, usage of the term 'fitness' in Europe has extended beyond describing the optimal state of bodily performance to include a set of ideas, practices and products geared towards attaining this state (see:Bingle 2005: 240).[1] Fitness centres are now a fast-developing leisure business with well-developed infrastructure, a fitness industry, and a global market featuring annual growth of above 10%.[2] The first Polish 'health clubs'

[1]On the history and distribution offitnessclubsseealso:http://www.fitnessonline.at/wissen/aerobic/geschichte/geschichte_1.htm

[2] From 2004 it has been a leading sector of leisure business. For example, in 2010 the fitness segment was 45% of total value of global leisure business, which is an annual increase of almost 3.5% between 2006 and 2010 (Datamonitor 2011). Other research covering the analysis of fitness business by International Health, Raquet and Sports Club Association (IHRSA, 2010) shows that in 2009 it was worth $70 thousand billion and it is the highest increase compared to other sectors in the leisure economy(internet newspaper: www.biznes.newseria.pl, obtained 2014.04.28; , obtained 2014.04.28).

opened in the 1980s, and at the beginning offered mostly aerobics performed to music; local gyms were then identified with workout, building up body mass (so-called muscle men), mass gainers and food supplements. It was not until the middle of the 1990s that fitness centres started to develop a broader and more modern range of services.[3]

The proliferation that began in the 1980s plus global access[4] make fitness one of the most popular areas of leisure, reflecting such features of late modernity as increasing privatisation and individualisation, commercialisation, instrumentalisation and pacification(Roberts 1999; Rojek 1995, 2010; Pantzar, Shove 2005). As such, involvement in a fitness club, both by producers and consumers, is not only a certain type of practice (e.g. exercising with a personal trainer or reading fitness magazines), but also, or perhaps mainly, a contribution to the production and reproduction of the fitness club in order to legitimise it as a significant social value. Any attempt at understanding keep-fit culture, that is, the meanings and functions associated with it, must therefore involve a wider context of transition from the reactive to a pro-active life policy, understood as a self-realisation policy, active or reflective shaping of the body, self and lifestyle (Giddens 2001: 296-298).

The unquestionable success of fitness centres may be explained by the fact that social imagination has become infected with the imperative of a professional look, a slim and sporty body, and the necessity to accomplish the broad project of self-improvement in the public sphere and to build physical capital in the private sphere. Modern selves no longer merely bear witness to the body-in-itself, but to the body-for-itself, the body-for-others, and what the body can do (Baudrillard 1998).Fitness clubs are also sites where Valentine writes (1999) that bodily boundaries are contested. Bodies are increasingly viewed as nomadic, and the negotiation of bodily space has therefore become an urgent existential pursuit:

> An individual may experience multi-faceted, overlapping, and fluid understandings of how they should be producing and regulating the space of their body which may not be completely congruent or consistent, and

[3] The value of the Polish market is today about 1.5 billion Polish zloty, and the forecast for the next three years shows that it will triple – the CityFit network of centres open 24 hours a day plans to join the market (internet newspaper: www.biznes.newseria.pl, obtained 2014.04.28; http://pieniadze.gazeta.pl, obtained 2014.04.28).

[4] The Eurobarometer of the European Commission shows that market saturation in Poland fluctuates around 2%, while the average European rate is 8%; 14% of Polish society does sport in facilities and clubs (with the Finns – 45%, Germans – 36%, the Czech – 26%) (http://forsal.pl, obtained 2014.04.28); about 14% of Americans buy season tickets in fitness clubs, in Britain and the Netherlands it is about 11%, in Poland in 2008 it was 0.5%, currently 1.5% of Poles regularly go to fitness clubs (http://pieniadze.gazeta.pl, obtained 2014.04.28)

> sets up tensions and conflict between different bodily ideals and sets of regulatory practices in different locations. (Valentine, 1999: 348)

Gwen Bingle (2005: 242) indicates in the discussion on the progressive rationalisation and instrumentalisation of gym usage that fitness has reinstated movement as a remedy against the stress of everyday life, thus transforming fitness into a fascinating arena for the negotiation of work and leisure practices. On the one hand, as he writes (ibid), the practice of fitness was clearly conceived of as the ideal leisure counterpoint to mind and body, while on the other corporations and health insurers were quick in the uptake of this trend. They realised that providing movement compensation to workers might bring a sizeable return on investments, due to it increasing bodily resilience and performance.

The paper aims to examine how fitness centres fall in line with the abovementioned reflexive projects of the self and active policy of choice and lifestyle and how they create, reflect and are influenced by the foundations of the late-modern order. Such a perspective makes the phenomenon under analysis a procesual, dynamic category involved in a number of individual and social processes. As such the understanding of the phenomenon is never complete, but is driven by the dynamics of social transformations, individual reflexivity, activity and readiness to act.

The main goal of the paper is to observe how individuals incorporate fitness activities into their everyday life, to ascertain what fitness means to them and why they exercise, and to explore the ambivalence based on a complex interplay of tension and release.

I quote extracts from individual in-depth interviews (N=40) that were part of a broader research project entitled *Perception, adaptation, resistance. Strategies of thinking and acting in planning leisure activities in Poland?* (N116 27464). The interviewees were men (6 persons) and women (12 persons) aged 30-35, inhabitants of Poznan who went to the biggest fitness centres in Poznan at least twice a week, and had been going there for at least a year. The interviewees were recruited from people I had earlier interviewed about leisure time. I suggested two more, one hour-long meetings (one at their home and another in the fitness club after their workout) focusing on the subject of their activities at the centre.

The respondents were asked the following questions:

What is fitness to you?

Why do you go to the gym?

What kind of experience/pleasure does a fitness club provide?

What does it feel like before/after a workout?

What goals do you want to achieve at a fitness club?

According to the phenomenological and interpretative approach in sociology, the aim of the interviews was to follow the informer's thoughts, deepen the conversation, ask second questions and discover new meanings. Due to formal limitation, this paper presents only a part of the material thus accumulated, and describes the main tendencies that came to light during the interviews.

Perception of a fitness club as a leisure experience

This section of the paper examines how the interviewees used the term fitness, how it related to their everyday life, what sorts of commitments and responsibilities it elicited, and the implications arising there from.

In spite of this performative shift and the widespread adoption of fitness, what exactly is meant by fitness is much less clear. As the evolutionary biologist Stearns (1976: 4) wrote, fitness is "something everyone understands but no one can define precisely". Some interviewees felt the same way; for them, fitness was difficult to clearly define, often identified with the personal experience, and subject to its variability and dynamics.

"Yeah. I think so, yeah. I think fitness is a very personal thing. I find it difficult to clearly define, every day is different: sometimes it is a pleasure, another time it is hard work, sometimes it is boredom, sometimes – socialising, and it just depends ... (F, 35, nurse).

For others, fitness implied *"the mobilisation of 'subconscious' forces so that the 'seed' could be 'planted in your head'"* (F, 34, personal adviser). This woman clearly indicated that *fitness is in your head, it's a mental phenomenon.* Another interviewee stated: *"When I go to the gym I carry out what I had in mind. I align my actions with what was on my mind"*(M, 35, pet-shop employee). Fitness seemed to be a task that she linked to the process of bridging intention and action.

One of the male interviewees said that there was something internal in relation to the activity, something worth salvaging or feeling good about. He explained that while sometimes he could "feel a little defeated" after a workout, the fact that he "went to the gym and did something" made him "feel good":

"I was disappointed initially that I couldn't do the run, but I wouldn't allow it to ruin the fact that I was happy I'd done a workout...I should be proud of myself that I've gone to the gym so I tend not to harp on about it or beat myself up that I haven't done the run" (M, 35, merchant)

The gym also reflects the inherent ambivalence of the reflexive projects of the self: *"I don't know, it's hard to say what it means to me to come here, I guess it is always something different: sometimes I'm here because a friend is coming, another day – because I've put on 2kg and I'm scared there'll be*

more; yet another day because I want to, I need to relieve all the stress" (M, 35, businessman). As previously pointed out, the gym is a category negotiated every day, one that varies depending on time and situation: *"I thought of myself in different categories when I weighed 10 kg more; I exercised more and in a different way, it was hard work then while now it is almost a daily ritual and a pleasure"* (F, 33, educator).

As the majority of the interviewees confirmed, taking advantage of the opportunities a fitness club has to offer is an increasingly popular form of leisure, relaxation, improvement of mental well-being, looks, physical fitness and health. For two of them, fitness is mainly a way of driving out thoughts about work:

"I stop thinking of the backlog of work and concentrate on the work of my muscles" (M, 35, pet-shop employee);

"I switch off completely, all I can hear is my pulse and my muscle" (M, 34, surgeon).

For another one in three, fitness relieves work-related tension and is an opportunity for calming down and regaining one's balance:

"I let off all tension from work, it goes away with my sweat" (F, 30 years old, marketer);

"Everyday we take on roles which do not suit us, but which let us make money; here is where I can release it" (F, 34, personal adviser);

"I switch off the phone and I am alone with my exercise schedule (...) first I go to the sauna, then the stepper, back to the sauna, shower. No holiday can help me relieve tension so well" (M, 35, manager);

"I regain balance, first of my body, then of my mind, then the whole of me, all through physical effort" (M, 32, teacher).

Most participants described fitness as a space within which they felt 'good', 'happy' and 'great'. One of the women (F, 33, instructor) was more explicit about the biological side of this feeling, explaining how *"these little endorphins flying around your body are quite nice"*. Similarly, another woman emphasised that *"going to the gym can set me up for the day in terms of energy and mood because of the release of serotonin"* (F, 30, economist). For a 33-year-old man *"the improvement in mood and endorphins running through you"* after a workout *"is a major motivating factor for going back [to the gym] the next day"*.

Therefore, the gym is also a site of relaxation, relief and improvement of both physical and mental well-being, as one of the respondents noted: *"I feel very good after the effort, and I feel so light, I have so much extra energy"*(F, 30, marketer). For others it provides pleasant tiredness combined with satisfaction and pleasure: *"I feel exhausted, but my mental state is much better"* (F, 30, English teacher). The majority of respondents indicated that the plea-

sure resulted from the feeling of having achieved something significant (specifically from completing an exercise):

"It's like a happy feeling, a feeling of accomplishment" (F, 33, broker);

"I feel great that I did it...I always feel great after a workout...I feel that I have achieved something important" (F, 33, instructor);

"It's at the end of the day when I'm in bed when I feel the best about what I did in the gym that evening, there's nothing better than the sleep I get after working out" (F, 30, economist).

Most interviewees saw sport as a visual and aesthetic category (which is discussed below), with a goal to improve looks, shape the body and lose weight, and with the benefit of being slim, sporty and attractive:

"I want to be fit because such a person seems clear to me" (F, 32, educator);

"I'm sculpting the body. It's now very important, good appearance is a success" (M, 35, self employed);

"I'm getting back into shape after having twins, there is always something to improve, lose and shape" (F, 34, young mother);

"This is where I want to become slim and attractive, I don't feel good with myself now, and I want to lose 5-7 kg" (F, 32, nurse).

These statements illustrate the conviction that social attractiveness, life satisfaction and success depend on how a person's looks, body or style meet the requirement of social adequacy rather than on that person's personality. According to this belief, a slender, slim and sporty person should be satisfied with life and predestined to success more than someone heavy, plump or overweight.[5]

To sum up, analysis of the fitness club from the perspective of its functions, which frequently remain outside the observer's perception, demonstrates that it is also a place that meets social and individual needs and allows users to express their lifestyle:

"I go to fitness clubs because most of my colleagues do. It's a bit how our work place is like, we often talks about our achievements and successes, exchange opinions and motivate one another. Those who don't go to the gym are often excluded from our conversation" (M, 30, economist);

"There are always people in a fitness club; there's always someone to talk to. We have similar goals, we work hard in the same place, and we often smile and observe one another. This is what I often need" (F, 33, instructor);

[5] According to the interviewees, people doing sport are modern andpredestined for personal and socialsuccess. They are also open and energetic but also systematic, disciplined and independent. Other associations included: youth, physical attractiveness, wealth and creativity. Passive peoplenot active in any sport are perceived negatively. They are deemed unsystematic, lazy, indecisive and impatient. They are also believed tobe scruffy; fat, and heavy, thus unattractive and described as careerists, workaholics, people living an unhealthy lifestyle.

"When I go to the gym I know at least that I work on myself. Maybe I'm even trendy? I don't know (ha-ha). I'm exercising 3-4 times a week at the moment, it's my favourite activity. My friends know that I lead a sporty lifestyle and are often envious that I've found my way of life" (F, 32, educator).

The variety of interests, forms and ways of experience make it difficult to provide one clear definition of a fitness club, or to list all of its Features. While the fitness club as such was designed to take care of the body by offering it a chance to renew, it is also a place where users are involved in a broader project of self-improvement, taking care of looks, and putting into effect tips from the world of fashion. These tendencies can be found in the accounts of fitness club users that I shall present below.

The dialectic of discipline and freedom

In their statements, the interviewees usually related fitness to the idea of freedom by referring to 'freedom from' (work, chores, and other people). A 33 year old instructor said: *"I don't have to do anything else, I concentrate on myself – I am free from anything else.* Similarly, a 30-year-old woman, an economist, asserted: *I am free from any unnecessary thoughts, I focus on the exercises and I get the rhythm".*

The idea of freedom was also expressed by referring to the process of freeing the body from toxins, fat and backache: *"my freedom is when I feel light,* a 30-year-old woman said" (F, 30, English teacher).

For some of the interviewees exercise had become a way of negotiating the area of personal freedom with themselves and others and the right to decide about their life and to express them (*freedom to*):

"My freedom is my strength and my power, it is when I can see the effects of my actions, when my body becomes what I want it to be-strong and clean; when I felt hat I have control over it" (F, 32, educator);

*"I exercise because I like it and it gives me pleasure. The pleasure comes from the control of the body, with sweat and fatigue" (F, 35, advertising).*The interviewee referred to an interesting aspect of fitness, which is a combination of discipline and pleasure. Pleasure is derived from discipline. Other interviewees also experienced this kind of pleasure: *"I feel satisfaction and pleasure only when I'm exhausted; it is only then that I'm proud of myself. This is incredible: great pain, great exhaustion and the equally great joy"* (M, 34, surgeon). Motivation is usually provided by a personal trainer who encourages the customers to work out and to whom the responsibility for their self-discipline is delegated.

Most exercisers, especially women, stated that they regained a feeling of control and negotiating their freedom in the context of taking control over

their own body; confirming its status as its personal value and making it an important element – and even a subject – of the fight for independence:

"I want my body to be pretty and slim; I want to take care of it. I know it's a great effort and I have to be systematic, but nothing in life is free" (F, 30, beautician);

"I've given birth to two children and my body does not look the same as it did. I will soon get back to work and I want to look good, I want to enjoy my body's vitality for a long time to come" (F, 34, young mother).

All the interviewees realised that today good looks are considered and are strongly connected with the image of a modern person. They also realised that the body not given to social examination, not prepared for it properly, is a private body that is excluded from the social play – it is a body to which nobody will pay attention, which nobody will appreciate or admire; a body that is prone to stigmatisation and exclusion. Therefore, a fitness centre is a place where the biological becomes social, given to corrective-controlling practices, and a shaped body becomes a manifestation of a certain lifestyle. The interviews revealed ambivalence with regard to body and looks, which are the arena of confrontation between the 'I' aspiring for full subjectivity and the over-regulative social system. Interestingly, there is no proof of clear social-cultural objection, nobody tries to argue this. Such reflexivity performs at least two essential functions. Firstly, it confirms the adequacy of choices: *"this is where the body is built and today good looks is half the battle, no doubt about it"* (F, 30, economist); *"you get down to work, you exercise, slim down, increase your attractiveness and those who appreciate it will probably notice it"* (F, 30, beautician), which helps continue the long process of self-work: *"you can't rebel against it, you just have to work on yourself; it might be shallow, but such are the expectations, such is life"* (F, 35, teacher). Secondly, it minimizes the everyday risk and maintains people's faith in numerous expert systems, from statistics to personal trainers: *"I believe that taking care of yourself– daily exercise – will make my life longer"* (W, 32, paediatrician); *"perhaps when I start thinking of how much money I spend on my exercise I will decide it doesn't make sense..., no, it's better not to think"* (M, 35, businessman).

It would seem that with fitness there is no excuse for anyone: *"I also go to the gym because I let myself go a little. When you work all day long you can limit your food, but I'm not sure this is a good idea so I guess it's better to go to the gym. Slim people need that, too. I think even slim people are fit for some reason"* (W, 30, marketer). This woman considers workout important for pragmatic reasons, performance of means rather than the fulfilment of ends. Another interviewee's narration could be defined as 'failed

experience', [6] which provides a useful counter to the argument that participation in fitness activities is evaluated on an instrumental basis.

"I exercise because I must, because I have a tendency to be overweight, a sedentary job, and cholesterol problems. If I don't take care of myself I'll have a heart attack in 10 years, my doctor said. It's not easy; I have never liked exercise" (M, 35, pet shop employee);

"Appearance is very important in my job. If you're attractive, you're important. I don't like fitness – I treat it as a duty. What gives me satisfaction is my appearance and probably the fact that I'm more self-confident at work" (M, 35, businessman).

As we can see, fitness is not spontaneous; there is a strong need to plan and control it. It can be a way to release stress, but certainly not a way to forget oneself. As one of the interviewees observed, *"everything has its goal and meaning: just like in a schedule that lists activities to be done in a certain order, and which is based on repetition and control"* (F, 30, beautician). Exercise must be well organised in order to bring results. Exceptions and unexpected changes are undesirable. Control is reinforced by expert knowledge/power in the fitness club, e.g. fitness coaching or personal trainer, whose aim is to help the exerciser to improve his or her performance through reflection of how a particular ability and/or knowledge are used. Control is exercised on several levels. Firstly, it is self-control, i.e. control of the body or eating habits. A member of a fitness club internalises the imposed discipline and exercise regime, and transforms it into auto-or self-discipline. Doing sport regularly helps to keep self-discipline in the effective use of spare time, daily time management, and in taking care of one's looks: *"I am better organised, my whole day is better managed"*(F,30, teacher*); "I have more energy and I work better"*(F,30, economist). A man who usually exercises after work observes: *"endorphins are produced during exercise and I have more energy for life in spite of being tired"* (M, 35, businessman). They slowly become supervisors of themselves and are aware of the potential and permanent supervision (Foucault 2003: 191-220). Exercise gives individuals the key to understanding themselves and their bodies with their limitations and possibilities. Each exercise lets one discover a new part of the body, particularly when it involves pain and effort, which – paradoxically – confirms that everything is going according to plan. More often than not, the process of making oneself more attractive transforms into a sequence of desperate steps taken to create a certain image:

[6] For van Alphen (1999: 25), the notion 'failed experience' designates those instances of trauma in which linguistic, reflexive, and conceptual mediation isresisted.

"2 years ago I had more time and I was going to a fitness club every day. I exercised a lot, I lost 12 pounds, and I felt addicted. My friends helped me. Now it's better, I exercise 2-3 times a week and I don't feel such a compulsion" (F, 35, English teacher). A person devoted to perfecting the body slowly loses control over this process or the ability to perceive the body adequately, as well as control over the quality and quantity of food eaten.[7] The power over oneself is manifested in self-discipline.

Secondly, control is an integral part of the expert-knowledge system. Contrary to self-discipline that involves individual ability to achieve goals independently, through one's own efforts, control comes from outside (institutional and expert) sources, or 'others' who offer various kinds of explanations and ways of dealing with the situation.[8]

The activity of an individual is reduced to the process of decision-making based on trust that certain sources and beliefs are right. Power thus understood is the power of persuasion. It belongs to those who can best explain, describe, and eliminate individual tensions and fears connected with results and the programme.[9] Influence on others is not direct or immediate, it is realised over time through slow assimilation and internalisation of tips: *"I know I have to trust my trainers and be ready for working with them long-term"* (M, 35, merchant).

The commercialisation of experience

The implication of these analyses is that the cultural imagery of leisure, recast through the lens of fitness practices, is constructed as a sphere in which freedom is increasingly being replaced by the obligation of self-work. Consumption plays a pivotal role in this process, since it is through the wares of the market place that the production of leisure selves is most often accomplished. Smith Maguire (2008:196) explains further:

> The prospect of shopping for a newly fit body is a means to reward discipline with pleasure... Reconciling the hedonism of consumer culture with the asceticism of exercising by linking them as cause and effect (work out now; shop later) serves as an engine for consumption, and perpetu-

[7] Examples of such behaviour include increasing rates ofeating disorders, such as anorexia, bulimia, and muscle dysmorphia (or more informally bigorexia).

[8] Contacts with experts are regular, making them more credible, and often involve closeness. Trainers represent expert systems, the individual indirectly trusts particular abstract systems and the guarantees that they give.

[9] A professional trainer should have the skill to train, from making exercise plans, through anatomy of the human body, to tactic knowledge, as well as skills combining psychology, sociology and interpersonal communication, which facilitate their influence on the trainees.

ates the double bind of indulgence and restraint characteristic of consumer culture.

Customers of sports centres are basically fashion-aware consumptionists. For some, consumption is almost entirely limited to investing in their looks and body:*"yes, it is a trend, but a good trend, because it lets you take care of yourself, and it's fashionable and costly, especially if you want to be professional; it suits me"* (F, 33, broker). Investing in new food fashions and new exercise options[10] is also important, which makes the fitness club environment particularly sensitive to new trends and consumption trends that they immediately follow. The exerciser is expected to be visible to others, therefore the fitness club environment is sensitive to looks and clothes: all new trends are quickly identified and adapted, and equally quickly devaluated when fashion changes or the product becomes old in the market.

Contrary to the quite common criticism of the consumerist attitude, the users of fitness clubs do not see it as wrong or ambivalent. Consumption ambitions are expressed openly, they are not perceived as wrong or unacceptable. Being consumption-oriented does not provoke a feeling of shame or require additional justification: *"I know, different people come here for different things, some want to be seen as having money, others really want to lose weight, but it is a place for all who can afford it"*(M, 35, merchant). Another person remarked: *"It is not cheap entertainment, but I can afford it. I chose fitness because it is more professional and it motivates me. I need to have a prepared set of exercises and I have to be sure that they will bring results. I also like good clothes and shoes"* (F, 30, English teacher).

The fitness club is becoming a place that quickly satisfies the needs, wants and whims of the customer (Bauman 2006), or rather gives them the hope that they will be satisfied. Thanks to the equipment and programme selected at the sports centre, one can reduce or eliminate the time and distance between the wish and its realisation, as machines organise their exercise down to the minute. A quick walk compared with a walk on a specialist machine at the gym becomes too slow. A well prepared and planned exercise (often with some support) allows one to burn fat or gain muscle in a much shorter period. Satisfaction increases as one exercises and is the function of quickness and effectiveness of performance: *"everything is faster, more professional and planned here, I know there will be results"* (M, 35, manager).A 35-year-old

[10] As the interviewees showed, and also as research of 'bodyLIFE' magazine confirms (www.bodylife.com.pl),the following activities are currently the most popular: aeroboxing, indoor cycling, belly dancing and various forms of dance, healthy spine activities, and Pilates.

businessman states: *"I know there's no adventure, there's no fresh air, but I like it. I need measurements, good equipment, water and supplements"*. As Featherstone (2007: 45) explained, postmodern culture requires a controlled decontrol of emotions in order to balance the instrumental and express dimensions of consumption. Being a good exerciser requires self-discipline, being a good consumer requires self-restraint. In other words, (as mentioned above) the consumption of pleasures is made permissible through the discipline of exercise.

Smith Maguire (2008a) considers the connection between fitness and consumption to be a kind of somatic pragmatism rather than a mere symptom of a narcissistic personality. A similar thought was developed in Waring's (2008: 306) analysis of how fitness and the pursuit of physical capital complement the 'work style' of the urban middle class by demonstrating and reinforcing the virtues of competition, success and professionalism:

> ...the tacit expectation that individual employees [in a professional context] should engage in health and fitness practices...creates a situation whereby employees can raise their physical capital and demonstrate certain positive traits...In this way, the city workplace can be regarded as a competitive social space and in turn professionals appeared to be drawn to the premier club environment as a means of enhancing their competitive edge, assuming that fitness is some kind of prize, something they can compete for in their quest for social achievement (Waring 2008: 304)

In this sense, both Smith Maguire's and Waring's analyses of the centrality of fitness (as physical capital) for service/executive class lifestyles resonate particularly well with the work of Giddens (2001), who argued more generally that reflexive lifestyles and investments are not merely narcissistic defences against socio-political conditions. Rather, they are also positive appropriations of circumstances in which the sign function of the body impinges upon the conduct of everyday life (compare also Neville 2012:56-58).

Summary: ambivalences and paradoxes of reflexivity

Fitness is entangled in social and cultural context of on going transformations but, at the same time, it is a result of individual agency. The fitness club is a space through which individuals experience themselves and others. By making choices about fitness activities, not only do individuals satisfy their needs but they also verify who they are or who they would like to be. They experience how their reality is constructed and what rules govern it. In this way they learn who they are, what their abilities and limitations are, and what needs and expectations they have. The fitness club is more than a tem-

porary experience of the reality surrounding them: it is also a process of changing definitions, reflexion and negotiation.

Firstly, reflexivity that is defined as a process of self-reference or as an act of responding to the environment is of a strictly reactive character (Drozdowski 2009: 274). It is a result of gathering knowledge and systemising it in order to be more effective. Thus it is a vehicle of individual aspirations understood as self-construction. As the interviews demonstrate, although exercising in a fitness club provides intrinsic pleasure or a sense of freedom achieved on personal rules, it is also a strictly controlled process. The analysis shows that the reflective attitude is rarely a matter of choice, but rather a result of pressure or social-cultural obligations. While fitness clubs create a space to express one and to shape and confirm one's self-image they are also a sign-function of wealth and prestige as they follow certain social fashions and patterns. The body, on the other hand, becomes an object of new negotiations and imprinting new meanings, and the achieved looks justify one's choices.

Secondly, the interviewees believe that the ability to self-discipline the body with modern technologies of power is the most important test of both individual agency and physical capacity. Therefore, the measure of freedom is the ability to manage one's body and act reflexively in a defined situation although reflective submission to a top-down defined situation, in spite of choice being an autonomous value. As Bellahnoted (2007), the more effort an individual makes to enjoy their freedom and to make choices, the higher the probability of becoming expert-dependent and conformist, less intrinsic and more rational and calculating. It is clear that more work on autonomy is accompanied by more work on self-discipline and by the pluralisation of the techniques of self-creation or self-control. Self-discipline as an element of fitness gives the illusion of being causative in the sense that it is strongly entangled with expert knowledge systems.

Thirdly, the multitude and variety of individual policies regarding the body makes one's presence in a fitness club more subjective and difficult to interpret, since all the reflective effort remains within the private sphere of the individual. In-depth analysis of the interviews demonstrates that membership in a fitness club implies social profits of a certain kind, understood as a new dimension of inter-subjectivity. This is created and sustained by co-presence rather than by conversation; by sharing a space and participating in a sequence of events:

"It is not about deep conversation but about working on yourself and supporting one another" (M, 35, businessman);

"We all know one another by sight, we observe who copes better and who does worse, we see the results and that's enough. I come in and I see there are others like me, also complete beginners" (F, 32, housewife).

The users of fitness clubs do not expect others to have a similar world-view or be good debaters, but need them to confirm that their choices are good and socially functional. In other words, they are needed to justify choices or evaluate achievements. Individuals act like double-agents: they guarantee a sense of safety but also remind one of obligations to oneself.

However, as Bauman shows (2006: 123), a consumer society tempts its participants with the ideal of physical fitness understood not as physical efficiency, but as (preferably unlimited) the ability to overcome one's limitations. Physical fitness requires constant pursuit from those who seek it, which excludes a definite victory. The pursuit of a fit body is the state of continuous self-inspection, continuous self-accusation and self-condemnation, which leads to continuous unrest. The reflexive creating of identity uses new symbolic measures, new sources of expression, which makes the centre a significant source of building knowledge or competences regarding oneself.

Finally, fitness exists in an uneasy relationship with leisure, although these two terms are often considered synonyms. Smith Maguire (2008) writes that the representations of fitness are constructed as a means of inserting the virtues of discipline and productivity into spaces typically associated with free time and freedom from obligation:

> Exercise is not itself pleasurable, but is a matter of discipline; pleasure comes from the effect one's fitter body has upon others, the satisfaction in having made 'good' use of one's leisure time...Even when fitness activities are represented as enjoyable, they are rarely constructed as ends in themselves. Exercise is instrumentally rationalized as the means to other ends (Smith Maguire, 2008: 196).

That the fitness field demonstrates an ambiguity between leisure and free time is also a point developed by Sassatelli (2007: 168-169). He explains that time spent at the gym is not time spent free of all rules. Instead it is rather like work, based on shared rules and, at times, rigidly codified practices, e.g.it requires planning, organisation, time-management, evaluation and re-evaluation, and so on.

The implication of these analyses is that the cultural imagery of leisure, recast through the lens of fitness practices, is constructed as a sphere in which freedom is increasingly being replaced by the obligation of self-work. Additionally, the reversal in the roles of production and consumption has also played an important role in this process. Since it is the desire for consumption that plays a formative role in shaping individuals' relations to their bodies, the production of modern consuming bodies always presupposes that their conversion and consumption of pleasures is made permissible through the discipline of exercise.

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Articles and Studies

GABRIELA ŻUCHOWSKA-ZIMNAL

Reflexive Use of Clothing for Constructing and Communicating Self-Identity: Research study on young Polish adults with a high level of cultural capital

The objective of this article is to perform an in-depth exploration of the issue of the reflexive usage of clothing and sartorial strategies approached from two perspectives: clothing as a source of meaningful communication about the identity of self and others; and clothing as a tool for the reflexive construction of self-identity. The primary assumption is that the self-identity narrative manifests itself through one's clothing. Via these narratives we can observe codes of communication specific to culture in a hybrid state, where traditional, modern and postmodern elements are mixed without causing an impression of incoherency for contemporary individuals. I analyse this by looking at three key concepts: the *aestheticisation* of everyday life and consumption (Featherstone 1991), reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994) and symbolic creativity (Willis 2002). The second half of the article is based on some of the findings obtained during my qualitative research conducted in 2011-2014 on a sample of young Polish adults with a high level of cultural capital.
Keywords:postmodernity, reflexivity, symbolic creativity, fashion, clothing, self-identity

Introduction

The everyday reality of the late modern, capitalist era seems to be overwhelming individuals with an amount of images and objects that is beyond the capacity of their perception. At the same time, performing their consumerist role, individuals are surrounded by a kaleidoscopic universe of goods, from which they are constantly coerced to choose. Thoughtfully constructing one's self-identity, as well as communicating it to others in an attractive way, has become a major duty for everyone (Bauman 2000:30-38), not only those in artistic and alternative circles who were pioneers at leading their lives as if they were artistic projects (Baudelaire 1964, Featherstone 1991, Smith 1974). Social actors, in order to perform their every-

day roles successfully, need to strategically plan their lifestyles (Giddens 1991, criticised by Warde 1994), of which consumption styles often constitute the core. They invest their efforts in developing patterns of choosing objects from the massive amount of alienated commodities. The task that follows is to negotiate the meanings that these objects are then to represent, as well as the messages that are to be conveyed by them (Appadurai 1986, Douglas 1976).

These acts are not as shallow as consumerism's critics would like to perceive them. The goal of such apparently trivial everyday occupations is providing tools and sources for constructing and consolidating self-identity (often through acts of communication and negotiation of meanings). Culture itself values much higher than ever before the visual component of actions and symbolic, metaphorical content of communication. Since the beginning of the Post-Fordist phase in Western production, the role of consumer is no longer passive and we can observe a social coercion of active and reflexive choosing. Arjun Appadurai (2005) claims that consumption nowadays is not a consequence but a necessary condition for the emergence of The Imaginary, and that it drives the contemporary meaningful universe forward. In the era of late modernity and post-modernity, social actors have easy access to diversity in heterogeneous culture content, delivered to them *en masse*, in a hectic and overwhelming form. They lack authorities in terms of consumption (because values present in production, consumption and advertising contradict one another); the authorities of fashion and authority of fashion itself seem to have lost their power and certainly are not universal (Crane 2000, Lipovetsky 2004, Szlendak and Pietrowicz 2007, Kaiser, Nagasawa and Hutton 1991). Also, there are no clear procedures in how fashion trends are to be interpreted in everyday life. Almost all individuals are to some extent aware that what they wear is connected with a sort of a code, where elements of clothing are *signifiers* (to use de Saussure's term) and they may be used to form what Bourdieu calls social capital, as they serve to negotiate prestige and form relations of power in social interactions. Nowadays this *signifier* is composed individually; signs, codes and values present in the media and designed by producers are redefined and recomposed, changed according to local culture (Jameson 1991, Drozdowski 2009). Often what the producers have planned as an advertising strategy for a product is completely reversed by consumers symbolically utilising the product. So individuals are constructing their image aimed at others but also, reversibly, their own perception of self-identity (this mechanism was described in the conception of reflected or looking glass self by G. H. Mead). These images are composed from elements that are available to a person in his/her sur-

roundings and media but also, partly, from the socially inherited taste that is transmitted in structures of habitus (Bourdieu 1979, followed by M. Lee 1993 and C. Lury 1996) and strongly linked with one's socioeconomic status. Professional and peer groups and subcultures have primary status over their members' styles of consumption and dress, so these styles are not structure-genic *per se* and cannot be the only reason for new groups to emerge, but dressing styles can be a tool with which pre-existing groups express group values and norms, so existing structures can be consolidated this way. As I have argued elsewhere (Żuchowska 2011), in the contemporary world there seems to be no option of not choosing (Bauman 2000:30-38, Baudrillard 2004:196-197), while there is also no option of withdrawing from the consumerist conditions; for even the lifestyles that are counter-consumerist actually prey on the consumer world and consumer culture and use its imagery – though often they do so in a very creative and innovative way, such as in the alter-globalist, ecological movements (freeganism) or other counter-cultural subversive acts (Drozdowski 2009).

The objective of this article is to perform an in-depth exploration of the problem of reflexive usage of clothing and sartorial strategies approached from two perspectives: clothing as a source of meaningful communication about the identity of self and others; and clothing as a tool for reflexive self-identity construction. My primary assumption is that the self-identity narrative manifests itself within one's clothing and furthermore that via these narratives we can observe communication codes specific to culture in a late/liquid (Bauman 2000) state of modernity. This stage of culture is, I believe, of a hybrid nature (Marody 2000) because the traditional, modern and post-modern elements are mixed without causing an impression of incoherency for contemporary individuals. I will analyse this going by three key concepts: the *aestheticisation* of everyday life and consumption (Featherstone 1991), reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994) and symbolic creativity (Willis 2002). The second half of the article will be based on some of the findings obtained during my qualitative research conducted in 2011-2014[1] on a sample of young Polish adults with a high level of cultural capital.

It is worth stressing from the beginning that my study, though based on sartorial choices and practices, is not devoted solely to the field of fashion. Therefore, fashion will be a concept introduced briefly in one of the later chapters of this paper and is not to be treated as its major topic, only as an

[1] The project since 2013 has been funded through Agreement No.: UMO-2012/07/N/HS6/00440 by The National Science Center, awarded based on decision number DEC-2012/07/N/HS6/00440.

alternative perspective which I refrain from using when presenting the final results.

A somewhat ideal approach: the traditional, modern and post-modern self

My own research on clothing and dress,[2] t' the results of which will be presented in the second half of this paper, was based on the notion of self-identity. My biggest focus here, however, is **not on the social dimensions** (such as class distinctions or gender politics) of the construction of self **but on the question of its coherence and continuity, as well as the everyday life practices** and routines (including the phenomenon of cultural reflexivity) that shape it. Self-identity, as one of the key notions in this article, may take the definition given by Anthony Giddens (1991): as an individual's conviction that he/she is both distinct from the rest of the social world and coherent with his/her own past stages; the subjective feeling that one's combination of characteristics of personality and biography is unique. It is therefore a structure allowing a capacity to keep a particular narrative going. One asserts this belief by a reflexive project that includes developing a particular lifestyle from the everyday choices available. Giddens argues that this reflexivity of self extends to one's body, that is used as a visual representation of mind and identity. This happens through regimes of body, such as eating, sport or body posture (also analysed by Foucault 1975 or Melosik 2010) and naturally through body costumes, and the individuality of style – of which also Goffman (1959) wrote as part of performing a role during the presentation of self in everyday life. According to Giddens, self-identity in late modernity seems to be a never-ending challenge, a constantly engaging project, as an analogy to what Bauman writes about the constant task of composing identity (2000:30-38). In fact, this understanding of self-identity, the process of its construction as well as its manifestation in a personal coherent clothing style seems to be its modern or late modern version and derives from Nineteenth Century role models: bohemian artists, Baudelaire's dandies (Baudelaire 1964), Benjamin's flâneurs (Benjamin 2002), and those whose lives, subordinated to aestheticised consumption, are so scrupulously planned and performed as if they were pieces of art (Baudelaire 1964, Featherstone

[2] Regarding the notions of dress clothing and appearance, in this paper I follow distinctions introduced by Roach-Higgins and Eicher (1992) and used by Johnson, Schofield and Yurchisin (2002:125). Clothing is thus understood as ??nclosures that cover the body. Dress is an assemblage of modifications to the body and/or supplements to the body. Appearance includes features of the undressed body, such as its shape and color, as well as expression through gesture and grimace.?

1991, Smith 1974). Today, such lives may be lived by some celebrities (at least the official parts of their lives), artists, members of a subculture or counterculture (Goffman and Joy 2005:335-366) or youngsters. However, such total, all-out options are rather rare, as they do not seem to adhere to the contemporary 'liquidity'. To explain this, we should return to Bauman's work.

Bauman's later papers (2004) on self-identity in liquid modernity (which is not that distant from the concept of postmodernity as it will be understood in this chapter) lack one aspect that was very strong in Giddens' works: coherence and stability. The author questions such 'rigidity', saying that a stable construction of self would be an obstacle in contemporary culture, and that individuals who are too strongly attached to their identity would have difficulty in engaging in the contemporary game of chances, risks and opportunities. He argues that postmodern people are rather role-players and not designers of coherent identities, that they change rapidly according to situations they engage in and that they adopt a number of contradictory roles without worrying about them fitting one another. Similar observations can be found in Lash's works (Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994, Lash 2001). Lash stresses that late modern constructions of self-identity are developed in neither a linear nor a cohesive way. On the contrary: they often resemble tinker-like, roughly formed constructs with evanescent characteristics that one is not strongly attached to (Lash 2011:IX):

> Second-modernity individuals haven't sufficient reflective distance on themselves to construct linear and narrative biographies. They must be content, as Ronald Hitzler has noted, with *Bastelbiographien*, with *bricolage* biographies in Levi-Strauss's sense. The non-linear individual may wish to be reflective but has neither the time nor the space to reflect. He is a combinard. He puts together networks, constructs alliances, makes deals. He must live, is forced to live in an atmosphere of risk in which knowledge and life-changes are precarious.

This must have important consequences in the visual and sartorial fields as this approach means one person must develop a number of different styles and that examining one of them is not enough to gain information of his/her other styles and identities.

We would expect contemporary individuals, especially young people who are strongly motivated and structurally predestined to profit from opportunities that occur around them, to be role-players instead of stylised, coherent and stable individualities. A similar conclusion can be reached from David Muggleton's research on subcultures, that I believe can be generalised to

embrace all postmodern styles, not only those inspired by subcultures. As such I shall differentiate these new styles from their modern and postmodern predecessors according to Muggleton's criteria, which are as follows: appealing to a fragmentary form of identity instead of group identity; heterogeneity, unstable points of reference and group bonds; multiple sources of cultural identity; low level of attachment and ideologisation; fascination with appearance and look *per se* (that becomes auto-referential and connotative, no longer serves as a tool for communication, but becomes an autotelic value); celebration of inauthenticity; positive and playful attitude towards the media – the latter often in the form of pastiche (Jameson 1991) and subvertising (Drozdowski 2009). I expected to find these characteristics in strategies of composing everyday attire by postmodern social actors, not only those claiming to follow a subculture style.

Bokszański (2005) also worked on contemporary identity, and I am indebted to him for a theoretical approach that links Giddens' and Bauman's/Lash's conceptions of identity: Bokszański defines identity as having two components: distinctiveness (or, as Ricoeur puts it, *ipséité,* meaning that there are no two identical identities and each is aware of its own uniqueness) and sameness (or *męmeté* which means remaining the same despite the time passing). This second aspect is not always present and I believe that we can identify entering the postmodern era by its vanishing.

Western researchers have completed a couple of qualitative projects on related subjects. Thompson and Haytko conducted research on dressing styles among college students and concluded their work saying that their participants remain modern and not postmodern, in the sense that – although they use various sources and contradictory discourses as source for their individual styles – the results are strongly meaningful and coherent, personalised styles indicating stable identities. To quote Diana Crane's (2000) summary of their results:

Thompson and Haytko (1997) found that college students whom they interviewed in depth used the conflicts and contradictions surrounding fashion to construct distinct and nonconformist styles, in contrast to being 'passive trend-following consumers'. (...) Their use of fashion discourse involves a continuous juxtaposition of divergent fashion discourses that are directed at resisting and contesting specific fashion meanings and images they deem as exerting a negative influence on their self-conceptions and those around them.

Another theory that allows us to link the contradictory conceptions of identity (and clothing styles as its indicators or visual emblems) was delivered in works by Marody (2000), who proves that Poland has developed a hybrid form of culture, where elements and structures of modern, postmod-

ern and traditional provenance coexist without causing any sense of incoherence among Poles. Therefore, during my research I expect to find among Poles attitudes towards clothes that combine elements of modernity, postmodernity and traditional orientation (by the latter I mean for example attachment to rigid gender structure, affirmation of class and professional roles, and a marked division between everyday and holiday or special-occasion attire). It goes without saying that Poland is not unique in this stage – one could argue that every Western, European, or even the world's contemporary culture is to a degree in a hybrid state. However, I believe it to be particularly easy to observe in post-communist countries and among the younger population. I expected the traditional, modern and post-modern attitudes and forms of identity to coincide in each individual without causing an impression of discrepancy within my research participants.

A more realistic approach: cultural reflexivity and its limitations

To begin this chapter I shall briefly outline how the concept of reflexivity will be understood by me in this article. The term was introduced by Beck (Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994), who described the disintegrative but improvement-bringing aspect of the transition from industrial society to risk society. This aspect of emancipation of agency from structure and the change of authority of and within the expert systems (especially fashion) is present in my research, however I will focus more on how this concept is developed in the paper of Scott Lash, who stresses the personalising and auto-referential aspect of this notion on the one hand, and the aesthetic framework on the other.

The reflexivity as understood by Lash is the critical (subversive) potential of an individual to use the particularities of their condition (mainly ones of an aesthetic sort, or objects – images, signs, narratives – whose meaning derives from the phenomenon of mimicry rather than Derrida's *la différence*) to question, firstly, the universalities of the system or the dystopian consequences of modernisation, its rules and resources (the structural reflexivity), and secondly its very own self (auto-reflexivity) (Lash 1994, Polish edition 2009:146-152, 177-178). Based on a process that is the opposite to cognitive reflexivity, the aesthetic one is not its bizarre repercussion. On the contrary: it is just as influential, if not more so, given that contemporary culture is more than ever saturated with signs and images (Sztompka 2012). The aesthetic reflexivity of everyday life is becoming the object of the mimetic intermediary, and therefore uses meaningful objects to question or to critically work on the system (in my research – subsystems such as the fash-

ion industry, job market resources, traditional gender relations of power, etc.) or construction of its own self-identity. It would be worth stressing once again that according to Bauman and Lash the latter is therefore formed without coherence (Lash 2011:IX).

When analysing this concept, I shall switch from the more ideal dimension of self identities, their elements, their building, stabilisation and acknowledgment, towards the manifestation of these forms and processes in a visual everyday form, meaning: personal clothing. These apparently trivial, everyday acts of buying (consuming), composing (choosing) and presenting (using signs, attaching and negotiating meanings) most commodities, and items of clothing in particular (because of their strongly personal and aesthetic qualities) have a high cultural impact. As Mary Douglas (1976:207) puts it:

> All consumption activity is a ritual presentation and sharing of goods classified as appropriate to particular social categories which themselves get defined and graded in the process. An individual's main object of consumption is to help to create the social universe and to find in it a creditable place. (...) Successful consumption requires a deployment of goods in consumption rituals that will mobilise the maximum marking services from other consumers.

Nicolas Abercrombie (1994) extends this point of view from the relations of consumer with his/her audience onto the relation (of power) between consumers and producers, and tackles the problem I already introduced earlier: attributing and redefining the meanings of the purchased goods:

> If images are at the center of modern consumption and of the producer-consumer relationship, then the control of their *meaning* is similarly central to the distribution of authority in that relationship (...) Producers try to commodify meaning, that is to try to make images and symbols into things which can be sold or bought. Consumers, on the other hand, try to give their own, new, meanings to the commodities and services that they buy (Abercrombie 2004, cited by Lury 1996).

Paul Willis (2002:284) stated that human beings are communicative before they are productive, and the same intuition is continued by Lash who maintains that information and communication are replacing the slowly vanishing social structures and becoming the new structural framework for new, fully aware and independent agency. Willis' concept of symbolic work starts from the premise that "symbolic work is spread across the whole of life" and is a condition of it and that it produces culture. He argues that the core elements of this work are: language, active body, drama and symbolic creativity (meaning practice and symbolic resource) – since Barthes taught us to

think of fashion as a form of language it is not difficult to see dressing and wearing as performative acts that are thoroughly drenched with meanings. However, this observation brings us to a sharp remark that Celia Lury (1996) made on this topic of saturation with images and meanings: that although this saturation with signs is perceived to be one of the strongest characteristics of contemporary consumption, it does in fact drench some social strata more than it drenches others. This division is also highlighted by Lash: he shows how the new (new) middle class (the one that develops or uses information and communication technologies at work) has the position that naturally predestines them to reflect on the rules and resources of structure, as well as it reflects on their own agency – and their self-identity with the assistance of psychologically grounded expert systems (Giddens 1991). At the same time we cannot ignore the growing underclass, as well as the lower classes, for whom such reflection seems not much less abstract than it used to be for a villager five centuries ago. Lash gives the vivid example of an African American women from a ghetto, although I believe we do not need to search that far from the privileged. In fact, I do not expect such a reflexive approach, neither do I imagine a reflexive, aestheticised creation of self (needless to mention subversive consumption patterns) from most social actors, **except within a small social segment** of the young, highly educated, financially stable, living in big cities with access to cultural resources, and with an advanced level of knowledge on both high and popular culture. If taking only identity manifestations into consideration, that is individual sartorial choices, then perhaps we also need to narrow this segment down to individuals experienced in working with images and interpreting visual codes. **These were my objectives when composing the research sample for my interviews.**[3]

An alternative approach: fashion

It would not be a complete study if I were to neglect the question of fashion altogether. However, I wish it to be stated once again and clearly that fashion *per se* was not the main area of my research interest – just as it is not synonymous with the notion of clothing (clearly not every outfit a person wears is fashionable and not every fashion trend is about clothing). Fashion as such has been sufficiently analysed and researched in more recent and somewhat earlier social studies (Barthes 1964, Blumer 1969, Lipovetsky 2004, Szlendak 2007, Woodward 2008), often highlighting its aspect of

[3] Detailed description of the research sample in the chapter ??n empirically grounded approach...?

gender (Crane 2000, Melosik 2010). The notion of fashion (and a few now classic concepts of it) was the first theoretical tool used by sociology to explain what people wear and why. Among the pioneers of this subject, Simmel (1980) analysed fashion as dialectics of urge of individuality on the one hand, and group affiliation on the other. He also perceived fashion to be mainly a tool used for consolidating and legitimising distances in social stratification. This now seems a slightly simplifying (not to mention misogynist) approach. Veblen also saw fashion as a tool of class distinction and this path has since been developed by Bourdieu (1979), Lee (1993) and Lury (1996) for instance. Blumer (1969) proposed what was back then a very original approach as he questioned the social stratification's main role in shaping fashion's trends. Instead he argued that what he called 'collective taste' (1969:284) is determined by hypnotic currents of modernity. As he explicitly noted (Blumer 1969:282):

> The fashion mechanism appears not in response to a need of class differentiation and class emulation but in response to a wish to be in fashion, to lie abreast of what has good standing, to express new tastes which are emerging in a changing world. (...) They are fundamental changes. They shift fashion from the fields of class differentiation to the area of collective selection and center its mechanism in the process of such selection.

We can agree that Blumer's analysis brought valuable conclusions, however **these apply to the field of institutionalised fashion alone.** Undoubtedly, what is promoted by fashion magazines and mainstream clothing companies has an impact on what the mass consumer wears, and it would be more than nad've to believe otherwise. Yet as will be demonstrated through a few quotes below, I am convinced that sartorial decisions in the social segments from which I recruited my sample were only slightly influenced by what they believed to be fashionable at the time.

This belief of mine has been corroborated by the results of a few research projects, among which the conclusions of Kaiser, Nagasawa and Hutton (1991) were particularly precise at supporting my point. They argue that postmodernism in fashion gave women an opportunity to create a personalised styles of dress where not all elements were even in accordance with any of the fashionable propositions competing for the market at that particular moment. They showed that among women claiming to be interested in fashion, tastes and opinions on particular products, as well as sources of desirable goods or fashion hints, often differed drastically. Even among women who claimed to have a greater interest in fashion, many had difficulty interpreting the photographs in fashion magazines and a majority **could not imag-**

ine ever wearing what was 'in' fashion at the moment. What is more, not only is the fashionable female customer group very heterogeneous in terms of tastes, sartorial judgments and practices – this group is also relatively small. As Gutman and Mills (1982) showed in their study of over six thousand women, **only a third** of them **admitted to having any interest in fashion.**

My research brought similar results. Only a few participants spoke about fashion in an affirmative way and no more than five fragments of interviews with 50 participants[4] were coded by me as 'FASHION AS AUTHORITY'. Very few participants admitted to be following fashion while choosing their daily dress. More claimed that they follow fashion trends exclusively for business purposes (as they work in fashion, costumes design, etc.) but never for personal interest. The biggest group of participants either tolerated fashion and used it very selectively (occasionally wearing something really fashionable, but only if in keeping with their pre-existing individual style) or expressed rather negative opinions on fashion (as vulgarisation of tastes) and rejected trendy clothing only on the basis of finding it too fashionable.

> In the current fashion? No, if I dislike something, I simply don't wear it! If I do not like something I would never put it on, because I would feel bad in it. Also, there are other fashionable clothes that I like, but I would not wear it for other reasons, as my body would not look good in them for instance. So it is not that I am a fashion victim and I follow what is «in» blindly and I would wear it even if I do not like it that much or look that good in – only because I would reckon it is what should be worn now and that 'you have to have this now'. (female, 28, advertising salesperson and semi-professional jewellery designer)

> Actually I'm not interested in fashion, and – paradoxically – fashion is not important to me because I care too much about how I look. And fashion seems to me to be an external element controlling what I should wear and I hate having any rules dictated to me from the outside. I prefer taking my own path, and this includes how I dress. So if everyone wears only grey at the moment, then I'll put on something even more colourful. I like colour, so I'll dress the way I like. This is not fashion, because no one will convince me that wearing my current favourite shellsuit jacket in autumn 2012 is in any way fashionable, in fact I don't reckon it would ever be. But this is a trend I invented myself, for myself. Sometimes it does happen that a thing is fashionable and promoted, pushed for people to buy at some point

[4] A description of my research sample is given in the following chapter. All quotes were translated from Polish by myself.

> and at the same time it suits my taste, then I am able to pick something like that for myself. Lately I saw in the H&M chain accessories made of metal plus a fabric string in neon colours, and this is something I really like and goes perfectly with what I wear nowadays – so this is something I would buy because of this coincidence of fashion and my taste, but this is just about all. (female, 28, PhD student and academic teacher in Culture Studies, film journalist, translator and film festivals programmer)

My findings were the same for both men and women, regardless of their age, occupation and sexual orientation. Below is a male example of a similar attitude towards fashion:

> I don't look out for trendy stuff and I don't follow fashion trends. It's more that when I see something that becomes trendy and popular I wonder whether it's something I used to wear six months or two years ago by any chance, you know? There've been a few times already when I was wearing something that everyone laughed at and something like a year later suddenly everyone started having that look. [...] I mean if I know that something is 'in' now and it's in my wardrobe, then I'd rather not wear it, I actually prefer going against fashion. I don't know... if classic hats were in fashion at the moment and I had one, then I don't think I'd wear it, I'd rather intentionally **not** wear it. (...) I think people who dress according to fashion trends are rather uncool, as they have no personal vision of what they want to wear and they look up to what they think is fashionable instead. If they can compose their original appearance in an interesting way out of these elements then great, but if they look the same as fifty others I walk past on the street one day, then that suggests that they have no individual style, they follow the fashion trends so are not well-dressed. (male, 30, freelance interior and visual designer, VJ)

One of my most interesting observations when interviewing people who work in the fashion industry (and have jobs such as a magazine stylist, personal stylist and shopper, costume designer and even fashion designer) was that they often have a very reserved relationship with fashion, an unfavourable opinion of fashion as an industry, and often consciously opt to choose their own attire against the trends of fashion.

> I have no idea what one should wear now, or what one shouldn't – trends are something I have such a lack of interest in. I care more about looking the way I want to look, meaning for instance lengthening the upper half of my body, which is too short compared to the lower half – which is

why I only wear garments that drop down low on my hips. Sometimes I won't leave the house unless I'm dressed in a way that makes me feel invisible – meaning not that the clothes are mediocre, because they can be strong and original – but meaning that everything fits me and doesn't make me feel exposed. If someone told me for instance that I should not wear this coat because different types of coat are 'in' now, then I would laugh in their face. I love this coat, I will wear it more, for years from now. The trends are dictated by commerce, the will to sell products in massive quantities – that's very strong in fashion, just as architecture also has trends but not such strong, aggressive ones and it's much cooler; the same goes for painting, where there is a convention but everyone paints in a personal, individualised style. I am the way I am and I will not be bothered by these things for now – or maybe forever? This is why I like my job at Balenciaga because this brand doesn't follow fashion trends. (female, 31, fashion designer, currently on internship in Paris)

Really, if someone is nicely dressed, it doesn't need to be fashionable. You shouldn't just have fashionable items in your wardrobe, most of the garments there should be classic, timeless clothes. Otherwise you would need to get rid of all your clothes each season. I personally hardly ever buy fashionable clothes. If someone wanted to follow the fashion trends, they would look like everyone else around them, which is no good. This summer peppermint was the predominant colour, and there was so much of it that it made me sick. It is a beautiful colour that I hadn't really noticed before, and even recently when I saw a pair of peppermint trousers I thought of buying them. But I soon realised that would have been a bad choice as the colour has been EVERYWHERE recently (...) I hate it when someone says that something is already 'out' of fashion, this searching for fashion trends is dull and boring – someone decided we must all wear dark purple, so we should all run to the shop to get purple clothes? No, and I never agree to it when advising my clients when shopping for clothes. I discourage buying anything trendy as I don't want them to look in their wardrobe a season later thinking that they have nothing to wear because all their clothes look dated. I AVOID trends. (female, 26, personal stylist and personal shopper)

As the two below fragments show, sometimes the most coherent element of a personal style may be opposition to fashion. The last participant presented in this chapter stated this very explicitly: **fashion is not considered a solution to the dilemma of what to wear for postmodern young adults who**

have the highest cultural capital (well educated, living in the biggest Polish cities, having prestigious freelance jobs):

> Above all, I think that [the way I dress indicates] my attitude towards fashion – in a broad understanding of this term, meaning this whole fashion business. [I think my appearance communicates] a sort of my lack of obedience to rules of how one should dress, for instance how someone my age should dress or what a tidy and aesthetically pleasing look should be; well, I think I often attempt to be an eyesore for people who see me in public. (female, 27, theatre decorations and costume designer).

> I don't think [I am interested in fashion]. Of course it depends whether we mean professional fashion or trends you see in clubs and bars. Also there is a difference between understanding trends as what is popular in the world, in Poland in general, or in certain regions. I say that for me fashion is some external way and need of expressing one's individual aesthetics. The thing is that when I look through the new fashion lookbooks, there are certain items among the things that I like, but that's the case absolutely regardless of the fashion itself. Choosing these clothes would be following fashion in a way, but only as far as it is at some point parallel to my aesthetics, but I keep my distance towards fashion, I do not actively follow trends all the time. To really dress according to fashion trends seems like a huge sacrifice, but also I don't understand why anyone would do it, as I don't think people pay attention to whether somebody is fashionable or not. In other words: fashion for me does not resolve this problem [challenge] of dressing. (male, 24, philosophy and fine arts student, currently working as a DJ and bartender)

An empirically grounded approach: research on young adults

In this part I will present some more findings obtained during my qualitative research conducted since 2011[5] on young Polish adults. The research sample was chosen using non-probability, purposeful sampling with an additional snowball method. Taking into consideration Eastern Europe's troubled history, I chose participants aged 23-33 at the moment of interviewing, as:

– firstly, they are already financially independent – at least to a large degree, and their tastes and choices are mature and independent enough to

[5] Since 2013 the project has been funded via Agreement No.: UMO-2012/07/N/HS6/00440 by The National Science Centre, awarded based on decision number DEC-2012/07/N/HS6/00440.

be able to draw conclusions on their self-identity from their aesthetic choices; and

– secondly, all their conscious life has taken place after the transformation to a capitalist economy, therefore their consumer attitudes and choices will not be influenced by the ordeal of scarcity that older Poles experienced.

The choice of purposeful sampling was a logical consequence of my assumptions introduced in the previous chapter: I would interview individuals with high cultural capital (to use Bourdieu's term) because if the cultural reflexivity extended from the self-identity construction process to personal clothing style as its visual emanation for anyone, then this would be the case of my research participants. My aim was therefore to include those who had the biggest resources (both immanent, meaning mental or cultural; and external, meaning material or structural) on the one hand, and the greatest motivation (to reflexively construct and improve their identity project and its visual manifestations) on the other. My respondents were from two of the largest Polish cities (Cracow and Warsaw), with a university degree or currently studying. The sample was divided into three/four groups: (1.) participants working in the fashion industry, (2.a) participants with creative/freelance jobs requiring them to work on images), (2.b) participants with creative/freelance jobs but not working with images, and (3.) participants with jobs requiring a lower level of creativity (mainly corporate office workers and specialists).

My aim was not to choose only people actively working in fashion (and, as the previous chapter demonstrated, this would not be a good approach since fashion is not an authority for the people I wanted to interview). The main criteria were taken from Lash's conception of cultural reflexivity, and as such a person's education, cultural surroundings and lifestyle were more important to me than their relationship with the fashion industry.

My principal research questions were: In what ways do young Polish adults with high cultural capital resources use sartorial goods symbolically, and how do they compose their looks so as to create meaningful statements aimed at others? The findings were expected to verify the hypothesis that (at least for individuals possessing sufficient structural and cultural resources to be reflexive) the aesthetic sphere of everyday life is of principal meaning, and that significant amounts of energy and conscious (pre)occupation are invested in everyday sartorial practices.

Visual material was also taken into consideration at all stages. I analysed both verbal and photographic data, and during my interviews I also showed pictures to the participants in order to stimulate their narratives and reach their latent patterns of judging others' appearance and decoding meanings

that the clothing of anonymous others might be attempting to convey. I showed the respondent around 30 photographs, split into 10 blocks: *chic*/ dandy style, punk style including a child dressed up as a punk, postmodern *haute couture* shoes, postmodern 'constructional' dresses, Emo teenage style, outfits transgressing gender norms, pop stars and celebrities in their public outfits, corporate dress code, street and mainstream fashion, and ethnic and religious costumes. The participants were asked to discuss and judge the pictures, express what they liked and what they were against, to interpret the styles and compare them to what they themselves or their friends wore. Some additional questions were asked to qualify their opinions on key subjects, such as age and gender boundaries in dressing, attitude towards Muslim women wearing burqas in public space, and the purposes of stage and professional costumes. The usage of photographic material was expected to motivate participants to discuss without using highly structured questions delivered by the interviewer. Such a technique helps create an open and comfortable research situation, as opposed to the traditional interview. It also allows the researcher to reach participants' hidden cognitive schemes. This method has been successfully applied in projects dealing with clothing and fashion (Crane 2000, Woodward 2009). I also ran an analysis – in parallel with the data from the interviews – of the participants' own clothing, based on photographs of them wearing their own favourite attire. This has been practised by S. Woodward (2008) and K. Olechnicki – this latter researcher treating photo-blogs in the same way that F. Znaniecki used personal diaries.

For the purpose of this article, 25 semi-structured individual focused interviews were analysed out of the original sample of 50. The research sample comprised the individuals who could be perceived as those mostly predestined to having developed the characteristics described by S. Lash as a result of reflexive modernisation in the fields of aesthetics and cultural practice. These are stimulated by the participants' young age (although they have already achieved financial independence), place of living (two of the largest Polish cities), level of education (academic degree or currently studying) and occupation (art, fashion, design, performing music, social media, freelance translators – plus a fourth control group of corporate office workers and specialists). The interviews focused on the topics of everyday clothing choices/strategies, and how this connected with the respondents' symbolic universe, with codes intentionally used in communication (of self-identity, values and opinions), and to one's appearance and ways in which the clothing of anonymous others is judged. Additionally, I analysed one focus group interview that I conducted with young Polish women who had converted to Islam. This interview also focused on questions of clothing and its relation to religious identity.

Results

First of all I attempted to establish the importance of the participants' own sartorial practices, the position that acts of dressing have in their everyday life, as well as the role of their own attire in the processes of formation, re-formation and communication of self-identity. I also inquired whether their everyday dressing was carefully planned and performed according to conscious strategies, or emerged spontaneously without intentional planning. The financial aspect proved to be a significant factor, as my respondents had limited resources. However, while struggling to dress within their budget, they do not choose the simplest options – and the aspect of independence and creativity remains very strong (all quotes below have been translated by me from Polish, my questions in italics):

Do you plan your shopping for clothes?
Yes, I sort of do.
Is there any pattern in how you shop?
I often buy clothes that are in sales, however they are always only garments that I would have bought anyway, even without a sale. I have a rather set vision of myself, and never buy on impulse. On the contrary, my choices of clothes are dictated by the very rigid rules of my taste. (male, 28, graphic designer)

I don't treat clothes as brands, but treat them as «individuals». Quite simply if you can mix something found in a second-hand shop with something from Zara, and achieve the effect you were searching for, then that's perfect. I manage to achieve the effect I want in this way, so I don't need to look at brands. I need to see that something will fit my vision, that I can use it for it, then it doesn't matter where it's from. But the essential thing is that it suits ME. (male, 24, philosophy and fine arts student, currently working as a DJ and bartender)

This individual approach does sometimes sound as strong opposition to the possibility of having one's personal taste and style influenced from the outside, and this is also often connected to criticism of mainstream fashion, as in the following examples:

Oh, this is VERY WELL THOUGHT-OUT now when I try to judge it. I also communicate my general attitude towards the world through it. I have this strong will to ignore, to manifest a rebellion against these rules that society attempts to pump into our heads. I do my best to choose

clothes consciously, so I have a detailed awareness of why I wear these and not other garments, and what they do to me. (female, 27, theatre decorations and costume designer)

It was a question of self-development, self-formation. Because in the past I wanted to make an impact, a kind of impression on other people, or sometimes I saw something on the street or in a shop window and immediately wanted to achieve such a look. And that was entirely caused by my urge to be liked, to be perceived as good-looking, and back then I didn't think about why I wanted a particular item of clothing, why I, myself, would like to look that way. Now I dress only according to my own will and taste. (male, 24, DJ)

My perspective of planning this is usually not to go to Zara or H&M to buy clothes that everyone on the street will soon be wearing. I also make sure new garments can easily be matched with other items in my wardrobe to make new combinations. I prefer new options to buying something that will be good once, for one look only. (female, 26, stylist and personal shopper)

Naturally, the careful planning of everyday dress was a must for the Muslim converts I spoke to during the focus group interview. This was firstly because there are religious rules connected to women's dress that they have to follow, and secondly because buying suitable garments for them is difficult in a non-Muslim country. However, they also highlighted the fact that clothes do not have symbolic meanings attached to them – as in Islam there are no visual representations of what is invisible (Baudrillard 2003).[6]

It is not about a shop or a brand for me but about the clothes themselves, I simply choose from every mainstream shop something I need, I never choose the whole style because I am a fan of Zara for instance. I'm a fan of Zara because I like smart clothes, but I could never wear it all, and of course I couldn't because I have to have everything covered. There are styles and clothes that I would never wear in public regardless of the brand. (...)

[6] See: J. Baudrillard, The violence of the image, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/the-violence-of-the-image/

Our style is very individual, completely, what we wear is not a result of trying to be a part of some global style. And it would not be possible because there is no global Muslim style, women look completely different in different parts of the world: Egyptian and Indonesian women for instance look aesthetically as though they are from two completely different worlds. And Polish converts to Islam dress according to which part of the world influences them; I am closest to Egypt, because I lived there for some time.(...)

Are there any meanings or symbols attached to clothes in this religion and culture? Does dressing in a certain way mean something?

No, only what I said, that they show which part of the world the woman is from or attached to. But there is no symbolic meaning, as there are no symbols or amulets or things like that in Islam. Also, you can immediately see that I am a Muslim, so I do not wear something like a necklace with a cross worn by Christians to show their faith. (female, 23, customer advisor for IT outsourcing company, Muslim for 5 years)

Some participants were able to verbalise what their style is about with little hesitation – suggesting that they had given it some thought. Here are a couple of examples, and their juxtaposition is even more interesting as self-identity is created based on a cohesion and consequence of clothing for one of these girls, and via the form of role-playing and using clothes as costumes for the other:

I think I am closest to let's say intellectual guising, mixed I'm afraid with the mainstream, although the latter is used as a result of conscious choice, juggling with the meanings of specific items of clothing. (...) I think all this is about constantly locking oneself in shackles of a sort, which do not need to be a burden, not necessarily. Because even a lie, if repeated dozens of times, becomes the truth. It's an attempt to fit into pre-existing frames of some kind. (...) Also I like adjusting my clothing to my partner, for example, or to someone I'm meeting up with. I always think about what this person was wearing the last time I saw them, and try to wear something similar; a sort of mimicry of this person. (female, 23, student and a project manager in an advertising agency)

I couldn't start wearing, for example, suits all of a sudden, as my clothing just has to fit all the rest of me, right? This cohesion is crucial here, because it would be very easy to fritter it all away. When someone jumps

> from one [occupation] to another the way I do, then it's not simple at all to keep full control over it, but I manage – and all of it, the way my bedroom looks, the clothes I wear, and so on – it's like my calling card. (female, 28, PhD student and academic teacher in Culture Studies, film journalist, translator and film festivals programmer)

Sometimes the meaning of style or individual items of clothing is not really analysed or verbalised, and does not seem to be crucial, although at the same time we can observe an incredible preoccupation with the forms or codes of dress itself. There were a few examples of such an attitude – scrupulousness in describing the details of one's sartorial strategy, with an apparent lack of need to construct any concrete message with these carefully-studied forms. The respondents who showed such an attitude were all male and preferred a classic, elegant style. We could perceive these as either an example of a traditional type of personal style or a modern one (like a dandy). Here is how such an attitude with regard to smart male style was expressed:

> (...) I do not think that a waistcoat, tie and shirt look complete without a jacket. As far as the pattern is concerned, it is a variation on a glen plaid, which is a type of material I like a lot, I am a big fan of such classic solutions. His collar shape is well chosen considering the shape of his face, this gives him the «white collar» look and the tie is done correctly, the colours are harmoniously matched. I can imagine myself in this, but certainly there would have to be a jacket there. (...) I like to wear elegant clothes every day, although when I'm going to a major event then I always make sure there's a visible difference from everyday attire.(...) I always try to choose the classics: black oxford shoes, *cashmere striped* trousers, cutaway jacket, black waistcoat and a typical wedding tie. Or alternatively, if I'm afraid of being too smart or drawing too much attention, then I choose a dark navy blue suit, but also with oxford shoes. (male, 27, freelance translator)

> The moment of biggest change in the way I dress came when I bought a suit a few years ago. I was reading about this one brand of men's suits on a fashion blog and started to admire the clothes, I liked the way they were made, so I started digging into the matter and soon began to know the entire philosophy that stands behind the tailoring of a man's suit – including the questions of why they are made of wool, the basis of the suit's construction, and the fact that it uses horsehair canvas that provides support. I discovered that this is all not only cool, but is also quality... And how wool is the best textile ever and it is very sad that cotton

and synthetics seem to have taken its place nowadays. (male, 31, sociologist working as an Internet advertising consultant)

Although clothing seemed important to most of the study participants, comments like those above were not predominant. I would hear much more often from the individuals I interviewed that they like dressing in an attractive way and that the way they look is very important to them, but they do not spend time on learning about fashionable or classic codes, and nor do they plan their look in the form of reflexive project – as Giddens would like to see it. Most of the participants choose clothes to buy and then compose their dress when going out depending entirely on their instincts or mood of the moment, while a large group of them had never in fact analysed the way they dress over a longer period of time, and never tried to understand or verbalise why they pick specific garments rather than others – up until I posed these questions during the interviews.

Maybe I do dress similarly to this sometimes, but not often, as it's something that requires a sort of premeditation and composition, because the simplicity is only apparent here, and I am afraid that it would be easy to lose what happens to be simple but very tasteful here, and fall into dressing in a way that has nothing attractive about it – I would find it difficult to see this borderline. Although I might find such garments in my wardrobe, I would not be able to compose a look out of them this way. Anyway, I find it interesting when I see it on someone, but when I try to dress like that myself then I find myself boring, it's a completely different picture when I see it from the outside. (female, 29, psychotherapist)

I don't know, it's hard to say. When I was a teenager I used to wear what I felt good in and what I felt showed my individuality, or at least I felt it did. At some point I think my body changed and I didn't look very good in very close-fitting clothes, so I started to wear loose and comfortable clothes and soon the comfort and ease started to dominate in my look. Additionally, my taste became more mature and after I'd worked more with image I started to feel more confident combining colours. So it went from comfort and feeling at ease to colour mixing and then more elements deriving from my experience or job. But it was never really that premeditated. (male, 33, PhD student in art history, curator in a National Art Museum)

Some examples show that one's sartorial history was the opposite of intentional planning:

For example I sort of changed my heart. My style changed the most when I stopped being a punk, then it was kind of constant in college, then changed a lot again after I came back from Asia when I brought tons of weird, very colourful clothes. Then I don't even know what happened, I just got bored, I guess, so I stopped with the colour, then again I was under the influence of Anna Maria who I worked with, so the colour came back, now I dress differently, depending entirely on my mood. (female, 27, theatre decorations and costume designer)

I don't know, you often hear that people wearing black all the time are such and such, but personally, I don't intend to make a particular impression on purpose, I don't think about it. For sure, the way we dress is a manifestation of something within us, but it would be impossible to say: that day I wanted someone to think of me in such and such a way, and this is why I wore this and that nor would I be able to say: this is what I meant when I put that on. No, consciously I do not attempt to convey any messages with it. (...) The way I dress does sometimes change, years ago I never wore miniskirts, but now I wear them all the time, but what is this a result of? There was no outside influence, I just wake up and feel that I'll dress like that from now on...
(female, 24, financial analyst for a corporation)

This last quote shows, however, that even though not intentionally dressing according to the meanings that certain styles might have, the respondents are aware that their look may be and is interpreted by others. Two further examples also show that clothing is to some extent perceived as a medium, but it is far from being a code or a language, as there is very little discipline in using it and it is only to a small extent within the study participants' conscious decision-making process.

Of course, in a way, I think that everyone sends messages of some kind consciously to others, let's face it, we always dress consciously. But it isn't easy to say what this message would be and it is completely different in every situation and every day – these messages may consolidate and may clear up in my mind at some point in the morning, when I am putting these clothes on, but later, throughout the day these ideas vanish, you don't think about all these messages at all. (male, 27, freelance translator)

Sure, there are always messages. It all depends on how much energy and attention I invest in this. Sometimes I don't care at all what I wear and

whether it suits me and sometimes I really care a lot. Sometimes I try to look like an interesting person and I succeed in it, sometimes I don't try to look interesting yet still draw a lot of attention. It's all a sort of game, you have different options to choose from, and different tools and different stimuli, it's all a result of how the world impacts you. (male, 24, philosophy and fine arts student, currently working as a DJ and bartender)

Yeah, I suppose so. According to others I send out certain messages, but I reckon those are more other people's comments, others who judge me. For example my piercing supposedly says that I am an individualist. But honestly, I never think about it when I wear it. (...) I don't know because I would never not wear something in order not to look Polish, for example, or a lesbian. I don't worry about such aspects when I get dressed, I don't feel any tension. We could only ask other people to comment on how I look, because I am unable to tell you what they think. (female, 31, fashion designer, currently on internship in Paris)

Some seemed more preoccupied by the reactions others may have to their look, although they were rarely worried about being judged unfavourably; it was rather that they sought positive reinforcement:

When my look A brings positive feedback, and the look B that looked similar is also praised, then of course, my C, D, and E looks will be composed accordingly. I hope to 'catch this wave'. (female, 23, student and a project manager in an advertising agency)

I use clothing to improve my mood because I feed on the reaction of people around me to feel better with myself.
(female, 29, psychotherapist)

I get the impression that people react to me positively thanks to how colourful I am. For example when I was going to physiotherapy for my knee, these receptionists and nurses were always saying: «Our sunshine has arrived!» So even more so when going there I would put on a yellow dress for instance to make all those women smile. (female, 28, PhD student and academic teacher in Culture Studies, film journalist, translator and film festival programmer)

The importance of what others wear is not greater, and is perhaps even lower than the importance of what others say about the look of my respondents, which they expressed in the above quotes. The findings of my research

here strongly support the assumptions of Barnard (1999) that very concrete information may not be conveyed by a person's dress alone. It is true that my participants paid attention to what both anonymous others wear and what their friends or loved ones wear, but although this might be a source of primary knowledge about others, it is not very detailed or concrete knowledge, while the observations also often have to be confirmed through conversation with a person:

> If there are too many parts then it looks coarse and becomes ridiculous. It's hard to say that you never judge people by their appearances because if you look at someone for the first time and it instantly clicks, you like it, then you develop a better contact with them. But if your immediate reaction is «Jesus, what is he/she wearing?», then a sort of distance emerges and with time you confirm whether this person is an idiot or cool. (...) It doesn't matter for me at all what brand other people's clothes are, or how much they cost, but the look itself matters when I meet someone new. When I am in a close relationship with someone, then their clothing does not matter at all, I only look at it when I don't know somebody. (male, 26, student of Culture Studies, fashion journalist)

> Clothing is usually the first signal for me about whether someone is interesting or not. It is a kind of filter for me, I find it easier to focus on a person who is well dressed. And when someone is not that well dressed, then they need to make a bigger effort to attract my attention and to make me like them. I usually like them more when they are well dressed. (female, 29, psychotherapist)

> This trivial observation of what someone wears and finding some known images in it – that is something I enjoy a lot. But I don't categorise people based on these observations. But a good-looking person, nicely dressed – then it's a pleasure to watch, as a nice object of observation, simply. For example I spoke to a guy today in the corridor, in the Faculty of Philosophy, and he was wearing this common, really bad combination of blue jeans, black trainers and a shirt. The first impression was: nothing interesting, pure stereotype. But I started speaking to him waiting outside the professor's room, and this impression vanished completely, other things came out. It may stay somewhere subconsciously, but it doesn't influence your contact with the person. I can imagine that there are people for whom clothing doesn't matter at all, they just wear it not to walk around naked. And I don't cross such people out. (male, 24, philosophy and fine arts student, currently working as a DJ and bartender)

Summary of findings

To sum up, when making the assumption that one of the distinctive characteristics of postmodern culture is the aestheticisation of everyday life, I was expecting the interviewed individuals to perform meaningful activities in the field of lifestyle, especially consumption and dressing according to Willis' concept of symbolic creativity. These trivial acts are considered as having the potential not only to communicate but to produce cultural identities. Although my research has proven rather high communicative motivation and potential in sartorial choices, I did not establish any influence on producing new identities or even distinct cultural structures via such trivial everyday acts. Also the knowledge about others gained through sartorial communication did not prove to be permanent, and the respondents claimed to seek confirmation of what was communicated from other sources.

This does not mean that some aspects of self-identity are not conveyed by my participants' appearance. The hybrid form of self-identity construction was easily observable, although in my research sample the traditional component was not strongly represented – with the exception of the respondents in the Muslim focus group interview, as well as the group of men who choose to only dress according to classic rules of formal male attire. Many respondents (usually the older ones in my sample) expressed a relationship with clothing that suggested a more modern approach, and this was usually combined with a very negative opinion regarding fashion. These young adults have a very strong vision of how they want to look, and express their contempt towards quickly changing fashion trends and people who follow them. A second, similarly large portion of my sample (often correlated with younger age) expressed a rather postmodern relationship with clothing. This means that their personal style was very heterogeneous and changeable. They were more willing to adopt fashion trends but in a personalised or even subversive way (Drozdowski 2009).

There were various examples of symbolic creativity and aesthetic reflexivity in my research findings. One's relation to one's own clothing (or, if established, one's style of dressing) is often strongly based on one's reflexive subversion towards the «system»: this is very strongly visible in the negative approach towards mainstream fashion, corporate dress code or rules of clothing traditionally determined by gender. Individuals' relationship with their own clothing reflects their position in society and may demonstrate their attitude towards the chances and roles that society has to offer, as well as the attitudes towards others who represent certain statuses. This is an illustration of structural reflexivity. What a person wears is also an illustration of

what images, signs and values he or she identifies with. Listening to my participants' narratives about changes in their clothing style throughout their lifetime indicated a great number of details of their self-identity, and also showed that the latter is an object of constant self-reflexivity, that it is a product of an individual's decisions about who they feel they are. However, these visual manifestations do not fully cover the self-identity construct, therefore it is not possible to decide with certitude whether the latter is coherent – although my results so far suggest to the contrary.

Because of the very specific research sample, my results could not be generalised, not even to embrace the Polish population as a whole. However, this may also be an asset, because young, educated adults living in big cities may be considered trend-setters and observations from my research can help formulate predictions on trends in the consumption in culture among other segments of Polish society.

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Articles and Studies

KATARZYNA M. WYRZYKOWSKA

Aestheticisation of Everyday Life on the Example of Musical Practices among Warsaw's Adolescents

The article examines youth musical practices as a form of cultural practice characterised as aestheticisation of everyday life. The analyses are based on a study conducted among Warsaw's adolescents as a part of a research grant from the National Science Centre (agreement number DEC-2011/01/N/HS6/00972). Analyses of empirical material show that music is omnipresent in the everyday life of adolescents. Thanks to music devices they can stay in contact with music wherever and whenever they want. However, the musical practices of the respondents participating in the said research are dominated by music listening; that is why this kind of activity has to be treated as the main form of aestheticisation of everyday life. Moreover, using music to maintain biographical narratives turned out to be another important cultural practice in adolescents' reflexive-self project. The conclusion reached is that in order to comprehensively present the practices observed here, it is essential to look at them in a broader socio-cultural context.
Keywords: aestheticisation of everyday life, musical practices, adolescents, aesthetic reflexivity, cultural reflexivity

Contemporary social reality places numerous challenges before social actors. The fast pace of life, the multiplicity of social roles that need to be adopted at the same time or multi-dimensional contexts (local, regional, global) for the formation of individuals' daily activities – all this together makes it difficult sometimes to find one's place in the surrounding world. As Anthony Giddens points out, in modern (or post-traditional) society individuals do not have ready-to-use patterns for their everyday practices. There are no more fixed and stable points of reference for shaping these actions. As a result, the identities of the individuals are built through the deliberate ordering and sorting out of their biographies. Therefore, the 'self' becomes a reflexive project that needs to be continuously built and reconstructed (Giddens 2001: 8-49). However, it is essential to stress that Giddens does not understand 'reflexivity' as a sort of reflective control of actions taken, but as a kind of systematic revision of social reality based on newly acquired knowledge (Giddens 2001: 29).

Bearing in mind the current processes, Scott Lash and John Urry point out successively the increasing importance of the aesthetic dimension in the process of creating individuals' daily practices. They define this type of cultural reflexivity as aesthetic. In this concept, 'aesthetic' refers to artistry, to visual art and beauty, while 'reflexivity' refers to the process of individuals' self-interpretations and their creation (on that basis) of context for everyday activities (Lash, Urry 1994: 5-7, 31-54).

Music plays an important role in social life, and analysis of the multitude of functions that it fulfils would require a separate paper (see: Merriam 1964: 209-276; Golka 2008: 207-219; Jabłońska 2014: 31-44). There is also no doubt that music can play different roles in everyday human life. As Tia DeNora states: "Music is not merely a 'meaningful' or 'communicative' medium. It does much more than convey signification through non-verbal means. At the level of daily life, music has power" (DeNora 2009: 16-17). But the question is: where can the power of music be found? On the one hand music can be used by individuals to regulate their mood, to facilitate physical exercise or even to evoke memories, or create identities. On the other hand, for some individuals music plays only a marginal role in everyday life and serves as no more than a background for other activities. The main goal of this article is to attempt to look at the adolescents' music practices as a form of aestheticisation of everyday life, understood as a process of assigning an aesthetic value to the objects and practices not directly related to narrowly perceived artistic activities; in consequence this process leads to a blurring of the boundaries between art and everyday life (Featherstone 1998: 304-308). Therefore, the question arises as to whether and when music can be one of the 'tools' used by young people to create and organise their daily activities. What kind of strategies of music usage can be distinguished? And so forth. The starting point for the analyses is the research carried out by this paper's author as part of the preparations for a doctoral thesis.

Basic information about the research

The study in question is based on a section of the doctoral dissertation prepared by the author at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (full thesis title: Adolescents' Participation in Musical Culture as Part of their Lifestyle). The research was conducted in Warsaw, and was addressed to the pupils of public, private and semi-private secondary schools.[1]

[1] All the respondents permanently live and study in Warsaw. They represent different capital districts (all of the city districts were included in this study). None of them attend music school (it seems that

The project is a sociological qualitative study, and its main research tool comprised the In-Depth Interview (60 respondents). In addition, some of the issues that in the course of the individual interviews turned out to be particularly important were further developed during Focus Group Interviews (5 groups, 28 respondents). At the same time, participatory observations were conducted (e.g. during music classes in community centres, in schools, and during concerts and music festivals, etc.).[2] The total duration of the fieldwork was 13 months. The research was financed by the National Scientific Centre (agreement number DEC-2011/01/N/HS6/00972). This article is based chiefly on the empirical material collected during the In-Depth Interviews. In order to deepen the analysis, the findings from the observations will also be referred to.

Music listening as the main form of aestheticisation of everyday life

As mentioned in the introduction, music can play a significant role in the life of individuals. Simon Frith states that one of the main functions of music in everyday life is that it shapes an individual's identity and in consequence helps place one in socio-cultural reality (Frith 1996: 119-125). Tia DeNora goes even further, saying that music not only allows social actors to create and re-build their identity or helps make sense of social reality, but is also often used by individuals as a means to organise their daily practices. Music helps organise one's internal (e.g. by regulating mood) as well as one's external/social world (e.g. by helping with group integration). One therefore needs to look at music as something more than just a background for other activities, and to treat it as an active component of social practices that often shapes these actions and gives them (assigns to them) a deeper meaning (DeNora 2009: 16-19; 46-53).

In order to present the specific features of the musical practices of Warsaw's adolescents it was necessary to investigate how the respondents (in general) situate music in their lives in regard to other activities (especially

studying at such institutions is a specific musical experience, in which a part of the music activities are mandatory, such as choir. Therefore, it would be difficult to include such a person in a group of people who do not take up such activities or do it voluntarily).

[2] In total, more then 50 observations have been made. In presented study ethnographical approach to observations was adopted, so observation has been treated as a technique that combines elements of free form interview, observation of ongoing actions and active involvement of researcher. Consequently, during e.g. music workshops researchers played and sang together with the respondents, and during concerts they didn't stay aside but they were incorporated to respondents group of friends and spent time together.

leisure activities). In turned out that music practices (treated as whole) are the most popular (frequent) free time activity. The other leisure activities mentioned the most often were: meeting up (or spending time) with friends, computer activities (e.g. playing games, surfing the Internet, etc.), reading (mostly books, but also journals and magazines) and sport activities (e.g. attending regular sport classes or exercising on their own) (cf. Rogalski 2000: 142-143). However, it has to be said that listening to music is the most prevalent among all the musical practices: almost all respondents listen to music every day (on average, they spend about 4 hours a day doing so, although there were some who even claimed 7 or more hours devoted to music listening). Apart from listening to music, another quite common practice is singing to oneself, i.e. humming or sometimes even singing out loud, all this for one's own individual pleasure. Most of the respondents admitted that they enjoy singing when no one is around. Moreover, while the vast majority of adolescents have had contact with instruments in their life, currently only one in three respondents regularly play an instrument (what is more, this group comprised mainly boys). Other music-related activities, for example composing music, reading books (mostly artists' biographies), music journals and professional literature (about music equipment, sound engineering etc.) or attending concerts or festivals, are (in comparison to listening, singing and playing) much less common (although the frequency of attending mass-participation music events depends primarily on the cyclical nature of some of the larger such events and the regularity of concerts given by the respondents' favourite artists).

Compared to other musical activities, listening would seem to be the key and most common form of aestheticisation of everyday life. Therefore it is essential to investigate what determines the role and importance of listening to music in the life of a particular individual. The music psychologists Adrian C. North, David J. Hargreaves and Jon J. Hargreaves argue that two factors have to be taken into account: how music is used by social actors, and the degree to which individuals engage with it. The degree of involvement in specific music listening depends in turn on the broader context of the observed actions, for example when is the music activity taking place? Who is taking part in it? Etc. (North, Hargreaves & Hargreaves 2004: 44-48).

Taking into account the above theoretical inspirations from sociology, cultural studies and psychology, it was decided to contextualise the music practices observed, i.e. to analyse them in the following contexts:

– situation / activity: when? With whom (alone or with others)? Is music a main activity or is it performed simultaneously with some other activity? Etc.;

– the mode of music usage: what kind of music activity? How? Why? Etc.;

– the music genre: intentional or random selection of specific music? Is it possible to identify specific music genres/artists that social actors combine with selected non-musical activities (e.g. meetings with friends, house cleaning, studying)? Etc.

We argue that the attempt to look at the practice of listening to music analysed in the broader socio-cultural context allows one to capture its diversity and go beyond a purely descriptive analysis.

Frequent music listening, an activity so willingly practised by the respondents, makes music almost omnipresent in their lives. How do they justify their needs for such intensive everyday contact with music? For some of them, music is simply one of the most important elements of their lives: "For me, music is like air, it is something... I couldn't live without music!" said Magda.[3] For others, music listening helps to regulate their mood: to isolate from problems, to create a good mood, to increase their level of energy, etc. But in many cases the respondents stressed that the greatest strength of music listening is that it helps one perform other, non-musical activities, effectively. What kinds of practice is music attached to most often? Those mentioned the most often were (starting with the most popular activities): listening to music while travelling (by car, bus, etc.) or when going on foot from one place to another; while studying and doing homework; while falling asleep; during computer activities; when having a rest; during housekeeping chores; while reading; and when wanting to wake up. In the following sections only the first four will be analysed in-depth.

Most respondents attend schools in a different district than the one in which they reside. Therefore during the working week they spend a lot of time travelling, and music is an essential part of the journey. In the morning music listening allows them to stay awake and provides positive energy. It also helps kill the monotony of daily travel by public transport: "In the case of a journey, short or long, music is an indispensable component. Yes, travelling is tiresome and music certainly makes it more enjoyable," admitted Kostek. Listening to music not only helps isolate one from the people in a crowded bus, but can also fill the deafening silence of a lonely journey. For Anita, music works this way: "For instance when I'm travelling alone by car

[3] The names referred in this article are not the real names of the respondents, but they are only aliases assigned in order to guarantee them anonymity and to make the presentation of the research more transparent. In addition the respondents' aliases are used as interviews codes, each referring to a specific audio recording, transcription and notes.

I feel so lonely. That silence. Yes, at that point I have to listen to some music that I really like".

Most of the respondents listen to music while they are studying (i.e. doing homework, preparing for exams, etc.). However, their attitudes towards combining these two practices were very mixed. There proved to be three main attitudes in this respect:

– Always listen to music while studying;

– It depends (on the subject of study and on one's mood at the moment in question);

– Never listen to music while doing homework (two main reasons: [1] having no need to do so, [2] music distracts, regardless of the subject one happens to be studying).[4]

Some of the respondents always listen to music when they study: music facilities studying, generates a pleasant atmosphere and kills the silence. Wiktoryna cannot image studying without having music turned on: "When I'm doing my homework I always listen to music (...) No, it isn't distractive. I would rather say that it makes things easier. When I listen to music while doing other things, I can evoke a certain kind of mood, a kind of rhythm for doing other things". What type of music do adolescents listen to while studying? An interesting finding is that some of them claim that in order to do homework effectively they listen to music different to the music they describe as that they like the most. For example Seweryn, who is a dedicated rap fan (not only does he present himself as a passionate rap listener, but he also composes his own pieces and performs in public), openly admitted that when he is studying he has to resort to a different music genre: "when I am doing my homework, I listen to different music, not rap, but something to chill out to: Ray Charles, Glenn Miller, something like that. Something quiet to calm down and relax to".

Nevertheless, for some of the respondents listening to music while studying is not that obvious. Firstly, it depends on the subject of the study: for instance while doing mathematic exercises or writing an essay, music seems to be much more distractive than when they are studying other subjects. Secondly, whether or not the music has vocals, and the language in which it is performed, also proved important. Music with lyrics is more distractive, and that sung in Polish distracts more than other music (because the respondents subconsciously focus on the song lyrics). For example, Kacper sometimes finds it challenging to study while listening to music: "when I am writing an essay and listening to music at the same time... at the beginning writing

[4] In what follows we only discuss the first two cases.

takes much more time, because my mind has to get used to doing those things simultaneously. But then, after some time I no longer focus so much on the music and I can write with ease". Other respondents choose their repertoire carefully in order to reduce the chance of being distracted by the music: Tytus listens to classic rock, while Witoryna prefers classical music.

Falling asleep is the third activity with which music is frequently combined. Music seems to be a common remedy for insomnia: "I listen to music when I go to bed and can't fall asleep" (Alina). Adolescents appreciate that music helps them regulate their mood whenever they need it. For example, Konrad states that "Even when I'm falling asleep, I listen to Beethoven's music or other classical works, because it helps me calm down and mellow out and I feel much better".

The Internet and new technologies are nowadays an integral part of youths' everyday life (cf. Filiciak et al 2010). So it is not surprising that the respondents spend so much of their free time on computer activities (e.g. playing games, surfing the web, using social networking, communicating with friends, etc.). In this case, music usually serves as a background for those activities. "When I'm using the computer, I listen to music. In fact whatever I'm doing on the computer, music is always there, quiet or loud, but it is always there" said Czesław. Darek goes even further – he prefers independently selected music to computer game soundtracks: "(...) when I play, I don't have to hear all the sound effects and the game soundtrack, but like listening to my own music: from speakers or headphones". Music does not pull the individuals away from doing their planned activities; instead it fills the silence, and helps create a comfortable atmosphere for work and leisure.

What distinguishes adolescents' listening practice is that the vast majority of these actions are performed individually (cf. Larson, Kubey 1983; North, Hargreaves & Hargreaves 2004). What is more, it seems that such a form of participation suits them best. Why? The main argument is that this form guarantees the fullest perception: you can listen to the music to the full (hear every word, every sound), calm down and relax. Tomek argues that "first of all, no one bothers me and I can concentrate, I mean ... focus ... in such a case listening has greater sense, because when you are listening with others it's more just talking than listening, and music is just an empty background for the conversation". Moreover, several respondents pointed out that listening in solitude brings out more of the emotion hidden in the music. "Perhaps music touches my heart more when I'm listening on my own," observes Larysa.

Modes of music listening: between hearing and reflexive listening

In Polish literature focusing on participation in culture studies (especially in studies based on quantitative data), music practices are often described by using categories such as 'passive' and 'active'[5] forms of participation[6] (e.g. Kłosiński 1984: 157-158; Rogalski 2000: 135-138; Szubertowska 2005a: 12-14).[7] Listening to music is usually classified as a 'passive' music activity, while singing and playing instruments are treated as 'active' forms. This division is often accompanied by a belief in the superiority of 'active' forms of participation in music culture, both at an artistic level (creative activity aimed at developing a deeper aesthetic sensitivity, etc.) and socially (educational gains, supporting social integration, etc.).

In the light of the empirical material collected here, such dualistic classification is impossible to maintain. Firstly, the division in music practices presented above bears the hallmarks of value-judgments. Every action treated as 'passive' already intuitively seems to be something automatic and performed without any deeper thought or reflection, and hence is perceived as something inferior and of less value. Secondly, the initial attempts to apply the 'active'-'passive' classification to interpret the research material turned out to lead to a reduction in the complexity of the phenomena observed, to their simplest and most superficial manifestations. The division in question seems to be, cognitively, the least useful tool when we try to describe and characterise music listening practices.

In order to capture the multidimensionality of listening practices and to overcome the conceptual limitations described above, it was decided to ap-

[5] In literature written in Polish two terms: – 'aktywne' and 'czynne' – are used interchangeably. In English both translate as 'active'.

[6] Sometimes it is possible to find another division. For instance, Elżbieta Szubertowska divides music practices into an expressive (singing and playing an instrument: alone and with others), aperceptional (listening to music: alone, at concerts, etc.) and intellectual (reading professional literature, collection CD, etc.). E.Szubertowska (2005b), Education and the music culture of Polish adolescents, Psychology of Music 3: 324-325.

[7] What is interesting is that in more recent literature one can find more or less conscious inconsistency in the application of this division. That process usually manifests itself in using only the category of 'active' participation in musical culture. As a result, certain musical practices are openly treated and classified as 'active' while others remain outside of the classification: any conceptual label is assigned to them. For example, in Eugeniusz Rogalski's article, activities such as playing instruments are treated as an "indicator of active participation in culture". But when he discusses listening to music (as he highlights the most common practice among young people) he does not refer to the "indicators of active participation in culture" that he employs, or to any other classification. See: E.Rogalski (2000), Miejsce muzyki w życiu młodzieży na tle innych zainteresowań kulturalnych, in: A.Białkowski (ed.), *Powszechna edukacja muzyczna a wyzwania współczesności*, Lublin, pp. 135-139.

peal to the category of cultural reflexivity. The gathered empirical material structured from this point of view allows one to distinguish two opposing modes of music listening:

1. Hearing music: in this model music serves only as a background (or soundtrack) for other, non-musical activities. No (or little) attention is paid to the music itself (to how it sounds or the lyrics). The individual is focused on doing other activities.

2. Listening to music: reflexive listening to music (listening in the full meaning of the word). The music is the object of what is being done (listening is the main activity). A lot of attention is paid to the music itself: to how it sounds (its melody, rhythm, instruments and tone, etc.), or its lyrics.[8]

However, it needs to be stressed that in most cases the respondents use both modes in everyday life and often mix them, creating a kind of in-between mode. But it has to be said that the 'hearing mode' occurs more often than the 'listening' one. Moreover, a few respondents admitted to not listening to music reflexively at all.

Modes of music listening are worth developing using the examples of specific respondents. In Kostek's musical practice, there are three dominant modes of music listening. When listening to ballads, he focuses on the songs' lyrics. He makes himself comfortable, and concentrates fully on the music. Although he claims to attempt every day to devote at least one hour to such reflexive listening, there are situations when he uses a mixed-mode of listening to music. This happens when Kostek is cleaning his apartment, when he loves listening to classic rock (e.g. Led Zeppelin). He likes it when the music is loud, so that he can feel the rhythm and adapt his movements to the music. By doing this he is focused on the music as well as the cleaning. The third mode of listening, i.e. the hearing mode, appears when Kostek is traveling to school by bus. He hates spending time in a crowded bus, so uses music to make the journey more enjoyable. However, he does not focus on it, and thinks about other things (school tests, friends, etc.). He does not even pay much attention to what he is listening to at a particular moment; it doesn't matter. The only thing that matters to him is separating himself from the other people (especially from their annoying conversations), and music helps him achieve this.

Another respondent, Darek, connects different modes of listening with different music genres. He claims to listen to Polish rap primarily because he

[8] For comparison, Tomasz Szlendak (based on analysis of empirical data on the participation in the culture of inhabitants of villages and small towns in Poland) lists two types of music listening: situational (respondents listen to whatever is being played at the moment) and contextual (listening depends on other factors, such as mood, need etc.). (Szlendak 2011: 82).

likes the lyrics, so when listening to rap he focuses on the music only (analysing the rappers' lyrics, etc.). On the other hand, when using a computer or studying, Darek likes to listen to rock or punk rock. He does not pay attention to the tone or lyrics of the songs at such times, and is focused on other things he is doing. Music is just a means for getting into a good mood, and for filling the silence. Darek admits that the 'hearing' mode dominates in his everyday life. He is very busy during working-week days (Darek is a goalkeeper in a football team), so he does not have a lot of free time to dedicate solely to listening to music.

The third example – that of Łucja – is a very specific case. One could confidently say that music plays only a marginal role in her life. She listens mostly to music on the radio, and often pays no attention to what is being played. Łucja also claims to pay little attention to the how the music sounds or its lyrics. She just needs to hear something in the background when doing other things (homework, cleaning, etc.), and her musical expectations go no further than that.

The examples presented above reinforce the need to break the interpretative limitations posed by usage of the category of 'passive'-'active' participation in musical culture, because as noted by Christopher Small: "This music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing" (Small 1998: 9). Small proposes a broader perspective in analysing musical practices; instead of concentrating on dividing and classifying observed activities, he suggests focusing on musicking, i.e. on every kind of engagement in music: "the verb to music is not concerned with valuation. It is descriptive, not prescriptive. It covers all participation in a musical performance, whether it takes place actively or passively, whether we like the way it happens or whether we do not, whether we consider it interesting or boring, constructive or destructive, sympathetic or antipathetic. The word will remain useful only for so long as we keep our own value judgments clear of it" (Small 1998: 8-10).

Music as a cultural vehicle

Music as a social force is much more profound than just facilitating other activities or regulating the mood. Tia DeNora remarks that: "music can be used (...) as a resource for making sense of situations, as something of which people may become aware when they are trying to determine or tune into an ongoing situation". DeNora defines music as a "cultural vehicle" because it allows the individuals to mediate certain experiences, to 'store' and restore

memories accordingly to current needs: "music can be used as a device for the reflexive process of remembering/constructing who one is, a technology for spinning the apparently continuous tale of who one is" (DeNora 2009: 4-14). Therefore, it is possible to look at music as a cultural tool that allows individuals to maintain their biographical narratives as it makes it easier to combine the past and the present into a coherent whole (DeNora 2009: 62-63).

The process of (re)organising one's own biography with the usage of music is visible among the respondents. What differentiates these practices is the range and nature of these activities. Two dominant trends can be specified: music usage (intentional or not) in the process of remembrance of selected episodes from the past, and the use of music in the process of maintaining the consistency and continuity of one's entire biography.

The first type of biographical strategy primarily involves going back to certain songs (rarely to whole albums) or artists, to which the respondents ascribe specific memories. For instance Aneta uses music to recall holiday memories: "Summer 2 years ago, I was in Bulgaria... and this song 'Sex on the beach' was everywhere! Now when I listen to that song, I immediately thing about that holiday". She admitted that with this song she can return in her mind to Bulgaria whenever she wants to: to meet people, visit places, remember events and the emotions attached to them. Róża on the other hand told such a story: "I can remember 5 years ago, I was traveling by car with my mom's sister, and on my MP3 player I was listening to a song by Dżem, 'Do kołyski'. There was a huge traffic jam... and then I noticed the dead body of a female accident victim lying on the road... and my aunt started to tell me that maybe this lady had been going home to her family, that it could have all gone differently... and I suddenly focused on the song's lyrics. Now whenever I listen to this song I always cry and tell myself how fragile human life is". Sometimes the process of remembering through music is unplanned: a song heard at a particular moment (e.g. in a shop, at a party, a wedding, etc.) invokes memories associated with it. This unintentional recall of memories is sometimes confusing because, as Julia says: "Sometimes it is very annoying, because there are certain events that I would prefer remained forever forgotten... but unfortunately they come to my mind immediately when... when I suddenly hear a particular song".

The second type of strategy is based on using music in the process of maintaining continuity in one's biography. This process does not always proceed consciously and purposefully: not all respondents seem fully aware of the impact that music has over them. Even more interestingly, after the interviews some of them admitted that this project had actually helped them realise the importance of music in their lives. Of all the respondents, Franek's

story seemed particularly special. For him, music was basically the only subject that allowed him to get along with his father (other topics, like school, family issues, etc., usually provoke arguments). His parents had just divorced and Franek was staying with this mother, so he only met up with his father from time to time. His father is a professional soldier, and Franek described him as a very difficult person: secretive, not very upfront but at the same time very critical when it came to other people. For Franek music and its related activities are the core values on which his relations with his father are built: they often go together to concerts and festivals (even those far away from Warsaw), recommend music to one another, and play the guitar together. Although he did not say so explicitly, it was easy to see that when it comes to music his father is an authority for him. During most of the interview, Franek was rather sober and distant, but when it came to the musical relationship with his father, he became very animated. Music allowed him to talk freely about his relations with his father, and consequently made it possible to capture the dynamics of this relationship, i.e. to show its course, its turning points, and the emotions emerging in certain situations. As Franek said: "When I listen to Metallica's 'Orion' it reminds me of Dad and our first trip by car. It was a really good trip, and we had a really great time! We were driving around the city for a few hours, and I remember that it was terribly hot. All the windows in the car were wide open, with 'Orion' blaring out loud. And we drove along the road that's the S8 today".[9]

Music devices and aesthetic construction of the self

Music, a fluid and intangible manifestation of human creativity, is – apart from during live performances – almost always mediated through various media. That is why music devices and recording technologies play such a crucial role in the changes in musical culture; they provide different tools for production, participation and consumption. Timothy Taylor argues that "Technology, however awe inspiring and anxiety producing it may seem to be upon its introduction to the realm of human social life, quickly becomes part of social life, naturalized into quotidian normality as it helps people do things they have always done: communicate, create, labor, remember, experience pleasure, and of course, make and listen to music" (Taylor 2001: 206). Therefore it is important to investigate the role and importance of music devices in shaping the musical practices of young people.

[9] The example of Franek and his father clearly illustrates a process that Alfred Schutz referred as musical creation of (on symbolic level) the "we-perception" and "we-relation" (Schutz 2008: 225-239).

First of all, it is essential to analyse what kind of music devices are used by the respondents and what the context of this usage is. Adolescents use mainly three devices: a computer, a mobile phone and an MP3 player. The computer (PC or laptop) is situated in the centre of domestic music practice. The respondents appreciate the comfort given by this single, multifunctional device that allows them to carry out several different activities at the same time (listening to music, searching for information, downloading music, studying, etc.). For example Tomek has both a computer and stereo system, but he definitely prefers using the former: "It is much easier for me to turn on the computer as I have access to the Web, I can turn down the volume, change the loudness practically with a single movement of my finger... it is just easier to do it that way".

When out of the home, adolescents use mobile phones or MP3 players. Both such devices are crucial in their everyday practice of music listening, because they spend a lot of time travelling (e.g. to school and back again, etc.) and this activity is often accompanied by music. Interestingly, among the participants in the individual interviews were several respondents who use both a mobile phone and an MP3 player. For instance, Paulina treats this as a form of safeguard: "Yes, I use a phone. But I also have an MP3 player. I always take both of them with me: when one suddenly discharges, I can use the other. Yes, it's very important to me! I don't like the bus noises, so I desperately need to listen to music while traveling. Yes, I really hate noisy means of transport".

Nowadays personal stereos[10] and mobile phones play a fundamental role in the self-regulation process of using music. Michael Bull states that what distinguishes these devices is that "the new technology of MP3 players gives users unprecedented power of control over their experience of time and space" (Bull 2005: 343). Bull lists three types of control: aesthetic, social and cognitive. The first refers to the ability to control one's aesthetic environment (control over one's sonic surroundings, etc.). The second – social control – concerns social interactions: individuals decide whether, in a given moment, they want to get involved in interactions with others or not. The third type of control – cognitive – refers to the ability to use a personal stereo as a self-management and self-regulation tool. According to Bull, the MP3 players (he is mostly interested in iPods) create a kind of sonic bubble, i.e. a sonic space, that isolates one from other people, shutting one away in

[10] The term 'personal' stereos is usually used in reference to such music devices as Walkman, Discman and MP3 players (Bull 2000; van Dijck 2006). In most cases the mobile phone is not included in this group (probably because it was originally designed as a talking device).

one's own world (cf. Simun 2009). Technology enables the reorganisation of social space: isolating the individual from the world around them, and at the same time allowing them to enter a private auditory world (Bull, 2007: 3-10).

If we analyse adolescents' musical practices through the categories proposed by Bull, it is not difficult to notice the existence of the three kinds of control described above. For example, Magda admits that she never parts with her MP3 player: "To get to my school and back it takes about 2 hours. Because first I go by train, then take a tram; so I always listen to music wherever I am". As she does not like the crowd in public transport, then in such situations – in order not to get stressed and nervous – she turns on her MP3 player, isolating her thoughts from the people around her. With the use of personal stereo and music Magda is creating her own private space within the public transport. Another respondent, Mariusz, claims to often listen to music before school tests: it allows him to calm down, to think freely and catch his breath. Therefore, he cannot imagine a situation of forgetting to take to school an MP3 player, or of his phone running out of power. The music is essential to him for gaining control over his restless thoughts.

The devices presented above, and especially personal stereos, are not just usual objects. They intermediate in the creation of a particular musical experience, and at the same time they determine those practices. It would be hard to imagine the activities described above (with their range, nature or intensity) were such music devices not to exist. On the other hand, the evolution of music devices is influenced strongly by users' expectations. This is particularly visible in the case of mobile phones (devices that are not associated by definition with music), as their development is at least partly driven towards fulfilling customers' musical needs.

Practices with music: between reflexivity and routine

The musical practices of the respondents participating in this research are dominated by listening to music; as such, this kind of activity has to be treated as the main form of aestheticisation of everyday life. Cleaning, doing homework, or travelling to school – to all these daily and routine activities (often performed without pleasure, e.g. cleaning one's room), the music adds a new, aesthetic dimension. These seemingly 'normal' and common activities acquire deeper meaning through music (which is why the aesthetic function of music cannot be reduced to only the aesthetic experience; in the adolescents' musical practices, the interpenetration of the aesthetic dimension with other areas of human activity is clearly visible). Moreover, it needs to be stressed that the respondents are aware of how music works for them

in specific situations. Recalling the understanding of 'reflexivity' proposed by Giddens, in concrete situations they make use of music based on their previous experience.

Music is omnipresent in the everyday life of adolescents. Thanks to music devices they can stay in contact with music wherever and whenever they want. One could say that these devices play the role of black boxes, understood as equipment seen by social actors in terms of its inputs and outputs without any further knowledge regarding how it works (Latour 1987: 2-3). The respondents use music devices such as MP3 players and mobile phones in order to remain in their 'musical cocoon' whenever they want, yet they do not pay much attention to how those devices, or the software installed on them, work. As long as they can listen to music, the entire internal process inside the device is of no importance.

Moreover, when thinking about future research it is also essential to add that even among those respondents who in general place cultural practices in the margins of their life, one could observe signs of reflexive modes of participation in music culture. Therefore, we argue that in subsequent research the focus should be shifted from analysing the reflexivity of the individuals' practices (i.e. whether, in general, they act reflexively or not) to when and why the social actors act in a reflexive way.

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Articles and Studies

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Architects and Designers Meet Sociologists to Design Urban Space. Reflection on the (im)possible crossing of disciplinary borders.

Space as an academic concept occupies a place in various disciplines and professions. In each case it tends to be named, studied, understood and created in the appropriate conceptual apparatus, using the relevant methodology for the acquisition and analysis of data. On the other hand, an ever greater role in the process of designing space is accorded to the users themselves, who have certain specific preferences and their own models of shaping the space. Awareness of these different perspectives requires interdisciplinary cooperation. The paper refers to experience gained during interdisciplinary spatial design workshops, at which students of architecture, interior architecture, sociology and philosophy jointly prepared designs for urban space. The design process is analysed as communication between the representatives of disciplines using different resources of reflexivity about space. This workshop experience is not treated as ordinary, empirical research. It is rather an impulse and a starting point for further research on the cognitive aspects of cooperation gathering together experts rooted in different institutional contexts and fields of knowledge. The article discusses the possibility of cross-disciplinary cooperation between architects, designers, sociologists, philosophers, artists and other space constructors and users. Our assumption – based on the conceptions of reflexivity by Pierre Bourdieu, Scott Lash and Anthony Giddens – is that this cooperation is practised as an *interdisciplinary* relationship, incapable of overcoming disciplinary borders.
Key words: space, architecture, art, design, cooperation, interdisciplinary borders

Introduction

The article examines the issues of reflexivity on social space as knowledge used by interdisciplinary teams in the process of designing a public space and discusses the possibility of cross-disciplinary cooperation. This kind of cooperation is within the mainstream of the pop-up city idea and

practice, and is becoming an important element of local (urban) policy in Poland.[1] Our assumption – based on the conceptions of reflexivity by Pierre Bourdieu, Scott Lash and Anthony Giddens – is that this cooperation is practised as an *inter–disciplinary* relationship, incapable of overcoming disciplinary borders. The paper makes a reference to the experiences gained during two rounds of the 'New Space' Interuniversity Trade Workshops, at which students of architecture, interior architecture, sociology and philosophy jointly prepared designs for urban space. Group dynamics observed within the teams that formed in the frame of the workshop, the ways of cooperation discussed, and the communication within these groups led us to similar conclusions from one year to the next. It is important to emphasise that we treat this experience not as ordinary empirical research. It is rather an impulse and a starting point for further research on the cognitive aspects of the cooperation, gathering together experts rooted in different institutional contexts and fields of knowledge.

It is obvious for the social and human sciences that only to a limited extent is the form of a space dictated by the influence of a professional designer and their knowledge and values. One can see how in modern architectural and urban-planning theories, importance is increasingly attached to the way in which the space is perceived, used and shaped by people, and the nature of the relations between the space and social practices. These questions are significant not just for the development of sociology per se, but also for individuals who are professionally influential in regard to the quality of local life: city officials, urban planners, architects and politicians. In practice, they display different levels of reflexivity in terms of the theoretical context of their own actions. There is no doubt, though, that the need for a 'participatory planning process' and the application of sociological knowledge – including from the fields of urban sociology and the sociology of space – is slowly becoming the declarative standard of architectural and urban-planning practices. Our experience of working with architects and urban planners would suggest that it is much easier for them to approach sociologists with a proposal of collaboration than to accept the consequences of such a venture. The direct consequence of this is acceptance of the fact that theories of space in sociology are manifold and diverse, as are its methodologies and the specifics of social research. We would argue that difficulties in accepting these consequences result from different types of reflexivi-

[1] On the political (legal) level the new standards in urban planning are designed in the Act on Revitalisation (2015) in which interdisciplinary cooperation is necessary to prepare and realise the revitalisation projects.

ty: that of the architect/visionary/creator on the one hand, and that of the sociologist/spokesperson for society on the other.

Disciplinary 'reflexive communities'

Reflexivity – considered one of the key features of postmodernity (Giddens 2001) – is manifested in the increasing self-knowledge of individuals and the community, in the social awareness of the consequences of one's own actions – towards others but also towards the environment. Owing to this particular competence of social actors, an increasing role in spatial design is played by the users of the space, who have their own specific preferences and models for creating it. With the aid of the category of reflexivity we can gain a broader and deeper insight into the experiences gleaned from the workshops as a reflection of the processes taking place in modern society. In this society, as Scott Lash writes in reference to Pierre Bourdieu's conception, 'fields' are reflexive communities producing "the shared meanings and practices, the affective involvement with the 'tools' and product, the internalist generation of standards, telos, and ends, the felt obligations, the guidance by *Sitten*, the characteristic habitus of the field" (Lash 1994: 161). Anthony Giddens adds to the list of characteristics of modernity, reinforcing the picture of the aforementioned 'reflexive communities', the internal referentiality of social systems, manifested in the tendency to improve methods of influence and distinguish actions that are comparatively isolated and thus more susceptible to control. Internal referentiality is also linked to another attribute of late modernity, which Giddens calls the 'sequestration of experience' and is associated with a growing influence of expert abstract systems in all areas of daily life (Giddens 1991: 83ff.).

Referring to our experiences – jointly leading the interdisciplinary spatial design workshops, we can conclude that it was not just the fact that the various disciplines employed their own meanings and practices that dictated the shape of the process of joint spatial design by their representatives. This would mean that after the meanings were decided on it would be possible to form a 'common field'. Instead, a factor that exerted a stronger influence on the design process was the participants' readiness to use the process while being reflexive on the various paradigms, perceiving the ontology and epistemology of social life and space in different ways and as a result differing in their definitions of the objectives and norms of aesthetics in architecture. This is also the reason why for the purposes of our study we propose using the concept of reflexivity in two ways. First, as reflexivity applying in a given 'field', as understood by Bourdieu (e.g. 2009: 50-51). The relevant fields

here will be 'sociological', 'philosophical/aesthetic' and 'architectural'. This is a kind of meta-layer referring to the way in which from a sociological perspective we analyse the process of spatial design as social practices within the fields of disciplinary communities. We refer to Bourdieu's concepts as we analyse the usual practices of the students of all subjects – while in this sense social *practices* are the main material of analysis enabling us to discover the *models of practising* (reflexively – as in the concept of the habitus, organising the *practices* themselves). In the second layer, we complement the description of these fields in reference to the various types of reflexivity mentioned by Lash (1994): cognitive, aesthetic and hermeneutic. According to him, cognitive reflexivity, based on Enlightenment rationalism, corresponds to the positions of Ulrich Beck and Giddens, who refer to the current phase as late modernity. They consider reflexivity to be an immanent characteristic of a contemporary society which results from the development of expert knowledge; on the one hand, it contributes to the increased social risk, while on the other it means that risk becomes familiar through the development of knowledge (reflexivity). This is a type of reflexivity that is part of the so-called paradigms of social subjectivity, in which the individual – the rational agent – invoking reserves of socially established knowledge and participating in the creation of the discourse on social reality (e.g. local identity, aesthetics of architecture), undertakes actions that reconstruct the social structures, reflexively influencing them. Weighing up the risk (as understood in Beck's theory), the individual constructs their own identity, creating a kind of narrative about oneself. Therefore, at every level of social life, from the individual to the macrostructure, the process of structuration is dialectical in character: the structure of the social world determines the subject, but is also reflexively created by it. This type of reflexivity is dominant among representatives of the social sciences, as alongside the impermanent character of knowledge, distinctive in particular of all scientific disciplines based on empirical factors, they constantly revise social practices in the light of knowledge of these practices.

We can therefore intuitively assume that the cognitive type of reflexivity sets apart and at the same time distances sociology students from those of disciplines that are not geared towards application. Justification for this hypothesis, based on loose observations, is given by Giddens, who notes that, "the discourse of sociology and the concepts, theories, and findings of the other social sciences continually 'circulate in and out' of what it is that they are about. In so doing they reflexively restructure their subject matter, which itself has learned to think sociologically. Modernity is itself deeply and intrinsically sociological" (Giddens 1991: 43). Reflexivity therefore also

means the 'circulation' of social knowledge, although Giddens adds that "much that is problematic in the position of the professional sociologist, as the purveyor of expert knowledge about social life, derives from the fact that she or he is at most one step ahead of enlightened lay practitioners of the discipline" (ibidem: 43).

From the sociological approach to space planning

The sheer number and diversity of theoretical paradigms, based on a variety of ontologies of space using different research methodologies and stressing various aspects, is reflected in the list of 52 researchers of space and place whose conceptions are discussed in the book *Key Thinkers on Space and Place* (Hubbard, Kitchin, Valentine 2004). The way in which space is understood in sociology, social geography, anthropology and psychology today results from the development of diverse and often competing theoretical notions, especially the perspectives of humanistic and macroeconomic sociology. Adopting a specific ontology of space has cognitive and methodological consequences. Sociologists (or anthropologists, psychologists, etc.) following a constructivist paradigm will not say anything true about a space if unable to reconstruct its social meanings. Sociologists therefore ask how people perceive and mark a space, as well as asking why they perceive it in different ways. They look for answers in individual and collective experiences, cultural models rooted in the past and modified and maintained in various ways today. In this way, they 'discover' the various characteristics as well as the value of the space, permitting them to call it primary or secondary, one's own or someone else's, but also private, public, sociopetal and sociofugal space. Researchers analysing space from a macroeconomic perspective assume that it reflects fundamental macrostructural contradictions, and that power relations established beyond the space are materialised in it. They then ask who has the real power in a space, what entities determine its shape, and in what way the space favours maintenance and recreation of its macrostructural features. The number of perspectives provides a cognitive potential to better understand people in a space, but also to better understand the space in which people live and from which they emigrate.

Sociology not only offers a particular way of understanding specific conceptual categories, but also identifies various sources of knowledge which are complementary and allow us to examine and interpret space holistically. Owing to the diversity of methods – interviews, observations, analyses of documents, visual analyses, measurement of paths, mental and behavioural mapping, etc. – we are able to perceive the multitude and variability of spac-

es, the accumulation of structures and meanings in time, and their relational character. Through sociological theories developed on the basis of empirical theories, we can better understand people's actions, decisions and attitudes. The work of an architect, who is seeking to establish how best to implement accepted premises, may involve using both the results of sociological research with applied functions and fundamental studies aiming to provide better theoretical tools for understanding person–space relations. Similarly, sociologists themselves, in adopting given theoretical premises and the social ideology that underlies them, can – like artists or architects – be social engineers, visionaries, and designers of human actions and spaces. However, this role is a less obvious one than that of the researcher. Having said that, in the developing field of public sociology, there is a stress on the need for the sociologist to form a relationship with the community and to conduct research not for the sake of knowledge per se, but to make use of it (Burawoy 2005). The prominence of this point of view means an increase in the ethical responsibility of research. The similarly applied function of social research in spatial planning or design is relatively new, at least in Poland. It is hard to forge the relationship between sociology and architecture – fields joined by a common denominator of people – in practice, i.e. in spatial design. Of course, we can cite examples of specific architectural and urban-planning projects that result from balanced collaboration between sociologists and architects. These, though, are still much less common in Poland than elsewhere. There are several factors behind this gradual increase of the participatory element in the design process. Firstly, there is evidence of increasing social subjectivity: consumers' awareness that they have the right to expect their opinions, or even ideas, to be taken into consideration in the project. Secondly, the architects themselves – particularly those designing in the public space – have growing faith that the potential users of the space possess knowledge, competence and imagination that not only can enrich the project but upon which depends the success or failure of how the space is developed. There is no doubt that a major role has been played by publications pointing directly to the consequences of 'social' or 'participatory' thinking about space in the process of its design (the best-known examples of those popularising this process are Jan Gehl and Peter Hall, or in Poland Krzysztof Nawratek). Thirdly and finally, a belief increasingly popular among sociologists is that many social phenomena and processes cannot be described, comprehended and explained without consideration of the spatial context, understood not only as a social construct, but also as a kind of ecosystem, an area with a particular form and matter. For all these reasons, social researchers (sociologists as well as anthropologists and psychologists) are increasing-

ly attempting to work together with urban planners, architects and spatial designers.

Building interdisciplinary bridges

The differences between the representatives of various academic disciplines in their approach to space can be seen at the stage of categorisation of reality and acceptance of certain premises as to its socio-spatial ontology – which has a variety of consequences. On the one hand, for example, it can lead to the individual fields becoming further professionalised and specialised, meaning development of knowledge, diverse perspective and conceptions unavailable in the process of the popular view and understanding of social reality. On the other hand, though, by exhibiting and 'nurturing' their own distinctiveness, if this acts as a safeguard for their particularistic interests, as a result the sense of independence, exceptionality or stability of the previous position may be limited. By acting hermetically, the representatives of a given community can become closed off from interdisciplinary knowledge and dialogue. This may lead to aversion to different ways of perceiving and understanding the social world, seeing beyond one's own point of view, methods of action and implementation of solutions. Becoming isolated and resisting stepping outside the limits of one's own discipline can lead to a sense of a chronic shortage of information about the subject of analysis. A particular role is played by those disciplines located at points where different areas meet – social sciences and humanities, technical sciences/engineering and arts – which are at the same time of a strictly applied character, being followed in the spatial design process. Examples of such disciplines are architecture and interior architecture.

The need to combine the perspectives of various fields was expressed several years ago by academic staff at the Faculty of Interior Architecture of the Academy of Fine Arts in Kraków as well as the Faculty of Architecture at the Cracow University of Technology, who organised 'New Space' interdisciplinary spatial design workshops. In the first three editions, future architects and interior architects worked together as a team. In 2012 the first workshop to include students from the Institute of Sociology of the Jagiellonian University took place, and they were joined in 2013 by students from the Jagiellonian's Institute of Philosophy. The groups, comprising representatives of each subject, had the task of preparing a design on a theme with a general definition and stipulations. In the fourth edition – the first to feature sociologists – the topic was 'Cultural Bridges' (referring to the Vistula River and its banks in the Kraków area), and in the fifth – with philosophy stu-

dents – it was 'Trans-Formation of Local Identity'. This time, the projects were to be on three empty Kraków buildings: those of the former Cracovia and Forum hotels and the NOT building, the so-called 'Skeletor'. The main premise of this interdisciplinary programme is to "broaden the educational opportunities of students by pursuing academic interests in collaboration with related subjects at various universities, and at the same time initiating integration of the professional community combined with forming the skill of collaboration in sector groups" (Gibała-Kapecka, Kapecki 2013: 6). The motif for this joint work by representatives of various disciplines was the belief – expressed at many of the preparatory meetings for workshop leaders and students – that space cannot be discussed, understood and designed with blinkers on, heeding only the point of view of one's own field. 'Space' cannot be slotted into disciplinary compartments, as it is at once a product, a context and a pretext for human actions and valorisation, allowing a person to simply 'be', in a purely physical sense as well as an emotional, political, economic or other one. The workshops therefore confronted the theoretical competences of the students of three of Krakow's universities with their ability to work together and share knowledge, while also asking how an engineer, artist, sociologist and aesthetician-philosopher can work together to expand their imagination and working methods, making them more creative and efficient.

Let us, however, begin with a short description of the empirical reality, and only afterwards come back to the category of reflexivity and the consequences that result from diversity – which can in various conditions constitute a strength or weakness of interdisciplinary teams. Each of the groups formed for the workshops comprised representatives of every subject, and each was responsible for its final results: a graphic spatial design with descriptive elements. The group's structure was to develop during the work, as a result of the disciplinary competences and skills as well as the characteristics of its members. However, in practice it turned out that a major factor in the formation of this structure comprised the expectations of the workshop initiators, expressed during the introduction and during the workshop. The sociologists (students and group leaders) were invited to take part in the project as 'specialists who will look after the social aspect of the projects' – they were therefore called upon to provide theoretical and empirical knowledge about the expectations and opinions of the local community. Philosophy students (and their group leaders) were defined as 'specialists in aesthetics'. Incidentally, the students themselves were discreetly surprised to be given this role, at first making quiet protests that they were 'just philosophers/philosophy students', but with time internalising the role and demonstrating

commitment in preparing the descriptions of the projects' aesthetic conceptions. The architects were to be the 'creators' of the designs, which were expected to be prepared on the basis of the knowledge provided by the sociologists and philosophers. This function was legitimised firstly by their degree subject and the knowledge they had gained on the 'art of architecture'. As Steen Rasmussen (himself an architect) wrote, "Architecture is not produced simply by adding plans and sections to elevations. It is something else and something more. It is impossible to explain precisely what it is – its limits are by no means well-defined. On the whole, art should not be explained; it must be experienced. (...) The architect works with form and mass just as the sculptor does, and like the painter he works with colour. But alone of the three, his is a functional art. It solves practical problems. It creates tools or implements for human beings and utility plays a decisive role in judging it" (Rasmussen 2000: 9). Rasmussen's last sentence here stresses the primacy of ethical over aesthetic criteria. The role of architecture students as the project 'creators' also resulted from one other apparently prosaic but telling fact: they knew how to use computer software for designing and visualising designs for space.

The first edition of the workshop – in which the sociologists took part – was a remarkable, very creative experience, but one that made the difficulties of interdisciplinary communication emphatically clear. At least this was our impression based on analysis of our own class evaluations at the time: in terms of group dynamics and communicational structure, the necessary teamwork skills were lacking (including cooperative competences), and this was closely linked to a lack of knowledge of the specific nature and potential of the various disciplines, their language, methodology and tools. This made it much more difficult to work together, since, as Stephen Covey (2004: 277) put it, "unless we value the differences in our perceptions, unless we value each other and give credence to the possibility that we're both right, that life is not always a dichotomous either/or, that there are almost always third alternatives, we will never be able to transcend the limits of that conditioning". Design in general is – following Christopher Alexander (1964), a process of reaching knowledge, and the path that leads us to the solution is just as important as the solution itself.[2] It is therefore crucial to go beyond one's own opinions, experiences, values and perspective. The process of knowledge acquisition plays a key role, and for socially oriented designers becomes something equally important as the designing itself. The objective of design

[2] See: Christopher Alexander, *Notes on the Synthesis of Form*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.

conceived in this way is to apply solutions to their purpose – which is a continual process and an intellectual and practical challenge. The workshops, the idea behind which was to initiate new social orders (not only hypothetical ones within the designs constructed by the groups, but also actual ones implemented in the form of interdisciplinary consultations and discussions which sought to bridge the banks of the human imagination, sensitivity and competencies), required not just suitable conditions for meeting and working together, but overcoming a range of institutional and personal limitations, or even more – overcoming borders between disciplinary 'reflexive communities'.

Sociologists' research, which has applied functions, is often linked directly or indirectly to social change. This practical, 'engineering' aspect of sociology has been present in the discipline since the outset, when its founding aims were not just to better understand the social world, but also to 'organise' it better. As Giddens notes (1987: 21), "the social sciences have been reflexively involved in a most basic way with those very transformations of modernity which give them their main subject-matter". Artists, on the other hand, can be distinguished by the other type of reflexivity – let us look at it for a moment – rooted in the aesthetic modernism of Adorno, Baudelaire and Nietzsche, and represented by Bauman, Derrida and Lyotard. This form is distinctly antifundamentalist, denying the possibility that in our modern reality any coherent social ideology exists that designs that reality (such as rationalism or Marxism in the past). The source of reflexivity is the expressive 'I', which attains cognition through negation (e.g. of the existing structures of knowledge) and deconstruction. This is a reflexivity resulting from an ontology of reality that is focused on difference (and not, like cognitive reflexivity, on identity) and on an event (not a narrative) (Lash 1994).

When looking at the subject of different types of reflexivity on space, we refer to their foundations – depending on the academic discipline – in the various ontological paradigms cited earlier. These different types of reflexivity and communicational practices between the group members translated into 'design practices', meaning the ways in which the participants created their designs for the city spaces during intensive workshops lasting several days. The expectations of the main organisers and initiators of the enterprise – representatives of architecture and interior architecture – appeared on the face of it to be tangible, although in practice they proved to be based on definitions of 'expert knowledge' that were not agreed upon in the interdisciplinary group. The teaching models and methods used in the individual academic environments, the dynamic of the group work, and at the same

time the need to develop an individual style, combined to define the situation in which all the workshop participants found themselves. This was especially true of the interior architecture students, as in their education – and we make this observation solely on the basis of the workshops – there is a clear expectation that their work will be the result of an aesthetic transgression, a 'trace' of their uniqueness and creativity[3]. The Academy of Fine Arts teachers suggested that their students break with patterns, 'think differently' and 'do the opposite'. From our (sociological) perspective, when the student artists' reflexivity was directed in this way the result was that they focused on the form and marginalised questions of functionality. We often observed spatial projects in development that were lacking in comfort or safety from the point of view of the future user – as a result of the size and shape of the rooms, their texture (e.g. spikes sticking out from the walls), the lack of driveways, insufficient lighting in long underground tunnels or safety barriers on high platforms intended for usage – but were also innovative, displaying original solutions or following the latest design trends. The designers here played the role not just of specialists in 'design technique', but also upholders of aesthetics in the social space. Discussions with the students made it clear that they were confident that certain formal and aesthetic solutions would result in the 'right' use – that is, in keeping with their expectations – of the designed building/space. Some projects – for public spaces – seemed somehow to be based on the assumption that it is 'the user who should teach the designer, and not vice-versa'. Meanwhile, the sociology students were encouraged by their sociologist leaders to enter the role of 'spokespeople for society', which led them to observe the ideas of the architects with growing interest, but also sometimes concern, as they tried to 'realise' their designs. This 'realisation' was conceived as adapting to the (assumed) needs of the society that the design would potentially affect, and a noticeable motif in their thinking was social inclusion and integration. However, the sociology students' arguments in favour of 'inclusive' or 'participatory' projects – starting from the basic question of *who the space was for* – did not go beyond questioning the artistic solutions. For the sociologists, not only acceptance proved difficult, but so too did the suggesting of new spatial forms; they tended to err on the side of caution, affirming what they knew and viewed as tested.

To conclude, let us specify the broadly outlined differences that come from the different reserves of knowledge and types of reflexivity of the rep-

[3] The difference between a *designer* and an *artist* seems to be a basic question in the discussion on the social sense of design and the social roles of designers. See: Piłat-Borcuch 2015: 16-24.

resentatives of various scientific disciplines and professions. Sociologists tend to accumulate and interpret *narratives* about a place. Usually, people *talk*, *give their view*, *have their say* about a place, and very rarely – the exception is children – do they use tools allowing them to visualise their emotions or judgements associated with that place. When sociologists use an observation technique to learn about the patterns of use of a space, they also verbalise the unsaid: behaviours, gestures, and trajectories of movement immersed in time. Architects work with pictures, icons and graphics – these are their means of talking about space. It remains a challenge to translate words into pictures or sketches. And although it is increasingly common and popular for sociologists to use visual methods – such as mapping of space in diagrams, drawing or photography – this is usually just supplementary material obtained in questionnaire or narrative interviews. While we are discussing these limitations, let us add that designs for public space should consider the relations between the space's past and future. Testimonies and verbal sources are required for interpretation of this kind of relationship. The Cracovia and Forum hotels and NOT building, the subjects of this year's workshop, are examples of places with histories, which, when creating new designs, require that narratives are put into practice in the physical form of the space. A further stumbling block in cooperation between a sociologist and architect is the hypothetical consumer/user of the space. Even if an architect is interested in public opinion, they simply ask: "what do people expect from this place (in which the former Hotel Forum, Hotel Cracovia or 'Skeletor' etc. can be found)?" The sociologist will reply: "which people? The residents of Krakow, residents of the district where the building is, the building's immediate neighbours, tourists?" Of course, the decision concerning the consumers has consequences in the selection of the study sample, but in fact it signifies a great responsibility not just in methodological issues – de facto, it is a decision that results in specific groups and social categories being included or excluded from the process of spatial design. The literature on methodology of social research devotes much attention to the question of over– and underrepresentation of certain social categories in a sample based on gender, age, social status or other characteristics. For research with applied objectives, for example in spatial design, the researcher must be aware of the consequences of decisions made in sample selection. In this sample, the ways in which a space is used, its valorisation and the expectations for it will be examined, and through the design process this will have tangible, long-lasting social consequences.

The way in which recommendations are made can also pose an obstacle to collaboration. Yet this does not concern conveying the results of research,

which are expressed in the form of general observations – the need for safe spaces, for example. Such general recommendations can be inferred from theory, and their added value is mostly the empirical confirmation of what is 'widely known'. Sociologists – let's stick with the above example – using all their diverse research methods, can make this statement more specific by discovering what a 'safe space', 'safety' or a 'sense of security' mean in a given community, time and place. But these are also socially constructed categories, variable not only in a longer time perspective and broader geographical one,[4] but also differing according to the groups sharing use of the same space and considered in terms of age, gender, ethnic origin, education and individual experiences, etc. Even the specific solutions suggested by respondents (e.g. more benches or green space or expectations of playgrounds) are not linked to design solutions in a strict sense – and this offers much room for debate in interdisciplinary groups: how can the results obtained and communicated be interpreted? How can these socially defined expectations be fulfilled? How can a desired function be secured for a place? In practice, there are many solutions, and the choice of which to use is important. This means that the participatory nature of an architectural design process in no respect closes it to a new form or removes imagination from the designing. For this is neither about installing necessary equipment nor the unreflexive realisation of users' ideas, which can lead to clichéd, conventional, tired and mundane solutions. An example might be a park bench – recommended by residents, but put in a random place (albeit perhaps the best from the designer's point of view), which thereby loses its function, becoming a superfluous piece of furniture in an abandoned space. As sociologists, our task is not only to identify 'what', but also to provide explanations and help to understand 'why (not) in this place'.

Summary

The experiences of the workshop participants emphatically demonstrated the diversity of points of view and social practices that emerge from pursuing various scientific disciplines – although not all were able to use this potential. What was expected to be the strength of the workshops often become a source of tension caused by scholastically acquired knowledge and expert recommendations for its implementation, which became seen as the

[4] As an example: an operational definition of a safe space would be entirely different for a person living in Poland in the 12th century, in the inter-war period and at the beginning of the 21st century, as well as for an inhabitant of the Krowodrze district in Krakow, Manhattan and a Pacific island.

only correct option. By favouring our own ways of understanding space in the process of its design we grow distant from what Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz (2006: 10) points out in her introduction to the issues of phenomenology of space: "not only philosophers speak about space, they only find various ways of expressing the human experience of spatiality. The experience itself is universal and constant, because any sensation and cognition of the world is a spatial experience. Therefore, apart from philosophers, scientists and gardeners as well as poets talk about it – the first when creating theories of space, the second when planting trees and measuring the distance between them, and the third when invoking imaginary pictures and metaphors. But behind the diversity of expression their sources are always one". Incidentally, in a certain sense 'our' workshop was a forum for (future) representatives of some of the groups Buczyńska-Garewicz mentions: sociologists, engineers, artists and philosophers. As a result, it was inspirational not only from a cognitive point of view, but also as an exceptionally 'instructive event', as the dynamic and difficult collaboration process gave rise to clashes of differing (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) beliefs, visions and emotions. Following two editions of the workshop, we are convinced that for the participants (students) themselves, a single participation is insufficient to be able to effectively and synergistically combine various disciplinary perspectives. A few days of intensive work are not enough for students of several subjects to create a common code, because their disciplines function in different 'fields' of discourse. However, they have an excellent opportunity to embrace the challenge of negotiating meanings beyond the boundaries of their disciplines. Our post-workshop discussions with the sociology students revealed that they saw the workshop as a practical encounter with other types of reflexivity, rather than just a theoretical one.[5]

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[5] The starting point for 'bridging the interdisciplinary gaps' comprised the joint meetings, and as part of them the students?' joint execution of tasks. This was no guarantee of effective knowledge sharing, sometimes taking the form of exclusively declared or ostensible collaboration. For this reason, the organisers went one step further, planning 'pre-workshop' courses as a future extension. These will give the sociology and philosophy students an insight into the artist'/designers' perspective and provide the latter with pointers as to how sociologists and philosophers think about and study social reality. The joint 'pre-workshop' courses will aim to offer a forum for exchanging views and overcoming the distance that each type of reflexivity can engender.

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Research Workshops

KAROLINA PANZ

Testimonies of Survivors of Post-War Anti-Jewish Violence: Deconstructing a Myth of Polish Collective Memory

As many as thirty-three people of Jewish descent perished between 1945-1947 in Podhale. Twenty-six of them died within several weeks. In August 1945 there were several heavily-armed attacks on orphanages that sheltered the sickest Jewish children. These crimes were perpetrated by soldiers of the anti-communist underground movement. Despite this, the creation of their legend, remembrance and emphasis on their heroism constitutes a very important part of contemporary Polish history politics. In this paper the author shows in what way the testimonies of Jewish victims of violence perpetrated by heroes of Polish history have led her to deconstruct one of the myths in the pantheon of Polish collective memory.
Key words: post-war period, anti-Jewish violence, anti-communist guerrillas

"Their tradition, accomplishments and virtues"

It has been a dozen years now since I moved to Podhale, a mountainous region in Southern Poland, and began reconstructing the stories of Podhale's Jewish communities. As is the case in many places, one inevitably encounters history never told. The stories of several thousand Jews who lived here before World War II and perished during the Holocaust have been silenced. The same type of silence has covered the response of their contemporaries, the Polish inhabitants of Podhale, to the Holocaust of their neighbours. Still, what distinguishes Podhale from other regions is the scale of the infamous spiral of post-war violence against Jewish Holocaust survivors inflicted by the soldiers of the anti-communist underground.

Between 1945 and 1947, Podhale witnessed particularly intense fighting between the communist functionaries and members of the guerrilla unit *Błyskawica* (Lightning) led by Józef Kuraś aka *Ogień* ('Fire'). During the communist years, *Ogień* was portrayed as a criminal, a psychopath and a fascist. Recently, however, Józef Kuraś *Ogień* and his soldiers have become

an important symbol of post-war resistance to the communist regime. They have grown to embody the very icon of the 'cursed soldiers'. This powerful symbol resonated throughout the speech by the Polish Minister of National Defence, Antoni Macierewicz, at a commemorative mass celebrating the anniversary of the death of Józef Kuraś aka *Ogień*: "Their tradition, accomplishments and virtues (...) are (...) the very values which shall allow the power of the Polish army and the power of Poland to shine".[1]

Józef Kuraś *Ogień* and the 'cursed soldiers' constitute an important element of the Polish politics of history that has a growing presence in Poland's public discourse. In President Andrzej Duda's view, the politics of history should occupy a prominent place as an instrument in strengthening the international position of Poland and educating new generations of Poles.[2] The coordinator of the relevant programme of the Polish government,[3] Professor Andrzej Nowak, acting on behalf of President Andrzej Duda, has clearly emphasised that „our Polish politics of history ought to be constructed solely on positive experiences (....) A politics of history haunted by fear, terror or an unsettling past is not a healthy one".[4] Nevertheless, the construction of the contemporary symbol of *Ogień* and his soldiers is made at the expense of the memory of their Jewish victims.

According to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), parties involved in armed conflict must, at all times, differentiate between the military and civilians, because civilians must not be attacked. Still, in a questionable attempt to reconcile the objective of a 'positive' vision of the soldiers in the *Błyskawica* Unit with the most basic interpretation of civilized law, the crimes against the Jewish people perpetrated by these soldiers were and still are 'justified' by applying the stereotype of an evil 'żydokomuna' (literally 'Jewish communist'), while the victims, considered in anonymity and en masse, are stripped of individuality. A typical example of such narrative is the following quote: „It would be hard to assume that *Ogień* killed those Jews, previously saved from the Holocaust by the local people, or the guerrillas' neighbours, who had oftentimes risked their lives in doing so. A different

[1] PAP: "Minister Antoni Macierewicz na obchodach 69. rocznicy ostatniej walki i śmierci mjr. Józefa Kurasia "Ognia" w Waksmundzie", www.podhale24.pl (Last accessed December 1, 2016).

[2] The team at wPolityce.pl: "Narodowa Rada Rozwoju o polityce historycznej. Prezydent Duda: *Nie zbuduje się młodych pokoleń przywiązanych do swojej Ojczyzny, jeżeli nie będą dumni ze swojej tradycji*", 16 February 2016, www.wpolityce.pl (Last accessed May 4, 2016).

[3] The goal of this programme is the development of the Polish Strategy of Politics of History: *Zapis spotkania inaugurującego prace nad powstaniem Strategii Polskiej Polityki Historycznej w Belwederze, 17 listopada 2015 roku,* www.prezydent.pl (Last accessed December 1, 2016).

[4] Adam Sosnowski: "Trzy wybitne dzieła, czyli inauguracja nowej polityki historycznej. Na sali Szczerski, Gliński, Kolarski... i marszałek Piłsudski", 18 December 2015, www.wpolityce.pl (Last accessed May 4, 2016).

group of Jews survived the war in the USSR. It was within that group that an all-Russian Communist Bolshevik Party appointed many representatives of the new authorities".[5] Wishing to question this version of events, I decided to investigate the circumstances of every single act of anti-Jewish violence in this territory and, while reconstructing it, I focused on the victims. The key sources in my work were testimonies of those survivors who, right after the Holocaust, suffered at the hands of Polish citizens.[6]

Lawrence Langer, in his book *Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruins of Memory*, stated: "A monumental image of history does not fit the experience of Holocaust Survivors".[7] In my contribution, I wish to show how the experiences recalled in the testimonies available from those survivors who suffered violence from the anti-communist guerrillas or even died at their hands 'do not fit' the vision of the Polish politics of history based on 'positive experiences' alone.

"You wished to dominate the entire country"

I would like to start with troubling events recalled in the interviews conducted by David Boder in 1946 in France.[8] Boder interviewed Lena Kuechler, former manager of an orphanage in Zakopane, Józef Ferber, commander of a Jewish self-defence unit at the orphanage, and a few children who were in their care. Through their accounts I learned of repeated assaults by Polish guerrillas on Jewish children that took place in two Podhale towns: Rabka and Zakopane.

It was in those two towns that, in February 1945, a few weeks after the German occupation had ended in Poland, a plan was drawn up to establish care and treatment centres for Jewish children who had survived the Holocaust. Until that time, about a hundred children, returning from camps and leaving hiding places or the Polish families who had sheltered them, had been staying at the headquarters of the Temporary Aid Committee for the

[5] Andrzej Gwiazda, *Kto walczy z "Ogniem"* (www.niezalezna.pl, accessed 15 April 2015)

[6] This work was supported by the National Programme for the Development of the Humanities (Poland) under the "Społeczna antropologia pustki: Polska i Ukraina po II wojnie światowej" grant, number 12H 13 0384 82. My article discussing the entire history of post-war violence against Jewish Holocaust Survivors inflicted by the soldiers of the anti-communist underground during 1945-1947 appeared in 2015 ([Author]: *"Dlaczego oni, którzy tyle przecierpieli i przetrzymali, musieli zginąć. Żydowskie ofiary zbrojnej przemocy na Podhalu w latach 1945–1947"*, *Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały*, 11, 2015, pp. 33-89).

[7] Langer L., *Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruins of Memory,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, p. 78.

[8] The collection of interviews conducted by Dr. David P. Boder in 1946 is available in an online archive: www.voices.iit.edu (last accessed December 1, 2016).

Jewish People in Kraków. There, due to extremely rough conditions, the children slept on the floor and apart from being fed they were not really attended to.[9] However, the minimal care they received was not the only reason behind the search for a better place; an important motivating factor was the atmosphere that could be sensed around Jewish children in general. A report, written in 1945 by the Jewish Committee in Kraków, read: "A particular challenge was the question of ill children, for the most part suffering from tuberculosis, whose placement in hospitals encountered a number of hurdles, either due to the hospitals' lack of capacity or [...] due to a particular attitude towards Jewish children expressed by individuals from the medical or sanitary Staff".[10] These dry words taken from an administrative report reveal that, right from the outset, the Rabka and Zakopane orphanages were not only supposed to offer treatment for physical ailments, but also to shelter their residents from the hostility of the Polish surroundings.

The Rabka orphanage, destined for the sickest children, was inaugurated in June/July of 1945. It comprised three buildings that housed more than a hundred residents in total.[11] Due to safety concerns, these children were transported from Kraków in lorries covered with tarpaulin.[12] The list of orphanage children from the summer of 1945 features 116 names.[13] Among them we find 12-year-old Aleksander Bober who, having fled the Warsaw ghetto, led a street life that involved cigarette trafficking and sleeping rough at tram depots.[14] Nachum Bogner had survived in forest bunkers near Przemyślany and lost both parents in 1943.[15] 10-year-old Mira Bram had also lost her parents, but managed to survive on the 'Aryan' side, hiding at a 'volksdeutsches' home.[16] 8-year-old Benek Brander had been helped by two Poles. The boy's mother died in his presence as they were hiding in a cellar in Przemyśl.[17] The story of another young boy, Ludwik Rympel, was equally tragic; his parents, in utter despair, had attempted to take their lives and that of their son. The blood would not flow from the boy's cut veins and that saved

[9] Pismo Tymczasowego Komitetu Pomocy dla Ludności Żydowskiej w Krakowie, 26 February 1945, National Archive in Krakow (NAKr), UW II 69/05, p. 37.

[10] Sprawozdanie z działalności Wojewódzkiego Komitetu Żydowskiego w Warszawie, 1 February-31 October 1945, Jewish Historical Institute Archive (JHA), 303/II/75, p. 214.

[11] Sprawozdanie z działalności Wojewódzkiego Komitetu Żydowskiego w Warszawie, 1 February – 31 October 1945, Jewish Historical Institute Archive (JHIA), 303/II/75, p. 214.

[12] Testimony of Rose Silberberg-Skier, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archive (VHA), interview no. 33261, www.vhaonline.usc.edu (Last accessed May 15, 2016).

[13] Named list of children resident for treatment, August 1945, JHIA, 303/IX/1405.

[14] Karta Dziecka: Aleksander Bober, September 1945, JHIA, 303/IX/86, p. 75.

[15] Karta Dziecka: Nachum Bogner, September 1945, JHIA, 303/IX/86, p. 77.

[16] Karta Dziecka: Mira Bram, September 1945, JHIA, 303/IX/86, p. 87.

[17] Karta Dziecka: Benek Brander, September 1945, JHIA, 303/IX/86, p. 89.

his life.[18] Another case was Jerzy Cyns, who had gone through German camps in Płaszów, Gross-Rosen and Auschwitz, where he had to endure medical experiments and was tattooed three times. The 7-year-old, seriously ill, was referred to the treatment centre in Rabka.[19] Each of these children's stories of survival tells of a journey through hell. Their painful journeys did not, unfortunately, end with the war.

The first assault on the Rabka orphanage took place on the night of 12 August 1945, on a day after a pogrom in Kraków.[20] The perpetrators, as my research has established, were students and teachers from the Private Sanatorium Male Middle School (gimnazjum). Their spiritual and actual leader was a Catholic priest, Józef Hojoł, who developed strong ties with Józef Kuraś *Ogień* later on. Hojoł's agenda was clear: he believed that the current political regime persecuted religion, did not grant freedom of religion, and that Poland was governed by the Jews.[21]

During the first assault, a grenade was thrown into an isolation ward.[22] Sheer luck saved the thirteen-year-old girl whose bed was right next to where it landed. The girl dropped to the floor, but did not suffer any serious injury[23]. During the second assault, which took place exactly one week later, all the buildings took fire from manual and automatic arms, and more grenades were thrown.[24] After yet another week, on 27 August 1945, the third and most serious assault took place. This time, the gymnasium students secured assistance from the local anti-communist guerrillas.[25] The assault involved thirty-two people, and the purpose of the attack was to "scare Jewish children in Rabka". The attackers were armed with grenades, automatic guns, machine guns and a box of ammunition.[26] There had been shooting for as long as two hours before the first response shots were finally heard from the buildings of the Red Army and the Security Office situated on the same street.[27] The militia did not show up, as they collaborated with the guerrillas who were attacking the orphanage.[28]

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[18] Testimony of Ludwik Rympel, 1945, JHIA, 301/626, p. 10.

[19] Testimony of Jerzy Cyns, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archive (VHA), interview no. 635, www.vhaonline.usc.edu (Last accessed May 15, 2016).

[20] For more about the pogrom in Krakow: Anna Cichopek-Garaj: *Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia, 1944-48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and Julian Kwiek: *Żydzi, Łemkowie, Słowacy w województwie krakowskim w latach 1945-1949/50* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2002).

[21] Testimony of Stanisław Pyka, 24 August 1950, Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance in Krakow (AINRKr), 110/4239/1, p. 270.

[22] Testimony of Stanisław Pyka, 24 August 1950, AINRKr, 110/4239/1, p. 206–207.

[23] Crime scene examination report, 1 September 1945, AINRKr, 0125/207/2, p. 10.

[24] Testimony of Aniela Łącka, 23 August 1950, *AINRKr, 110/4239/1, p. 130.*

[25] Testimony of Stanisław Wróble, 18 January 1950, AINRKr, 110/4239/1, p. 208.

[26] Testimony of Andrzej Palarczyk, pseud. 'Komar', 4 August 1950, *AINRKr*, 110/4235, pp. 37–38.

[27] Testimony of Andrzej Palarczyk, pseud. 'Komar', 10 August 1950, AINRKr, 110/4235, p. 40.

[28] Special report, Nowy Targ local Militia commanding officer, 27 August 1945, AINRKr, 0125/207/2, p. 16.

The Rabka orphanage was closed down a day after the assault. Those children who could returned to their parents, while those most seriously ill, as well as those who had no guardians, were transferred to the Zakopane orphanage. In her report, Lena Kuechler wrote that the children who arrived in Zakopane after the transfer had lost weight and their health had suffered from the events, because they had been living in constant fear of further assaults.[29] In 1946, she wrote down a testimony of one of the children, seven-year-old Oleś Aronowicz. This is how he recalled those events: "There was constant shooting in Rabka. Sister Gusta would always tell us to get under our beds, though we did not want to do that. One night they shot about 2400 bullets. A sergeant who was defending us told me about it. One day the Germans [this is who he considered the perpetrators to be] threw a grenade into one of the rooms where a sick girl was sleeping, and then the bed ended up somewhere outside the window and she ended up on a wardrobe. There were about three assaults in Rabka. I remember the second one. When they threw grenades onto our buildings, Stasia [Stasin] and Niemno [Niemen] made huge holes in the wall. Later the buildings were given machine guns for self-defence. Then our Rabka home was closed down and we went to Zakopane. A soldier I knew told me that we were leaving because the Poles were taking over the entire town of Rabka. In Zakopane, things were better, things were the best. In Rabka, when we went to the woods for a moment to play, we would hear: 'There you are! Do you want me to beat your head?' There was no freedom in Rabka...".[30]

That 'lack of freedom' was soon felt in Zakopane too. Lena Kuechler, in her interview with Boder, recalled that following the Rabka assaults the Zakopane orphanage started to fear a similar wave of anti-Jewish violence. "I decided to anticipate events and put together a line of defence. I went to the security authorities and the Polish police [...]. I was granted ten people for defence [...] and fitted a machine gun on one of the terraces. Besides that, I had an alarm siren, a floodlight and a telephone. Exactly like in a concentration camp [...]. And yes, there was an assault, but we fought back".[31] According to a dispatch from the Civil Militia Station in Zakopane from that time, the orphanage was suffered fire from four machine guns on the night of 28 August; there were no casualties.[32] The worst was yet to come to Podhale, however.

[29] Lena Kuechler, Remarks regarding Oleś Aronowicz, 1946, GFA, 023135, p. 10.

[30] From Oleś Aronowicz's account, 1946, GFA, 023135, p. 7.

[31] Interview with Lena Kuechler conducted by David P. Boder, 8 September 1946, www.voices.iit.edu (Last accessed December 1, 2016).

[32] Operations report, PK MO [militia] in Nowy Targ, 11 August-20 September 1945, *AINRKr*, 0125/207/8, p. 83.

In January 1946, the town of Zakopane witnessed Józef Oppenhein's life being taken by the anti-communist underground soldiers simply because of the man's Jewish descent. Little did it matter that he had been a key figure in the history of his town.[33] A few days later, in Nowy Targ, a town situated less than 20 kilometres from Zakopane, some of *Ogień*'s soldiers killed Dawid Grassgrün, a Holocaust survivor who was the only elderly Jewish leader of the local Jewish commune.[34] Józef Ferber, head of self-defence at the Zakopane orphanage, told David Boder in 1946 in France: "Poles would drop off leaflets that said that they would kill us the same way they had killed the leader of the Jewish commune in nearby Nowy Targ. They wrote that the same fate awaited all people who lived there".[35]

After a few years of archival search, I managed to find the leaflet in question. It had been distributed by *Ogień's* soldiers in Podhale. Its content is outrageous:

"Jews and Jewish kiddies

You wished to dominate the entire country
Destroy the Poles and Polish children
So we will prepare heavenly bliss for you
Until the Jewish parch falls apart [...]

Flee, Jews, now that you still have time
Your country is Palestine
Otherwise we will take you all to the woods
and grant you heavenly bliss.

Golden freedom has ended
Now, after Gras(s)grün the time has come for you
Flee, for we have a great desire to beat,
murder and shoot you..."[36]

[33] For more about his death: Julian Kwiek: "Zabójstwa ludności żydowskiej w Krakowskiem w latach 1945–1947. Fakty i mity", *Kwartalnik Historii Żydów*, 4, 2013, pp. 679–695.

[34] For more about his story:[Autor]: "*Dlaczego oni, którzy tyle przecierpieli i przetrzymali, musieli zginąć*. Żydowskie ofiary zbrojnej przemocy na Podhalu w latach 1945–1947", *Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały*, 11, 2015, pp. 46-51.

[35] Interview with Józef Ferber conducted by David P. Boder, 7 September 1946, www.voices.iit.edu (Last accessed December 1, 2016).

[36] Leaflet *Żydzi i żydzięta*, February 1946, NAKr, UW II 248, p. 31.

In the face of these threats, Lena Kuechler turned to Zakopane's communist safety and security authorities for help and protection for her children. They refused to take responsibility for the safety of Leśny Gród.[37] This is why, in mid-March 1946, the decision was made to close down this orphanage as well. The children, ninety-two in number according to the residential records of February 1946, were to be transferred to orphanages in Otwock, Kraków and Głuszyca.[38] However, Lena Kuechler ultimately chose to resolve things differently. In her book *My 100 children*, published twenty years later, she described in detail the original circumstances of her plan to evacuate the children altogether from communist Poland. The orthodox organisation *Vaad Hatzali* helped by purchasing Greek passports for the refugees.[39] On 18 March 1946, after breakfast, the children were put inside a truck with the orphanage staff and a few soldiers. Having crossed the border in Cieszyn, they made it to Czechoslovakia.[40] From there they went to France, where David Boder interviewed them.

I studied these testimonies as a factual source and, wherever possible, verified the information they provided. Accessing other material proved difficult; the version that was official for several decades stated that those guerrilla assaults had targeted the Red Army and the Security Office located on the same street, not the orphanage. This view has survived to this day; what is more, the priest who inspired the assaults is considered a local hero today. In 2001, a plaque was unveiled in the largest church in Rabka, commemorating his anti-communist activity. No one mentioned his co-responsibility for the assaults on Jewish children.

"Striving for independence"

Lena Kuechler fled Poland when the series of murders of Jews in Podhale had just begun. The event that consumed the greatest number of victims was a mass murder outside of Krościenko. This town was part of the exodus trail of many Jews fleeing abroad illegally. Among them was a group of twenty-six people who set out from Kraków in a truck on 2 May 1946. The passengers included the Gallers, a family of four. Józef Galler was born at the end of August 1934 as the second child to Maria and Izrael. His sister Rena was three years his senior. The wartime story of the family, written by Józef, was given as a testimony in front of the Jewish Historical Committee in Septem-

[37] Letter from Central Childcare Board to Ministry of Education, 14 July 1946, JHIA, 303/II/10, p. 30.
[38] Report, inspector Klimy Fuswerk, 29 March 1946, JHIA, 303/IX/1628, pp. 27-28.
[39] Lena Kuchler-Silberman, *My 100 Children*, London: Pan Books, 1961, pp. 201-202.
[40] Report, inspector Klimy Fuswerk, 29 March 1946, JHIA, 303/IX/1628, p. 27.

ber 1945. The woman who wrote the protocol added a side note: "The boy is nervous and it is hard to get anything coherent out of him".[41] Józef's account lets us assume that, when the war broke out, the Gallers moved to Kraków, and then in March of 1941 they were in the ghetto. They managed to obtain Argentinian passports. Having sneaked out of the window and made it to the 'Aryan side' of town, they fled for two days before the murder of Kraków Jews in March 1943. Later, as Argentinian citizens, they moved to a Catholic home in Bochnia. They remained there until August 1943, or until the day when the Germans organised transport and took them to Bergen-Belzen, where they occupied camp quarters destined for individuals with foreign passports. Józef remembered that his daily ration was 1 litre of water with beets and 3 dkg of bread. He witnessed selections and murders, and saw people from the transports who were taken alive to the crematoria, and later, from his cot, he observed fire and smoke hovering above. The Gallers, along with 2,500 others, were inside a train that was stopped at the front line for several days. They were liberated on 13 April 1945 in Farsleben: "I suddenly heard a rumble, I ran out and saw green tanks with a white star, American tanks. The Americans treated us to good food and drink. I got sick as it was a great change after the beet water I was used to".[42]

We do not know when the Gallers returned to Poland. At the end of May 1945 the boy was certainly still a patient at a Hillersleben hospital.[43] After their return to Kraków they lived in the building of the Jewish Committee. Józef and Renia featured on the official list of children[44] and their mother was on the list of those sick and unfit for work.[45] We do not know at what moment they decided to flee Poland. In any case, they were inside the truck that was stopped outside of Krościenko by a local unit of Józef Kuraś *Ogień*'s soldiers on the night of 2 May 1946.[46] The local guerrilla leader was Jan Batkiewicz *Śmigły*, and it was Batkiewicz who, having checked the identification documents of the civilians on the truck, passed on the order to shoot them.[47] Eleven Jews were killed there, and the twelfth died in hospital.[48]

[41] Testimony of Józef Galler, 7 November 1945, JHIA, 301/1137, p. 2.

[42] *Ibidem*, p. 5-7.

[43] Hospital form for Józef Galler, Hillersleben 31 May 1945, ITS Digital Archive, Bad Arolsen.

[44] Names list of children at the facility on ul. Długa 38, 1946, JHIA, 303/V/583, p. 4..

[45] List of the aged, ill and unfit for work residing at Długa 38, 1946, JHIA, 303/V/583, p.9.

[46] Letter from the PUBP in Nowy Targ to head of Wydział III WUBP in Kraków, 30 January 1950, AINRKr, 009/6573, p. 32.

[47] Report of interrogation of Jan Batkiewicz, 9 August 1947, AINRKr, 110/1892, p. 24.

[48] Corpse examination report, drawn up 4 May 1946, in the presence of deputy procurator mgr. Roman Rękiewicz, court doctor dr. Józef Spieszny, head of PK MO por. Banaszek and record-keeper J. Strakosz, 4 May 1946, AINRKr, 110/1892, p. 93–96; Death certificate of Izrael Piniuński, 7 May 1946, AINRKr, 110/1892, p. 108.

The shooting injured Izrael Galler and his daughter Rena. Maria Galler with her son Józef remained in the semitrailer of the truck while the IDs were being checked. The woman testified a few hours after those events: "After a few moments I heard shots and at that time two individuals in Polish Army uniforms and with automatic arms approached the vehicle along with [...] a civilian who threw me and my son out of the vehicle. One of the individuals in the uniform shot at my son Józef and the bullet reached his head, they threw me to the ground aiming at me twice, but missing each time. Lying on the ground, I heard what they said to each other about my son, 'that kid is moaning a lot, do it again', and he shot him in the head once again".[49] Had the bereaved parents of the murdered boy not been so determined, the perpetrators of these events would never have appeared in court. They sent a series of dramatic letters to Poland, from DP-camp in Ulm[50] and from Israel, demanding that the perpetrators be charged. Their plea was finally heard in 1951. Two out of more than a dozen of Józef Kuraś *Ogień*'s soldiers were charged with murder.[51] Although they were given harsh sentences, as a result of amnesty they were released five years later.[52] The sentence of Batkiewicz, the individual who passed on the order to shoot the Jewish civilians, was annulled in 1992. The verdict read: "The organisation to which he belonged acted under the auspices of the Home Army. Hence the accusation of Jan Batkiewicz bearing co-responsibility for murdering more than a dozen individuals of Jewish nationality is groundless. The court rules that the actions of Jan Batkiewicz were motivated by his striving for independence of the Polish State".[53]

"Jewish communists"

Twelve-year-old Józef Galler was one of thirty-three victims who died as a result of post-war anti-Jewish violence in the Podhale region. Before his death he succeeded in passing on his wartime testimony. No other victim had managed to do the same, so I reconstructed their stories from bits and pieces of information left in pre-war and wartime documents or testimonies of other survivors. Based on what I have established, only one victim had political associations. Zygmunt Goldstein was the only one to have been

[49] Report of interrogation of Maria Galler, 3 May 1946, AINRKr, 110/1892, p. 75.

[50] Letter from Izrael Galler, 29 January 1947, AINRKr, 110/1892, p. 142; Letter from Izrael Galler, 31 May 1950, AINRKr, 010/9414, p. 101.

[51] Candidate profile, 14 November 1958, AINRKr, 009/6573, p. 11.

[52] Report on consent for preparing candidate recruitment as an informant, 14 November 1958, AINRKr, 009/6573, p. 9.

[53] Resolution of the Provincial Court in Kraków, 15 June 1992, AINRKr, 110/4488, p. 234.

involved in politics through his appointment with the Voivodship's Security Office. Still, at death, he had not been holding this position for over a year.[54] Historians researching the activities of *Ogień* argue that Dawid Grassgrun died because he was a Polish Labour Party activist.[55] In the light of my studies, however, this claim finds no confirmation whatsoever; Grassgrun survived as the only one out of several hundred Jews who were rushed to a tomb at Nowy Targ cemetery the day the Jewish community of this town was being exterminated.[56] He fled the scene naked and made it to Slovakia, where he survived working as a horse groom.[57] After the war, he returned to Nowy Targ and, as the only elderly Jew, attempted to rebuild the local Jewish commune and regain the synagogue.[58] His account of what he saw during the cemetery execution has stayed with the local community. He was murdered in February 1946[59] and, after his death, *Ogień* ordered that leaflets be posted around town. They read: "Blessed Dawid Gras[s]grün died a tragic death at the hands of true Poles who did not let this rotten leech suck Polish blood".[60]

The next two Jewish victims from Nowy Targ, Lonek Lindenberger and Ludwik Herz, had barely turned twenty when they died. They were the only survivors from their respective families,[61] and had survived the Holocaust thanks to the help of Oskar Schindler.[62] Ludwik Herz, having returned to his native town, managed to fill out a *Questionnaire pertaining to war damage* in which he wrote: "They have taken the furniture away. Murdered the parents. Pulled down the Zakopane mansion".[63] Both died in April 1946, shot

[54] Sentence in the case of Zygmunt Kozik, 26 April 1947, AINRKr, 110/983, p. 147.

[55] Maciej Kurkuć, *Zostańcie wierni tylko Polsce...". Niepodległościowe oddziały partyzanckie w Krakowskiem (1944–1947)*, IPN, Kraków, 2002, p. 440.

[56] Letter from Tadeusz Czubernat to the Regional Court of Labour and Social Security, 6 February 1978, AINR The Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in Cracow, S4/75, p. 543.

[57] Testimony of Paula Golden, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archive (VHA), interview no. 48314, www.vhaonline.usc.edu (Last accessed May 15, 2016), Testimony of Rosalie Gelernter, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archive (VHA), interview no. 21371, www.vhaonline.usc.edu (Last accessed May 15, 2016).

[58] Letter from the Provincial Offices in Kraków to the Office of Propaganda and Information in Kraków, 1 February 1946, NAKr, UW II 1066, p. 187.

[59] Testimony of Anna Grońska, 11 February 1946, AINRKr, 06/1/1, p. 115–116.

[60] ANKr, UW II 248, Transcription of leaflets regarding Dawid Grassgrüna, probably February 1946, k. 31.

[61] Inheritance edict, 8 March 1946, NAKr, 31/19/220, no pagination; Inheritance edict, 28 February 1946, NAKr, 31/19/220, no pagination.

[62] The list of Jewish inmates of Brunnlitz in Czechoslovakia, http://kehilalinks.jewishgen.org/krakow/kra_schindler.htm (Last accessed February 17, 2017).

[63] Questionnaire on recording of war damages, Ludwik Herz, 13 August 1945, NAKr, 31/St NT/155, no pagination.

in the back of the head, with three other people. I have not been able to find any source that would confirm the opinion of *Ogień* historians who claim that these Jews were armed, protected by functionaries of the Security Office and the first to have attacked.

"I had a hard time"

My research into the fates of these victims has demonstrated that attempts to justify their deaths with claims that they were 'Jewish communists' constitute a fabricated lie. What is more, the consequences of these evil acts go well beyond their immediate context. This becomes clear in the testimony given by Jerzy Cyns, recorded for the Shoah Foundation. As a child, Cyns went through Płaszów and Birkenau, where, at the age of six, he was tattooed three times. He also survived the assaults on the Rabka orphanage. His parents, who lost their second child during the war and went through German concentration camps, went to Rabka for treatment in the summer of 1947. There, the mother was murdered in front of 9-year-old Jerzy. He recalled: "I was lying under one bed and father under another. They spoke in Polish. Father yelled [at the mother] to hide under a comforter. They started to shoot and she was injured. She jumped out of the window and they shot her. There was firing all around the room. My aunt was holding her son in her arms. Luckily, they did not kill him but shot across his leg. My aunt was shot in the face and fell. [...] We left [Rabka] instantly. We buried everyone at Miodowa [a Jewish cemetery]. I could not go to school. I could not get a grip on myself. It was in 1947, I had a hard time studying. I completed a vocational school program somehow. I grappled with myself, worked hard to try, to prove that I could make a living".[64] Until the end of his days, Jerzy suffered from neurosis and had problems concentrating, which is obvious to the listener of his testimony.

"We can grant him memory and honour again"

Lawrence Langer, quoted earlier, wrote that the testimony of the survivors makes us rethink the relationship between the past and present and, from this perspective, much of the present discourse does not sound so grand any more.[65] The reestablishment of the glory and memory of Józef Kuraś

[64] Testimony of Jerzy Cyns, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, Visual History Archive (VHA), interview no. 635, www.vhaonline.usc.edu (Last accessed May 15, 2016).

[65] L. Langer, op.cit., p. 90.

Ogień and his commanders, or putting them on a pedestal as role models for our military forces and our society, are operations done at the expense of their victims and in utter disregard of the hurt inflicted. In 2006, during a solemn inauguration ceremony of the Zakopane monument commemorating *Ogień* and his soldiers by then President Lech Kaczyński, Andrzej Przewoźnik, the presidential secretary of the Council of Memory of Combat and Martyrdom Protection, said: "The Communists wanted to kill *Ogień* twice: first, kill him, and then kill the memory of him. Today we are making him a part of the pantheon of national glory again. We will not make him alive again, but we can grant him memory and honour again".[66] Yet, while looking at the Zakopane monument, one needs to recall the words written by 12-year-old Józef Galler, shortly before his own death, and imagine the scared children from the Rabka orphanage hiding under their beds. These testimonies of victims of post-war violence should also be included in the pantheon of our national memory, even if they unsettle the optimistic and monumental vision of our history.

[66] Polska Agencja Prasowa, *W Zakopanem odsłonięto pomnik Józefa Kurasia "Ognia"*, www.pis.org.pl (Last accesed December 6, 2015).

Research Workshops

KINGA ZAWADZKA

The Lifestyle and Value System of Professionals and Managers After Two Decades of Capitalism in Poland[1]

Abstract: The report presents the findings from the research *The Lifestyle and Value System of Young Polish Intelligentsia*, which examined the life orientations of Polish professionals and managers, and the shift of this social category to patterns characteristic of the middle classes in Western societies, after two decades of capitalism in Poland. The research focused on professional careers, family relations, child-rearing strategies, free time activities, social boundaries and attitudes towards the traditional ethos of the Polish intelligentsia. The research featured qualitative methods, complemented by available survey data.
Key words: intelligentsia, middle class, lifestyle, values.

Research problem

The Lifestyle and Value System of Young Polish Intelligentsia was a research project that examined the life orientations of Polish professionals and managers, individuals who started their professional careers after the collapse of communism in 1989. The main research questions focused on the lifestyle and value system of this new class, and its resemblance to the relevant formations in Polish and global history.

The starting point for the new research questions was the phenomenon of the highly influential class known as the 'intelligentsia', a fundamental component of social structure in Eastern European countries. Over two centuries of political subordination that came to an end in 1989, members of the intelligentsia – highly-skilled white-collar workers, lawyers, physicians, architects and university scholars – not only taught, designed buildings and practised law or medicine, but also, as a formation, had a particular mission to preserve the nation's identity, its memory, language and culture. In contrast to Western coun-

[1] The article is based on the author's original doctorate research, financed by a grant from the National Science Centre in the Preludium I competition (project no.: 2011/01/N/HS6/03897).

tries, the highest status of the intelligentsia within Polish society was based on higher education and social commitment rather than on economic means. After the collapse of communism, national identity was no longer under threat, and the free market began abruptly to absorb business-oriented individuals, particularly those with higher education and possessing unique, sought-after skills. The main hypothesis of this research concerned the shift towards Western patterns. My assumption was that Polish professionals and managers began to resemble their Western peers: focusing on work duties, relying on themselves, and expecting appropriate pay for high-quality, professional service. As such, social status became connected to money, and the idea of an intelligentsia began to fade.

The significance of this research topic lies in the fact that professionals and managers make a decisive contribution to the development of contemporary societies, their economies and their culture. They are people who hire and supervise the work of others, who innovate and who shape public opinion. They are important as a reference point for other social categories – professional and managerial jobs have held the top positions in most rankings of occupational prestige since such prestige has been measured. Apart from such tendencies, the Polish intelligentsia as mentioned above was historically highly influential with its socially legitimised mission towards the rest of society. Therefore, the shift towards life orientations typical of the Western middle classes, such as liberal views, tolerance and individualism, and coupled with a decline in their social activism, would mean the erosion of a class that has dominated Polish society for over two centuries.

Definitions and the state of knowledge

The key terms used in this article are 'lifestyle' and 'ethos'; although they relate to kindred social phenomena, they both require further attention. I define 'lifestyle' according to the concept formulated by Andrzej Siciński (1978), as „a specific syndrome of everyday attitudes and behaviours of certain social collectives, being a manifestation of their social position, therefore enabling social identification" [author's translation – KZ]. Ethos is a term related to lifestyle, more closely bonded with the value system of the group. Following the definition formed by Tadeusz Szawiel (Szawiel 1982), I assume that the core traits of an ethos are more consciously recognised by members of an ethos group. In this concept, the lifestyle is not necessarily perceived as a value, and if so, more as an instrumental one. Ethos remains an autotelic value, shared and internalised by the members of the social collective. In this context, the traditional Polish intelligentsia has remained an evident, well-developed ethos group.

The phenomenon of intelligentsia has an extensive record in Polish sociology. Academic debate concerning its position in Polish society has regular-

ly surfaced, in every decade since World War II. The origins, demographic and cultural changes, and specific role of the Polish elites under the communist system were described in major works by, among others, Jan Szczepański (Szczepański 1957), Józef Chałasiński (Chałasiński 1958) and Bohdan Cywiński (1971). At the turn of the 21st century the evolution of the intelligentsia under capitalism and the tension between its traditional ethos and the attitudes characteristic of the Western middle classes, were described by, among others, Hanna Palska (Palska 2002), who particularly concentrated on new consumption patterns, and Henryk Domański (Domański 2008), who analysed the objective conditions of the changes. The latest wave of sociological insight into the topic of the Polish intelligentsia, witnessed in recent years and months, includes in particular the most important publications of Tomasz Zarycki (Zarycki 2017)[2], Piotr Kulas (Kulas 2016, Kulas 2017), Maciej Gdula and Przemysław Sadura (Gdula Sadura 2012), focusing, in various contexts, on the ethos of contemporary Polish intellectual elites.

As far as the model of the Polish intelligentsia under discussion is relatively coherent, the models of the middle class, and the lifestyles and life orientations of professionals and managers, vary between specific Western countries. Regarding the traditional, historical influence of French culture on Polish elites, as well as the influence of the American business model that became increasingly important after the arrival of American companies in the Polish market after 1989, and due to the intensification of globalisation processes, it seemed most probable that Polish professionals and managers would follow mostly French and American patterns.

An in-depth description of the American middle class, and its major changes after World War II in the processes of urbanisation and the rise of big companies, can be found for example in the classic analyses of the mid-1950s, such as C.W. Mills' *White Collar. The American Middle Classes (1951)* or William H. White's *The Organization Man* (1956). The consequences of the subsequent major social changes caused by the counterculture of the 1960s, affecting the life orientations of the American middle class, were described, inter alios, by Barbara Ehrenreich (Ehrenreich 1989) and David Brooks (Brooks 2000), who emphasised the growing importance of higher education and its impact on lifestyle patterns (see also Florida 2002).

The specifics of French social structure, with an emphasis on analogies between cultural behaviour and class hierarchy, were described in the profound work

[2] In their newly released book (Smoczyński, Zarycki 2017), Rafał Smoczyński and Tomasz Zarycki point to the particular, influential position of the scions of Polish aristocracy and gentry among the elites of contemporary intelligentsia, their status of a reference point in social status positioning. My research did not confirm the thesis (e.g. the respondents did not expose their social connections with representatives of those categories), however, it may result from the choice of research tools (which might have been not sensitive enough).

of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1979), constituting a major point of reference for numerous studies on elites in contemporary sociology (e.g. Lamont 1992, Daloz 2009). An important quantitative study of French professionals and managers *(les cadres)* – embracing the history and specific ethos of this segment of the French upper-middle class – was also provided by Luc Boltanski (Boltanski 1982).

The two models – French and American – were depicted in the analysis of Michele Lamont (Lamont 1992). The author of *Money, Morals and Manners* claims that Americans emphasise scientific culture, self-actualisation, being pragmatic and practical, while also valuing knowledge ("knowing facts"), whereas in France the dominant features of the upper-middle class are intellectualism, cosmopolitanism, refinement and humanistic culture. I tested the impact of both models in the course of my research.

Research questions

In the light of the reviewed literature, I expected the following tendencies among Polish professionals and managers:

- a focus on work (in terms of time and consideration), and an expectation to receive the appropriate pay for a highly-skilled, professional service,
- a shift towards being more practical, responsible and self-disciplined (good time management, practical orientation in education strategies regarding children, self-development, coupled with practising sport and consuming organic food in everyday life),
- individualisation (in various dimensions: as a tendency to rely on oneself, liberalism, and self-improvement).

I also expected some traits characteristic of post-communist countries: Polish professionals and managers were supposed to be less 'post-materialistic' than their Western peers (Inglehart 1990) – focused more on the realm of consumption (prone to conspicuous consumption patterns) and less concerned with social issues (e.g. topics such as ecology). Some gender inequalities were also expected, especially in the realm of domestic life, the division of household chores and childcare responsibilities, which – far more often than in Western countries – were placed exclusively on women's shoulders despite them also having employment outside of the home (CBOS 1999).

Data and methods

The research, carried out in 2012, was financed by the National Science Centre within the *Preludium* scheme (Project Number: 2011/01/N/HS6/03897). It featured both qualitative and quantitative methods.

The qualitative part of the research was based on 60 in-depth interviews with Polish professionals (lawyers, physicians, university scholars, artists, architects and journalists) and managers in their 30s and 40s (the years of greatest activity on the job market).

The respondents, born in the late 1960s and 1970s, satisfied three crucial criteria: (*a*) they graduated from universities and entered the job market after the political transformation in 1989, (*b*) they had at least 5 years of professional experience, and (*c*) most of them had established stable family relations, thus enabling an examination of educational and upbringing strategies towards children. The criterion of place (respondents had to live and work in Warsaw) allowed for the investigation of a relatively homogenous group of respondents.

The interviews focused on the areas of: (*1*) work (self-evaluation of one's position on the labour market, the meaning of work, level of satisfaction, time devoted to job-related duties), (*2*) consumption (possessions, predominant models of consumption), (*3*) family life (marital patterns, gender division of domestic chores, educational and upbringing strategies towards children), (*4*) social life (participation in non-governmental organisations and religious groups, selecting and sustaining friendship ties), (*5*) leisure time (reading books, practising sports, holiday destinations), (*6*) self-evaluation of one's social position, social boundaries (financial conditions and position in the social hierarchy: people the interviewees do not want to be associated with, people who arouse hostility, and those who are similar /"people like us"/), (*7*) values (what it means to be a 'worthy' person, what it means to be successful), and (*8*) self-identity (approach to the concept of intelligentsia, self-definition).

The same set of questions was asked to the interviewees from the control sample of lower-skilled white-collar workers (20 elementary school teachers, administrative workers, librarians, nurses). Respondents in the control sample also had to meet the criteria of age and place of living. The purpose of the control sample was to confront the lifestyle and the value system of professionals and managers with the category of lower social status, in order to determine the uniqueness of the new Polish intelligentsia.

The quantitative part of the research was based on existing survey data (World Values Survey, European Social Survey 2002-2008, and data from the Polish Public Opinion Research Center), which enhanced the comparison with the West. The analysis was complementary to the main, qualitative part of the research.

Results

As mentioned above, the selection process was directed at finding a relatively diversified group of professionals and managers: physicians, lawyers,

economists, university professors, artists, journalists and managers employed in private, public and non-profit sectors.

The research revealed the internal variations of the new class. The four dominant types observed were artists, intellectuals, public clerks and business-oriented individuals. I assigned the interviewees to certain types pertaining to the life-orientations they represented (their focus on the relevant interview topics, e.g. free-time activities, child-rearing values), self-presentation styles (e.g. me as a worldly person, me as a member of the intellectual elite), and the types of social boundaries they stressed (according to the classification formed by Michèle Lamont, to moral, cultural and socioeconomic boundaries: Lamont 1992). Contrary to expectations, it was consumption (both in regard to practice and reflection) that proved far more important as a division factor than attitudes towards the traditional intelligentsia ethos. The main features of each category were as follows:

• Artists: painters, musicians, graphic designers and related professions. Unstable income (project work). Unclear work-life boundaries. Excluding others on a cultural basis. Reserved/hostile attitudes towards consumerism and capitalism.

• Intellectuals: scientists, university lecturers, journalists. Incomes more stable than in the case of artists, though often insufficient/unsatisfying – common practice of carrying out multiple jobs (e.g. working as a scholar and translator at the same time). Unclear work-life boundaries. Excluding others on a cultural and moral basis. Restrained/ambivalent attitude towards consumption.

• Officials: public sector managers, professionals employed in the public sector – prosecutors, physicians employed in hospitals, etc. High level of job security, clear separation of private time and worktime. Excluding others on a moral basis. Attitudes towards consumption: practical.

• Business-oriented professionals and managers: managers in the private sector, self-employed physicians, lawyers, etc. High incomes, low job security, high pressure on sales figures. Free time subordinate to the needs of the job (sustaining credible professional image, building personal relations with clients). Excluding others primarily on a socioeconomic basis. Attitudes towards consumption: enthusiastic (however at times distant in the realm of declarations).

Numerous interviews revealed hybrid cases, e.g. most of the architects matched two (artistic and business-oriented) or even three (artistic, intellectual and business-oriented) types. Not every case within the research confirmed a conjunction between life-orientations and occupational status.

There were also strong trends common to all types mentioned above. The most evident and best documented tendency proved to be a focus on

work, as a fundamental aspect of identity and a crucial factor in defining one's position within society. The respondents emphasised the fact that their success was a result of hard work and a long and consistent educational path. At the same time, in a number of cases the interviewees stressed the role of chance – the key factor being the moment of the individual's entrance onto the job market. This was at the beginning of the 1990s, when professional and business careers were highly unpredictable: *"I liked the image of a lawyer in a courtroom, holding one hand in his pocket, gesticulating with another. Of course I had no idea, I could not predict my path, as at the moment when I entered law school there were no international legal offices in Warsaw, so one might see a legal partner in an American movie, but, frankly speaking, I don't remember myself being attentive enough to notice such detail (I4)".*

Position on the job market – although career paths today are far more explicit and routinised than they were twenty-five years ago – is still, in various contexts, perceived as unstable. In many cases today's forty-year-olds, having attained the years of peak professional activity, are uncertain about their future: *"There are mostly young people working at our office, let's say up their forties, but no older lawyers. I wonder what happens to them, how they disappear, whether those forty-five-year-old attorneys are useless? (...) I've thought about it, and I guess they open new offices, smaller ones (I31)".*

Professionals and managers work long hours, with factual evidence for this not only obtained in the research presented here, but also in existing survey data (according to the Eurostat data for 2012, over 67% of Polish professionals and managers work from 40 to 44 hours per week). The majority of interviewees, asked how many hours they work, answered "normally" – an answer usually referring to a 50-hour working week (the record-holder, a cardiologist, claimed to work from 65 to 70 hours per week). One could not deduce the above from the interviewees' responses during the recruitment process for the research. Many of the respondents were available for interviewing within a few days after the telephone contact (as a general rule, the response rate was higher in the main group than within the control group of lower employment status). It seems highly probable that professionals and managers, and especially those individuals working longer hours, tend to maintain the image of an independent individual with a stable professional position – as a person who keeps their working time under control.

The specifics of the job market, with its uncertainty and the insecure middle class position within the social structure, can also be deducted indirectly, through an analysis of child-rearing strategies. Analysis of the interviews suggests a significant intergenerational change in family life patterns.

"I can see a vast gap between the way we were raised by our parents and how we raise our children – everybody is well-read now, everybody pays great attention to children, frequently only theoretically as they don't have much time, or they are busy with their jobs so they can send their kids to private schools. Children are very important in our generation (I18)". Not only the education, but also the upbringing process and free-time activities are becoming more and more 'professionalised'. Parents are familiar with literature on child and developmental psychology: they know that children should not attend too many extracurricular activities, and that they themselves should spend a lot of time with their kids (making sure they provide high-quality time together) and not put too much pressure and ambition on their children. At the same time, they perceive their social surroundings as highly competitive, particularly in regard to their children's skills and education. In their declarations, the interviewees distanced themselves from such attitudes (*"I don't want to fill her childhood years with piano, tennis, horse-riding lessons and hundreds of other courses, and don't want her to become an electric power generator or an eight-year-old robot who already speaks two foreign languages (I12)"*). But declarations seem out-of-touch with reality: there were many cases of children involved in numerous extracurricular activities. The key argument for dealing with this contradiction (even when talking about three-year-olds) is that children choose these activities themselves. My results correspond with the 'one wrong move' syndrome, discussed by Hanna Rosin and Rebecca Rosen (Rosin 2015, Rosen 2015, see also Strauss 2015 and Putnam 2015); the authors claim that upper-middle class parents see their own socioeconomic position as of great value but also uncertain, fragile, and something that is impossible to pass on to their children (in contrast to inherited social position based on money, today's elites are the elites of education, whose social position is strictly correlated with their professional status – see Brooks 2000, Friedman 2013) – resulting in them putting significant pressure on their children in regard to educational achievements.

A crucial part of the research aimed to reveal consumption patterns within the category of professionals and managers. At the beginning of the research process, I intended to conduct the interviews at the respondents' homes, but this proved impossible: only 10% of the interviews were conducted at home, the interviewees preferring to meet at the office or at a restaurant; as such, the number of cases for studying living conditions was limited. At the same time, the research design did not assume detailed analysis covering everyday consumption choices, while the interviews conducted showed a general though evident tendency: as expected, affluent professionals and managers refrained from discussing consumption in terms of possessions (their prop-

erties, cars or luxury goods). Nevertheless, the dominant consumption patterns may be deduced indirectly from the selection of topics the interviewees were willing to discuss, particularly those pertaining to free time activities: holidays, sports and food. This selection of topics reveals a socially legitimised way of demonstrating one's position without referring to money – by exhibiting lifestyle, refined cultural choices, and the consumption of experiences (see Bourdieu 2005, Bauman 2000, Brooks 2000). Distant holiday destinations, and independently planned trips (never the all-inclusive formula), enhance the image of a traveller, a worldly person. Similarly, familiarity with exotic food and restaurants can be regarded as a sign of distinction and cosmopolitanism (Daloz 2009). The focus on food and sports may both be interpreted as signs of a healthy lifestyle and self-discipline among contemporary professionals and managers. Apart from the practical dimension, sport bolsters one's image as an active, goal-directed person. Analysis of the interviews shows that both sports and travel were at times – and particularly among business-oriented professionals and managers – a part of one's self-marketing strategy or a way to establish and maintain relations with clients, as in the partly-ironic statement of a bank manager regarding job-related expenses: *"You must be a member of a golf club (...), you often do business while playing golf. (...) And it's good to go on holiday to some very distant regions of the world, where you can deal with some adversities and show how awesome you are – something like cave-diving in Mexico. In fact, you might really dive or just end up staying at the beach drinking beer, but, in general, that's the point (I23)"*.

One of the main characteristics of a member of the intelligentsia was devotion to high culture. Contemporary professionals and managers diverge from this image, although culture consumption patterns vary depending on occupational status. The interviewees identified within the typology outlined above as artistic and intellectual types seemed far more at ease discussing the topic of culture than members of other categories. It seems highly probable that artists and intellectuals use products of culture indirectly as working tools – for example reading books, attending theatre performances and visiting art exhibitions – because their occupation requires them to do so: *"It is important to provide oneself a stimulus strong enough, (...) an artist that stays all the time in his atelier has nothing to draw any inspiration from, his head is empty (I17)"*. Contrary to such a style of participation in culture, a number of business-oriented professionals and managers seemed to use products of culture as tools for boosting their professional image. They were happy to name books they had read or opera performances they had seen; most of these were given repeatedly. The interviewees mentioned theatre

performances directed by Krzysztof Warlikowski, opera productions directed by Mariusz Treliński, and books by winners of the Noble Prize and Nike Literary Award; this may lead to the cautious conclusion about conspicuous patterns of cultural participation – with a tendency to show oneself as a first-nighter, a cultured person. Both extravert managers and most of the other interviewees not actively participating in cultural events tended to answer questions on culture in the way they would probably react to a school test – with hesitation and an unwillingness to continue the topic. In both cases in which culture participation was present (artistic/intellectual type and business oriented type), its role was rather subordinate to the main professional activity, or strictly ornamental; the cultural participation did not appear as an autotelic value.

A core trait of the traditional intelligentsia ethos was its extended social engagement. The available survey data (CBOS 2016) shows that participation in various forms of social and political activity rises together with one's level of education, income, and size of the place of living. Those in their thirties and forties are among the most engaged categories (over 50% of the CBOS respondents were engaged in at least one form of social or political activity). The interviews with professionals and managers within my research show that the respondents chose relatively easy and non-committal forms of social participation: irregular donations, or allocating 1% of their tax to charities, while some were engaged in the activities of school committees or housing cooperatives. Nevertheless, none of these forms of engagement seemed crucial to one's self-identity. Many interviewees talked about lacking the time due to work-related commitments and an intense family life. Some openly pointed out that they were simply not interested in social and community issues.

The interviewees were asked about their attitude towards the term 'intelligentsia' and the intelligentsia ethos. The majority of respondents considered the term historical, inappropriate for contemporary times. Some indicated positive connotations with the word, but refrained from using it to define their own social status, as that would seem immodest or pretentious; they would prefer to be named a member of the intelligentsia by someone else. Some respondents found the word exclusive, pointing out its connotations with social distinction and social inequalities.[3] The intelligentsia ethos – for some interviewees incomprehensible, by some defined as a combination of social engagement and high-culture participation – was also seen as matching historical social categories. Asked what words they would use to

[3] See also Kulas 2017.

define themselves, the interviewees used the following terms: middle class, professionals and white-collar workers [*pracownicy umysłowi* – literally workers using their minds], in numerous cases they hesitated or refused to use any categorisations.

The interviewees were also asked to describe their immediate social environment. Apart from pointing to objective conditions such as common educational and economic status, and position on the job market, the respondents were employed by a cultural and moral category of openness. This term was used in at least three contexts: as liberal values and tolerance (openness to other cultures/cosmopolitanism, openness to ethnic and sexual minorities, emphasis on women's rights), as a tendency to rely on oneself (openness to new challenges, to risk), and as sincerity, straightforwardness (particularly valued at the workplace). Openness was also one of the most frequently mentioned traits in the context of child-rearing – as a value that the interviewees would like to pass to their children. Analysis of the available survey data (e.g. attitudes towards homosexuals – relatively low tolerance among highly educated Polish respondents in comparison to Western European countries – see European Social Survey 2010) provides an important context to the declarations collected within the qualitative research, although it exceeds the frames of this article.

Conclusions

The findings suggest that Polish professionals and managers today form a category of individuals of similar education, professional experience, socioeconomic position and – to some extent – common everyday practices, but apparently not a coherent social class. The traditional lifestyle of the Polish intelligentsia, including its emphasis on humanistic culture, vibrant intellectual debates at dinner parties, restraint from conspicuous consumption and active social engagement (see Siciński 1978) – seems alive only among a narrow segment of Polish intellectuals: academics, leading journalists, and artists.[4] The vast majority of the professionals and managers interviewed displayed a set of common traits that set them apart from the traditional lifestyle of the intelligentsia. As far as social features are concerned, these traits are moderate or non-existing social commitment, focusing on one's own life path (career, family, and child-rearing), competitiveness and emphasising one's social position. Contemporary professionals and managers

[4] In the context of this particular group of respondents, my research corresponds directly and confirms the findings of Piotr Kulas (see Kulas 2017).

also refrain from intense participation in high culture. In consumption patterns, they are approaching the habits of their counterparts in Western countries, focusing on the realm of consumption of experiences (travel, sport and related events); this is most evident among managers in the private sector. What is more, these traits are not unique to professionals and managers, but are also common within other segments of social structure, such as entrepreneurs or lower-skilled white-collar workers. During the interviews, the respondents hesitated or refused to name themselves members of the intelligentsia; the term sounded anachronistic and irrelevant to contemporary times. Most interviewees could not find any other term applicable to their own social category, nor did they perceive themselves as members of any particular social grouping – which may be regarded as a strong argument testifying to a decline in the intelligentsia ethos. Moreover, if we assume, after Tadeusz Szawiel (Szawiel 1982), that the ethos represents an autotelic value for group members (which is what differs 'ethos' from 'lifestyle'), then an important fact is that the element of a norm, of an obligation that would validate the patterns of behaviour in certain social situations, was – in the interviews in this research – almost absent.

The research revealed several fields of study that would require additional research in the future. The main possible directions are as follows:

- Child-rearing strategies in the middle class. What would be particularly interesting is a time-use study – answering the question as to how much time middle-class parents actually spend with their children, and what activities exactly they undertake together.
- The lifestyles and value system of professionals and managers born in the 1980s and 1990s – a comparative study of the young generation , providing an international context.
- The lifestyles and value system of Polish professionals and managers in a middle-sized Polish town – providing a comparison to the examined patterns characteristic of Warsaw.
- An in-depth evaluation of the lifestyle and value system of the lower status employment group. The research provided some general conclusions on the control group of lower employment status (administrative workers, primary school teachers, nurses) – e.g. the interviewees from the control group were more active in their communities than the interviewed professionals and managers. The total number of the control group respondents was 20, including individuals of various occupations – the group should be extended to make the conclusions more legitimate (it is highly probable that individuals recruited to the control group were more socially-oriented than the average in this socioeconomic category). Extending the control group

could also provide answers to many more important questions – e.g. many indicators suggest that crucial factors differing the lifestyle of professionals and managers from the lower status group are economic means and opportunities, and not culturally-rooted patterns.

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Research Workshops

MUSTAFA SWITAT

The Arab Diaspora in Poland. Research Report[1]

The Arab community is one of the examples of an immigrant population in Poland. This minority is present in the public discourse as an imagined community, while it generally remains unknown and has not yet been scientifically explored. The aim of this article is therefore to present the specifics of this diaspora in Poland in the form of a research report based on the author's own fieldwork.
Keywords: Arab diaspora, Arabs, Poland, Arab migration

This paper constitutes a report from research fieldwork presented in the doctoral dissertation entitled *The Arab Community in Poland. The Old and New Diaspora*, presenting a section of the final results. The subject-matter of the dissertation comprised an investigation of the functioning of the Arab diaspora in Poland, and the dynamics of change in this diaspora from the point of view of its members' integration with the receiving society in relation to the transformational changes in the Republic of Poland (Switat 2017).

Inspiration for conducting this research was, among other things, an approach based on Herbert Mead's theory of interactionism and presented by two researchers: Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan. These scholars asserted that how a given person is treated in a specific society does not depend on who that person is, but on how this person is perceived. Individuals are subjected to categorisation and have defined traits and behaviours attributed to them. This process results in the emergence of social distance, understood not as physical distance between groups, but as the subjective state of proximity sensed by the individual. Within this concept, a reduction of the distance leads to structural assimilation (Shibutani, Kwan 1965), understood as members of a minority entering all strata of the receiving society (Gordon 1964: 24). Hence also the idea for a study investigating the perception of the Arab population in Poland.

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The paradigm of symbolic interactionism investigates how recognised social patterns and meanings unfold in the course of social interaction (Babbie 2009: 74). This is presented using the example of mutual attitudes and interaction between representatives of the Arab diaspora in Poland and members of the receiving society, presenting the process of integration as a two-way process involving simultaneously the native and the immigrant populations.

Profile of the population in question

The Arab diaspora in Poland is very varied, and its individual members differ in many respects, among other things in their country of origin (the respondents represent 17 countries, with the largest numbers originating from Palestine, Syria and Egypt), their faith (Muslims, Christians and Druze), age (most of those representing the old diaspora were born between 1955 and 1969—approximately three quarters of them; the new diaspora is dominated by those born 1980-1989, making up almost half), level of education (one in five of the respondents have secondary level education, while almost all the rest have higher education), position at work (the largest number, embracing around one in four of the respondents, have their own business, while almost one in five are in trade, and the other significant group comprises academic employees, undergraduates and doctoral students), place of living in Poland (with the largest numbers residing in Warsaw, Łódź and Kraków), marital status (almost three in five—and around two thirds of the old diaspora—are married to Polish women), and so on. This is a distinctive example of an immigrant population, firstly because it comprises mainly men, and secondly because it is a group that is socially invisible, despite Arab subject-matter being very common (and most often negative) in public discourse, in the context of bad news from abroad of an Islamic-Arab genesis. Their negative perception is being carried over into Poland, where members of the Arab diaspora are perceived on the basis of stereotypes and events that originate outside of Poland (Switat 2016; Switat 2017).

Representatives of the Arab diaspora were among the first foreign immigrants from outside of Europe to come to Poland before 1989 after the Second World War; they would come to Poland through bilateral agreements between Poland and Arab countries where there was a socialist system of government (Gasztold-Seń 2012). For over 45 years of living in Poland, the Polish Arabs were participants in, among other things, Poland's transformation and the stages of creating its migration policy, and in addition they gradually underwent processes of integration.

This diaspora has not yet been covered by a comprehensive analysis, as unlike certain other minorities in Poland—such as, for example, the Vietnamese (studied by, inter alios, Kulesza, Smagowicz 2008; Halik 2006; Halik, Nowicka 2002), the Ukrainians (Konieczna-Sałamatin 2009) or Armenians (Machul-Teluś 2014; Łotocki 2008), no detailed research has yet been conducted regarding it. Citizens of Arab countries were among the respondents of research conducted by, inter alios, Paulo de Carvalho (1990) and Radosław Stryjewski (2012). The most interesting studies, with convergent results, are those conducted by Ida Schabieńska (2013) regarding cultural integration among Palestinians in Poland; the findings confirm that there are few women in this population, and it is a population with a high degree of cultural integration. However, issues related to the Arab diaspora (usually unfavourable in character) worldwide and in Europe (especially in the context of Muslim Arabs) are present in Polish public discourse, in the social, academic and media discourse (Górak-Sosnowska 2014). Investigating this diaspora will fill a certain gap in the knowledge of this population in Poland, its attitudes towards Poland's transformation, migration processes and interactions with Poles and within the diaspora itself.

Research goal

Investigating the functioning, the level of integration and organisation within the Arab diaspora in Poland in the context of Poland's transformation and migration policy was the priority goal of the research. The starting point for this was the decision regarding whether the study population is more a community or a diaspora. Taking Ferdinand Tönnies' definition of community (*Gemeinschaft*), according to which the main principles of a community (ethnic) are mutual interaction, being accustomed to one another, thinking and talking about one's community, agreement and living together (Tönnies 1988: 43), the author recognised in line with Zygmunt Bauman that the term 'community' is an idealised and rather Utopian term (Bauman 2008: 25), while the Arab population in Poland fulfils all criteria for a diaspora according to Robin Cohen's definition: forced dispersion, resulting for example from expansion or seeking work; shared memory of the land left behind; idealisation of the family home; the occurrence of return migration (either as a postulate or in reality); long-lasting awareness of the existence of a collectivity based on the firm belief of one's own otherness, a shared history and a particular shared fate; problems occurring in the relationships between this group and the society of the country of settlement, leading to either real or anticipated discrimination or to persecution;

solidarity with kinsmen living in other countries of settlement; and a creative contribution to the life of the receiving countries (where favourable conditions exist) leading to an enrichment of their culture in the direction of acceptance of cultural pluralism (Cohen 1996: 12-13).

Above all the diaspora in question is a population of immigrants, different culturally (and especially phenotypically) from the majority (the Poles), which highlights its specific character cultivating its own traditions. The Arab diaspora in Poland is therefore part of the international diaspora, but also a 'diaspora of diasporas', since it comprises members of different national diasporas (the Egyptian, Moroccan and Syrian diasporas, etc.). However, one should note that certain national diasporas are more 'diaspora-like' than others, because it would be hard to talk, for example, of a Kuwaiti, Armenian or Saudi diaspora; countries that are wealthy and safe are not conducive to the formation of diasporas comprising their own citizens, and as such they temporarily become members of the Arab diaspora when going abroad, for example to study or as tourists, but later on they return to their home countries.

Differentiation between the *old* and the *new* diaspora requires special explanation; the year 1989 was of key importance here, the most important date for the political transformation in Poland. Those Arabs who came to Poland in recent years may be recognised as the 'new' diaspora, and those who arrived in Poland before 1989 and who, for certain reasons, remained (mainly because of getting married to Polish citizens, or being unable to return to their home countries) make up the 'old' Arab diaspora in Poland. The two diasporas differ not only in their date of arrival in Poland, but also in the motives behind them coming to the country, their degree of integration with Polish society, their knowledge of the Polish language and Poland's history and culture, their residential status, and so on. In addition they are perceived different by Polish society.

Research questions

The subject-matter of the research was the Arab diaspora in Poland—obtaining information on its members' opinions regarding the Polish transformation and Poland's migration policy (opinions regarding migration policy were confronted with the opinions of Poles coming into contact with persons of Arab origin).

The research was designed to answer the following main research questions:

1) in the social-historical area: how do Arab immigrants rate the transformation in Poland?

2) in the social area: how do Poles and members of the Arab diaspora perceive each other?

3) in the social-political area: how do the Arabs and Poles covered by the study perceive Poland's migration policy and multiculturality?

The research also looked out for information enabling, among other things, the indication of dependencies between how long the Arab diaspora's members have been in Poland on the one hand, and their social status and how they are perceived by Poles on the other; an indication of the impact of binational marriages on the process of adaptation among members of this diaspora; identification of the specifics of this population's integration and its problems; and the drawing up of recommendations for constructing Poland's migration policy (integration policy) towards foreigners.

The comments made by representatives of the Arab diaspora and by Poles—following analysis and interpretation—provided answers to the research problems posited, in other words the image the diaspora's members have of the Polish transformation, and what the assumptions should be for migration policy according to the diaspora's members and Poles in the context of integration of the Arab population living in Poland.

Methodology

This paper is based on the findings of fieldwork conducted from May 2013 to March 2014. The study covered one hundred representatives of the Arab population in Poland and (for comparison) one hundred Poles, using—among other things—the snowball method as a sample selection technique. The study was conducted in twelve Polish cities home to branches of Polish-Arab organisations, and with the most numerous local concentrations of the Arab population. This was based on methodological triangulation (Frankfort–Nachmias, Nachmias 2001: 222-223), meaning the simultaneous application of a few research techniques (including that of in-depth individual interviews with members of the old diaspora, expert interviews for local Arab population leaders and questionnaires for members of the new diaspora and Poles). Bearing in mind that the strategy of methodological triangulation was used, then apart from the qualitative method with a quantitative component the following were also used: elements of the monographic method (in the field), ethnography, grounded theory and the comparative method (Switat 2017).

The representatives of the Arab population were recruited while applying the division according to date of arrival in Poland: Arabs who arrived in

Poland in recent years may be acknowledged as the 'new' diaspora (50 respondents), while those who arrived in Poland before 1989 and remained make up the 'old' diaspora (50 respondents).

Research hypotheses

On the basis of the research problems, the theoretical assumptions and own loose observations, the following hypotheses were put forward:

1. Members of the Arab diaspora in Poland rate the Polish transformation positively, although their level of knowledge on this topic depends on how long they have been in Poland.
2. Mutual positive interaction and attitudes shown by both populations covered by the study facilitate the process of integration.
3. Opinions regarding the issues of Poland's migration policy and multiculturality are similar among the Poles and Arabs interviewed.

Answers to the research questions thus posed were obtained and the research hypotheses were verified by such as the following: analysis of the historical and political conditions behind Arab migrations to Europe; desk research (available statistical data and sociological research findings) regarding Arabs in Poland and the world; content analysis of source literature related to the subject-matter of the research and analysis of the findings of own empirical studies embracing respondents of Arab origin and Poles (Switat 2017). The gathering of opinions among members of both groups enabled broad comparative analysis. One could risk stating that indirectly two cultures were investigated (in the spiritual and symbolic senses): Polish and Arab. Although this is frequently presented in terms of a dichotomy, an attempt was made towards demonstrating their similarities and not only differences, which could enable the process of integration and constitute the basis of a new model for treating multiculturality.

Selected research findings

The assumptions that the fundamental features of the population concerned are its small numbers, highly dispersed character and significant diversification were confirmed during the fieldwork. The group in question is non-uniform, and although there are certain common tendencies in regard to outlook among its members, the group is in fact a set of individuals with varied biographies.

The Arabs covered by the study were critical in relation to themselves and other members of the diaspora; in particular some members of the old

diaspora criticised those representing the new diaspora (for example for damaging the image of the old diaspora due to their poor knowledge of Poland and Polish culture), generalising while doing so, though themselves calling for an objective approach and that collective identity not be used in regard to them. However, during the research it turned out that in reality the division into old and new diaspora is very subjective. In fact it was not the year of arrival that had the greatest significance for better integration and position among members of the old diaspora as the fact that they knew the Polish language (mainly due to completing studies in Polish, as the most effective method of learning the language). All respondents fulfilling these conditions proved to be at least well integrated (if not assimilated), with substantial knowledge of Poland, a sense of Polish identity (most holding Polish citizenship), were loyal patriots towards Poland (treating the country as their home and their fatherland), and in many of their comments they were not only similar to Poles, but even (as some of the respondents said) "more Poles than the Poles" (acquired Polishness)[2]. However, there is also no shortage of such Arabs in the new diaspora.

Their integration occurred spontaneously, thanks to them functioning in Polish marriages, families and companies, thanks to a great deal of interaction with Polish society, enabling their knowledge of the Polish language. This section of the Arab diaspora may be treated as a kind of 'Polish-ised' elite. The fortunes of almost all members of the old diaspora (and some of the new) covered by the study have a lot in common: coming to Poland to study, learning and perfecting their Polish language proficiency, interaction with Polish fellow students, higher education and good skills (a prestigious vocation), marriage with a Polish woman, interaction with a Polish family, work with Poles, settling in Poland, and the slow fading of connections with their country of origin (although that would be a big simplification) in favour of strengthening bonds with Poland. A fact of importance in the case of their integration is that they came to Poland as young people (frequently with left-wing views) and entered their adulthood in Polish culture, while having ever less contact with Arab culture. In addition, as they had an ensured standard of living while studying (scholarships), and as such they could focus on their studies and learning the language. I therefore suggest that those who came to Poland to study (their intention being purely to study, without plans for staying in Poland after the completion of studies) be called settled for-

[2] This results from analysis of answers to, inter alia, questions regarding knowledge of Polish, knowledge regarding well-known Poles, the standard of knowledge on the history of Poland and Polish society, and adopted elements of Polish culture; example questions: What have you learned from the Poles? Are you interested in Poland's future? Do you want to integrate further with Polish society?

eign students rather than immigrants—and this applies not only to members of the Arab diaspora.

Those Arabs who came to Poland to study when it was the Polish People's Republic, and who then entered relationships with Polish women, changed the character of their stay in Poland to permanent; in their case, short-term migration became long-term, while marriage was conducive to their further integration with Polish society. These were not marriages entered into just in order not to return to one's home country and have a reason to remain in Poland. These Arabs function in Polish families, among Polish colleagues at work, among Polish neighbours, while their contacts with other members of the diaspora are sporadic. They have fully blended into the Polish community and adjusted to their Polish surroundings. Thanks to this, they know both populations, and believe that there are no major cultural differences between Arabs and Poles, that there is a convergence of opinions.

However, those who came to Poland for reasons other than studies are busy securing means for a living, hence their learning of the language is not as effective or fast as in the case of those studying in Polish. As a result, the integration of those without good knowledge of the Polish language is hindered, and it is more difficult for them to function independently in Poland. They are forced to rely mainly on the assistance of their Polish wives and other members of the diaspora. As a result they frequently end up working in businesses run by other representatives of their diaspora, most often in trade or catering. For many people in the new diaspora this work in trade and catering constitutes a type of stigma and 'vicious circle', from which it is hard to break free; they land jobs in catering because their knowledge of Polish is poor, but there are neither the opportunities nor the time in this work for learning the language or for integration, and as such they are condemned to this type of work for the further years of their stay in Poland. This is leading to the social degradation of well-educated immigrants (Switat 2016).

The fact that people who have personally experienced certain events have substantial knowledge and developed opinions of them is natural. This applies to members of the old Arab diaspora; their answers regarding the Polish transformation were extensive and based on their own experiences, while opinions displayed by members of the new diaspora tended to be perfunctory and based on second-hand opinions heard elsewhere; they only know the present Poland, and not the Polish reality of the years of the PPR. Nevertheless, despite drawing attention to certain unfavourable aspects of the transformation, members of both sub-diasporas gave decidedly positive appraisals for the process of transformation in Poland (in its political, economic and

social aspects). As such, the hypothesis according to which members of the Arab diaspora in Poland rate the country's transformation positively, despite their level of knowledge on the topic depending on how long they have been in Poland, was confirmed.

As for perception of the Arab diaspora, then bearing in mind the level of (lack of) knowledge among the Poles questioned regarding members of the Arab diaspora in Poland, and their (un)familiarity with it, one could say that the Poles' comments about this diaspora were largely answers about an imagined diaspora, since in most cases they were based solely on their own conjecture and imagination, far-removed from the reality they do not know—and hence the very frequent occurrence of phrases of the type "it seems to me" (Switat 2017) in their comments. Certain negative opinions regarding Arab culture and the Arabs, opinions heard from others and reiterated, have evidently taken on the qualities of dogmas (Switat 2016).

The Poles covered by the study fell into three different groups: favourable Poles, unfavourable Poles, and the 'undecided'—meaning those who in answer to the question "do you look favourably on the Arab population in Poland" chose the answer: "hard to say". The largest group of Poles—around two in three of these respondents—described themselves as favourable, while the smallest group said they were unfavourable. Those Poles who feel 'undecided' are not opposed to individual persons of Arab origin, only large groups.

Some of the Poles questioned rated members of the Arab diaspora objectively, based on their individual behaviours, but most used generalisations. A look at earlier studies regarding distance felt towards other people from other countries shows that for around a dozen or so years most Poles have shown stereotypical and pejorative perception of the Arabs: "he's foreign, bad and dangerous" (Nawrocki 1990: 118-124). And for over a dozen years there has been practically no increase in the level of knowledge of Arab countries, since Arabs continue to be mistaken with citizens of other (Islamic) countries.

The reality is that the members of the Arab diaspora covered by the study belong to a population that is relatively well integrated (especially those representatives of the diaspora who completed studies in Poland; they are very well integrated, and often even assimilated). This is a diaspora comprising individuals, people who, among other things, have different views, different statuses, who are of different origins, have had different experiences, share different faiths, but also different levels of religiousness (Switat 2017).

When analysing the answers given by the Polish respondents about the Arab population in Poland, one can observe a general tendency in the answers given in all respondent groups: those given by people with an un-

favourable attitude are mainly decidedly negative; the answers given by those claiming to be undecided are either negative or neutral (sometimes positive), while most answers among those with a favourable view are decidedly positive (in certain cases the Poles' favourable stance is purely declarative, since their answers to the questions suggest that their actual attitude is the opposite—for example it would be hard to consider somebody as favourable towards the Arab population if they do not accept Arabs residing in Poland, or if they believe that Arabs have no positive traits, and that the negative stereotypes regarding them are true).

Despite the ambivalence of Poles' attitudes towards acceptance of the Arab population in Poland, some of the respondents—in all groups—noticed that a very significant problem for members of the Arab diaspora is aversion among a part of Polish society, expressed in their unkind treatment and negative attitudes towards them in everyday life.

Just as members of the Arab diaspora claim that kindness and other positive attitudes in the receiving population help them in their integration, so too the Poles—as part of this integration—expect positive behaviour by the incoming population (respect for Polish law and Polish culture, adjusting to social norms, and a peaceful blending into society), which goes to confirm the hypothesis claiming that mutual positive interaction and attitudes among both populations in question facilitate the process of integration. On the one hand positive attitudes improve integration among the immigrant population, while on the other positive attitudes shown by the immigrants themselves towards the receiving population facilitate this society's acceptance of the incoming population.

According to most of the respondents, a multicultural or immigration-based Poland is not the reality today, but is a matter of the possible future. Most of the Poles and members of the Arab diaspora in this study agreed on many matters regarding the potential multicultural Poland, including that the state should above all help immigrants legalise their stay in the country (by, among other things, improving the appropriate regulations) and in their integration (non-financially) so that they can become self-reliant as soon as possible and be useful for the receiving population; immigrants should have the same social obligations as the receiving population. In addition, they recognised integration while retaining one's own culture (based on mutual tolerance and respect) as the best strategy for the taking in and inclusion of immigrants, and equality of cultures as the best model of multiculturality that would be accepted in a conceivable multicultural Poland. In addition they considered it essential for precise rules in Polish migration policy to be defined, so as to—inter alia—put migration-related issues in order, have them

under control, and prevent the problems with (mass) migration observed in western countries. For both populations the priority is to achieve a shared, conflict-free coexistence. As such immigration should be limited in numbers and should be selective (above all accepting well-educated, enterprising and non-confrontational immigrants). The opinions among Poles and Arabs, particularly regarding the issue of Poland's migration policy and its multiculturality, are therefore convergent—which in turn confirms the third hypothesis.

Summary

The Arab diaspora is one of the immigrant groups, an example of an ethnically and culturally different population, also frequently different from the native Polish population in terms of faith and phenotype. A feature of a diaspora is its separation from the receiving population and idealisation of the home country (to which frequently they cannot return for a variety of reasons), and this is also seen among members of the Arab population. Apart from this, there are two meanings to the dispersion seen here; members of the Arab population are scattered throughout Poland, immersed in Polish society, while at the same time they are members of Arab people scattered around the world—members of an Arab diaspora on a macro scale (in regard to size).

Despite their otherness, there are also attributes that link members of the Arab diaspora with Polish society—not only the fact of living in the same country or sometimes holding Polish citizenship, as we are often dealing with a similarity of attitudes, opinions and views. The members of this Arab diaspora live in a borderland of cultures, and as the process of integration and acculturation proceeds, with more years lived in Poland and growth in their connections with Poland, they slowly lose their bonds with their country of origin, and their identity metamorphoses. Members of the old diaspora in particular, Polish citizens, not only declare Polish identity, but really do feel such identity. This is confirmed in their comments, in their answers to questions regarding the Poles; they say "we, Poles," or "us, the Polish", and when asked about members of the Arab diaspora they use such phrases as "them, the Arabs" and "those Arabs".

They reject or belittle their Arab identity for various reasons, including because they feel more connected to Poland than their country of origin (a vanishing of bonds with one's home country more because of rarely visiting than having no contact, which—thanks to the growth of the Internet—is much easier today), or because of not acknowledging Arab identity even

from when they lived in their home country, due to growth in the significance of national identities and because of depreciation of the Arab identity—as a result of a collective identity and collective responsibility being applied towards the Arab population, in other words the negative perception of the Arab world resulting from the negative behaviours of individual members.

The information collected regarding the Arab diaspora in Poland reveals the true picture of this population: that of people who are well-educated, who are working, with active careers. In addition the old diaspora comprises people with a stable financial situation, in long-term relationships (mainly with female Polish citizens), almost all of whom have at least higher education. As such the real picture of this population is far removed from its image as functions in Polish society.

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Research Workshops

MAGDALENA DUDKIEWICZ

Programme for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Protection of Victims of Domestic Violence in the years 2012-2016 in Warsaw: Evaluation report

Pursuant to the provisions of the appropriate act[1], the Capital City of Warsaw conducts measures related to the prevention of domestic violence. The Office of Aid and Social Projects of the City Offices (BPiPS UM) commissioned an evaluation of the Programme for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Protection of Victims of Domestic Violence in the years 2012-2016. This document constituted a resolution passed by the Warsaw City Council, which **defined the goals, the tasks, the manner of implementation and the budget for measures connected to the prevention of domestic violence in Warsaw.**

Research goals

The purpose of the evaluation was both to examine how the Programme proceeded while assessing its results compared to the planned targets, and to find material providing grounds for asserting which measures carried out within the Programme should be continued, and which—in order to increase its effectiveness—should be expanded or modified. **The detailed aims of the evaluative research were as follows:**

- to analyse and assess the state of implementation of the Programme over the years 2012-2016,
- to draw up conclusions and recommendations regarding optimisation of the Programme's implementation and verification of the appropriateness of its indices,
- to compile a diagnosis of the phenomenon of domestic violence within the city of Warsaw (based on existing research studies and analyses), carry out a SWOT analysis, and draw up proposals for the assumptions and indices for a draft Programme for the years 2017-2020,

[1] Act on the prevention of domestic violence, of 29 July 2005, Dz.U. [Legal Journal] 2005 nr 180, item 1493.

• to propose the manner and tools for monitoring and evaluating the Programme in the years 2017-2020,

• to consult Programme implementers regarding the recommendations drawn up in the evaluation, plus the assumptions and indices for the draft Programme for 2017-2020.

Pursuant to the recommendation of the City of Warsaw, **four perspectives were taken into account** in the study—those of the:

• Office of Aid and Social Projects, departments of social and health matters in the district offices and at the Warsaw City Offices collaborating on Programme implementation,

• Interdisciplinary Teams for preventing domestic violence in the districts of Warsaw City,

• social welfare centres and other units dealing with the issue of domestic violence,

• non-governmental organisations.

Methodology

An extended evaluative study was conducted. Due to the specific nature of the issue in question (domestic violence) and the significance of the findings for social practice (to be reflected in the Programme's provisions, then in specific measures impacting on the lives of city residents) the **methodological approaches were triangulated**, embracing the following:

• **a methodical and systematic scientific approach**, above all assuming a sensitive approach to the process of data collection, so as not to remain at the level of stereotypes or judgments circulating among the respondents, but to carry out analyses of their deep convictions, appraisals and emotions within the study's subject area;

• **evaluative research**, the fundamental goal of which was to define the strengths and weaknesses of the Programme as implemented, and to draw up conclusions and recommendations regarding possible modifications in this respect.

The following **research and analytical methods** were applied in the project:

• analysis of existing internal data produced by the Programme implementers themselves and by collaborating institutions and organisations—available reports and evaluations from, among other things, implementation of the 'Blue Card' procedure by Interdisciplinary Teams;

• analysis of available external data, such as the results of polling, qualitative and evaluative studies regarding the issue of domestic violence in Warsaw, a report by NIK (the Supreme Audit Office of Poland), and internal audit findings;

• the procedure of direct comparison of the above data with the provisions of the Programme—the goals and their respective indices;

• 22 individual In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) with Programme stakeholders—qualitative and unconstrained in character, conducted using scripts tailored to specific respondent categories anticipated in the research concept. Written tools enabling the aggregated appraisal of Programme implementation on the proposed scales were also applied during the above;

• one group discussion with three people from the BPiPS UM;

• semantic analyses, including a projective method in which respondents compared the prevention of domestic violence in Warsaw to some kind of phenomenon or object in any field. Apart from comparative analyses, elements of such semantic methods as ME-US-THEM inventory and emotional temperature analysis were also used;

• an illustrational method (important from the point of view of the BPiPS UM commissioning body due to the possibility of including extensive citations from the respondents' answers in the report);

• statistical analyses;

• SWOT analysis;

• two consultation meetings with Programme implementers—one aimed at presenting the most important conclusions from the research conducted, the second a discussion regarding the manner of entering the goals and indices for their implementation in the next edition of the Programme. Participants at both meetings had the opportunity to participate in the discussion, and completed a questionnaire on the most important dilemmas that must be resolved when designing the next edition of the Programme;

• an expert interview with a so-called competent judge—a person not connected with implementation of the Programme, but knowing very well the subject-matter of the research, who was asked to comment on the findings of the analyses carried out by the researchers.

Fieldwork was carried out from July to September 2016.

Outcome

The research and analytical work carried out enabled preparation of the following:

• an evaluative report, containing:

– a diagnosis of domestic violence within the capital city of Warsaw (based on available data),

– a SWOT analysis,

– proposed assumptions and indices for the draft Programme for Preventing Domestic Violence and the Protection of Victims of Domestic Violence in the Capital City of Warsaw for the years 2017-2020,

– proposed tools for monitoring and evaluating the Programme for the years 2017-2020, together with suggestions for how to do so;

- a separate report on the consultation carried out;
- a multimedia presentation giving the most important findings and recommendations from the evaluative research.

Most important conclusions

The Programme evaluation carried out revealed that over the four years during which it functioned the **foundations for a system of preventing domestic violence** were created in Warsaw; the **system should be expanded and perfected.** The functioning of the system makes it possible to **show the real scale** of domestic violence, which until now has frequently remained hidden and underestimated. In the current phase of the system's development it functions above all diagnostically—identifying with increasing accuracy and effectiveness the scale of domestic violence, and ensuring measures providing assistance in this area. As such, **its continuation and expansion is all the more essential. However, it lacks a clear-cut and widely shared definition of the Programme's function in the system for preventing domestic violence in Warsaw,** while the Programme itself is perceived by its implementers above all as a closed formula hindering modifications in response to the conditions changing over the course of the four years. It also lacks a uniform way in which Interdisciplinary Teams function in Warsaw, and the individual Teams differ in how they proceed, in their composition, and their conduct where the 'Blue Card' procedure is concerned.

Another problem is that of a **growing workload for the Interdisciplinary Teams, which are approaching their limits in their work**; this applies in particular to social workers and police functionaries, while less so to the remaining team members. The most important consequences of such a situation are frustration caused by the inability to reconcile one's duties, a drop in the quality of actions taken, and routine (both in their main place of work and in measures for the Team) as well as a drain of the most competent, experienced and engaged persons. In addition the members of these Interdisciplinary Teams do not have a full picture of the functions offered by the IT tools available to them.

In keeping with its name, the Programme now coming to a close focused largely on the victims of violence. However, the implementers' experience

suggests that the effective prevention of domestic violence, and in particular obtaining long-lasting effects in this respect, requires **work being carried out in parallel also with the perpetrators of violence and in regard to altering their behaviour.** In addition, there was an evident emphasis in the Programme for the years 2012-2016 on measures dedicated to specific victim groups, coupled with the insufficient simultaneous organisation of comprehensive support for whole families.

Many of the Programme's provisions, including its goals, are on the one hand unknown to or incomprehensible for the Programme's implementers, and on the other it is impossible to assess the degree to which they are achieved:

- too many detailed goals were drawn up, with too many indices assigned to them;
- some indices are worded inappropriately for the content of the goal, and in certain cases no clear-cut index scales were anticipated;
- many studies and measurements—meant to be a source of data for the indices—were not conducted;
- neither index base values, anticipated/desired index values, nor expected trends in regard to change were defined.

The budget anticipated for carrying out the tasks in the Programme is insufficient, which in effect:

- generates hidden costs on the part of the implementers, as they spend money on handling the Interdisciplinary Teams;
- focuses the practical side of the Programme's implementation on running the 'Blue Cards' procedure, while putting insufficient emphasis on diagnostic, prophylactic, educational and campaign-related measures;
- as a consequence the Programme is based mainly on intervention in situations where violence has occurred, while concentrating less on preventative measures.

Finally it has to be stressed that the Programme's implementers continue to encounter manifestations of poor social awareness of behaviours involving violence (in particular violence in forms other than physical), their causes and effects, and also in regard to possible ways of reacting.

Reviews and Comment

KINGA ZAWADZKA

On Robert Putnam's "Our Kids"

Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis, published in March 2015, is the latest book by Robert D. Putnam. The author, professor of public policy at Harvard University, and best known for his earlier books *Making Democracy Work* (1993), *Bowling Alone* (2000), *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us* (2010), is one of the most influential academics in the world today. Apart from his academic career, he has served in various public institutions including the Council on Foreign Affairs, Trilateral Commission and American Political Science Association, and has been an advisor to numerous public officials, including – as we may read on his own web page – the last three American presidents, the last three British prime ministers and many more.

Unsurprisingly – considering his wide academic and political impact – *Our Kids* became an Amazon bestseller within just a few days of its publication. The book is strongly-embedded in Putnam's former works, especially in the concept of social capital (referring to "connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" [Putnam 2000: 19]), explored in detail in *Bowling Alone*. In *Our Kids* Putnam once again examines the erosion of American communities, the damaging disconnections of individuals from their relatives, neighbours and democratic structures; however, the main focus of the book is on the widening opportunity gap between the more and less advantaged parts of society.

The book is based on qualitative research conducted by Robert D. Putnam and Jennifer M. Silva – the latter, an associate professor from Harvard Univeristy, conducted over 100 in-depth interviews with young adults (18-22 years old) and their parents on "what it's like to grow up today". The interviews examined the lives of Black, White and Hispanic families from nine research sites that represented different kinds of economy and culture in the United States (as e.g. Atlanta, Georgia; Bend, Oregon; Orange Coun-

ty, California). The presence of parents – in cases where they were accessible – provided additional information on families' social, financial and cultural position and resources, and the intergenerational mobility of family members. Employing education as a measure closely correlated with parental socioeconomic status (though as an indicator of social class), Putnam uses the categories of 'rich' (college-educated) families and 'poor' ones (high-school or lower), and reports on how family composition, parenting styles, schooling system and the character of the community correspond with the opportunities of children from both segments of American society. The life-stories of the interviewees are used to a large extent in order to illustrate the recent survey data concerning the topics of each chapter.

The book opens with a nostalgic description of Putnam's own community background – Port Clinton, Ohio, a town of 6,000 inhabitants, where he graduated from high school in 1959. Putnam remembers the town as a "passable embodiment of the American Dream, a place that offered decent opportunity for all the kids in town, whatever their background" [2017:1], where all the kids, regardless of actual kin relations, were considered 'ours'. Over half a century later, as a consequence of the process that began in the 1970s, when income inequality started to grow, the town has turned into a cluster of class-separated neighbourhoods, where children from one side can hardly imagine the every-day reality of the other (having almost no opportunity for coming into contact); this image reoccurs in numerous other locations across the United States. One of the main purposes of the book is to show "how the other half lives" (using the words of Jacob Riis [Riss 1890]), particularly to the inhabitants of wealthy boroughs.

The following chapters (Chapter 2 to Chapter 5) tackle the topics of family characteristics, parenting strategies, schooling and communities. Vast discrepancies, revealing the increasingly advantaged position of the upper-middle class, are conspicuous on each level: family structure patterns (neo-traditional, two-parent model among families with BA or more versus prevalent single parent model among 'poor' families), imprisonment rates, median age of mothers at first-birth (median age of 30 among college-educated mothers versus less than 20 among mothers with HS or less), dominating parenting styles (supportive and nurturing practices among upper-middle class families versus increased exposure to neglect and stress among children from 'poor' families), schooling system (neighbourhood segregation resulting in better and worse schools, a growing class gap in access to extracurricular activities) and community issues (more ties to wide and diverse networks among middle class families – the ties essential for social mobility and economic advancement). The most striking figure refers to the relations

between family background and school graduation: the family background matters more than the 8th grade test score for college education – poor kids with high test scores are slightly less likely to get degrees than rich kids with low scores.

In Chapter 6 (*"What is to be done?"*) Putnam forms some policy suggestions, which are, among others, expanded earned income tax credits for the poor, broader access to day care, particularly during the preschool period and elementary school, and more funding for community colleges. The book closes with a presentation of the methodological aspects of the research – selection of the respondents, interview structure, and how the interviews were conducted.

One of the greatest strengths of Putnam's book is the extended use of qualitative material: the stories of the kids, followed by the latest survey data from various sources let the reader capture the essence and the scale of the problem. The book is written with wit, in accessible language that facilitates intake of the data and strengthens the impact of its message.

What seems to represent a weaker side of the book is its almost exclusive focus on communities and social capital (the main point of Putnam's interest), with the thread of economic and political facts underlying the shift in American society towards one that is class-based almost absent. At the same time, Putnam seems to glorify the reality of the 1950s – the era before the civil rights movement, with its strong communities and the dominant family model of bread-winning dad and home-staying mum – ignoring the irreversible changes within American families which require new solutions and new tools of social policy.

Nevertheless, the book provides an inspiring and eye-opening lecture that facilitates an understanding of the social stratification and widening inequality gap – the current process characteristic not only of American society, but also of countries in Europe, including Poland. A compulsory lecture for economics journalists, social science students, and all those who downplay how a fortunate family background contributes to successful career paths.

News and Conference Reports

ANETA GAWKOWSKA

Dr Sergei Kovalev Honoured by the University of Warsaw

On 14 March 2018, Dr Sergei Kovalev, a Russian activist and defender of human rights, received an honorary doctoral degree ('doctor honoris causa') from the University of Warsaw.

The initiative for this came from the Faculty of Applied Social Sciences and Resocialisation, whose Council requested the Senate of the University of Warsaw to grant the honorary degree to Dr Sergei Kovalev.

Dr Sergei Kovalev was born in Ukraine in 1930, and two years later his family moved to Podlipki near Moscow. In 1954 he graduated from the biology department at the Lomonosov Moscow State University (the MGU) where he was an assistant until 1960. In the years 1960-1964 he worked at the Institute of Biophysics at the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1964 he obtained a PhD in biophysics, and from 1964 to 1969 directed the interdepartmental laboratory of mathematical methods in biology at the MGU. After signing a letter in defence of Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky – who were

going through a show-trial – in 1966, he began his opposition activities, which led to him leaving the university and working at the Ichthyological and Reclamation Station in Moscow. In 1969 he was one of the 14 co-founders of the Action Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR, issuing the first independent samizdat *Chronicle of Current Events*. In 1974 he was convicted of anti-Soviet propaganda, and sentenced to 7 years of forced labour followed by three years of exile in Kolyma. After his release, he settled in Kalinin (now Tver), and in 1987 was allowed to return to Moscow. During perestroika he was a co-founder of Memorial (a human rights society) and the Moscow branch of Amnesty International. In 1991 he co-authored the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights and contributed to the chapter on the rights and liberties of man and citizen in the Russian Constitution. He was a member of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation from 1990 to 1993, and a member of Russia's Duma from 1993 to 2002. He co-founded the Democratic Choice of Russia party in 1993. As human rights adviser to President Yeltsin, he criticised the war against Chechnya, for which he was recalled from a diplomatic post in Chechnya in 1995. In 1996 he resigned as the presidential adviser on human rights by writing an open letter to Yeltsin in which he accused the president of abandoning democratic principles. To this day he continues to work actively for the furthering of human rights in Russia.

He has garnered numerous awards, including the Sakharov Prize awarded by the European Parliament, and the Freedom Prize instituted by the Lithuanian Parliament. In 2009 the President of the Republic of Poland awarded him with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland. Sergei Kovalev has been nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The decision by the University of Warsaw to grant Sergei Kovalev the honorary title was taken by its Senate on 29 June 2016. Three reviewers were asked to evaluate his achievements: Prof. Ewa Łętowska, the first ombudsman in Poland; Prof. Andrzej Zoll, a former president of the Constitutional Tribunal and a former ombudsman; and Prof. Tomas Venclova of Yale University. Each of the reviewers expressed their strong support for the motion to honour Sergei Kovalev.

Professor Andrzej Zoll stated in his review: "I

have no doubt that the UW Senate has passed a fully justified resolution to initiate proceedings for granting the title of doctor honoris causa to Dr Sergei Adamovich Kovalev. The act of honouring this person, who is the conscience of Russian society and the conscience of the world, for whom values such as democracy, the rule of law, justice, and above all human rights are important, will indicate that these values are also important for the University of Warsaw, for Polish science, and for Polish society."

Professor Ewa Łętowska in turn wrote: "Kovalev is absolutely right when he considers civil courage a rare and difficult trait, as opposed to physical courage. This is especially true in societies subservient to a paternalistic or autocratic vision of relations between the individual and the authorities, which is so characteristic of Eastern Europe. Sergei Kovalev is a brave man in this deeper sense. He is a consistent humanist – and places the human individual before blood kinship resulting from a common citizenship."

Professor Tomas Venclova referred to Kovalev's experience in his academic work, which he later used in his political activities: "He started as a biophysicist and is the author of many works on the subject. Experience in the field of the natural sciences instilled in him faith in the concrete, strict proof of his assertions and distrust towards generally accepted but wrong postulates."

The ceremony for awarding the honorary doctorate was held in the Senate Room of the Kazimierzowski Palace at the University of Warsaw. After the National Anthem had been sung, the University Rector, Professor Marcin Pałys, opened the ceremony. In his speech he said: "The Honorary Doctorate, unlike an ordinary doctorate, is not only a recognition of the person's achievements, but also an act by which we give this person as a role model for members of our community. Sergei Kovalev's attitude is an example of the courageous and determined demand for the observance of human rights in practice, and for the real and everyday respect for civil liberties." The Rector emphasised that the moment for handing the honorary title to Sergei Kovalev was no accident. A few days previously, the University had marked the 50th anniversary of the events of March 1968: "Then students demanded that the declared civil rights really be exercised. Today's ceremony underscores our respect for Sergei Kovalev, who, like our students in 1968, demanded the same in his country. At the same time, we emphasise that lessons from these experiences should always be remembered."

The laudation was delivered by the nominator, Professor Jacek M. Kurczewski. He opened with the following words: "We have gathered to honour Sergei Adamovich Kovalev, one of those to have helped shape the world's fortunes, to have served mankind." He quoted fragments from the reviews,

and emphasised the similarity of the struggle for freedom under the difficult conditions of Stalinism in the USSR and in Poland. "This inhumane system did not end at the Bug river, and while Poland was ruled by Stalin's subservient communists in the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party], masses of Polish citizens of diverse ethnicity were unlawfully imprisoned in camps or exiled to the far north of Russia and Soviet Central Asia following the annexation of the eastern territories of the Republic of Poland, or sent there during the Soviet-German war." Professor Kurczewski stressed that back in his student days, Kovalev was involved in activities furthering freedom in scientific research, opposing the pseudo-scientific theories of Trofim Lysenko on genetics. He said: "The University of Warsaw, by honouring Sergei Kovalev, a defender of human rights, also honours his defence of the right to undisturbed scientific research and the dissemination of scientific knowledge, constituting the foundation of academic freedom and the university as an institution of free science and free teaching. By defending the right to know about genetics, the young Kovalev and his colleagues proved that in the very logic of scientific activity freedom is a necessity that cannot be ruled by those in power, even if they use terror. The instrumental development of science for the power of the communist regime and the Soviet system itself produced an outburst of aspirations for freedom. Without scholars, that system could not have functioned, but they also corroded it by being scholars." Kovalev's nominator underlined the similarity of the situation faced by young students and scientists like Kovalev and the Polish students of March 1968; both groups were invoking the freedoms and rights written down in law, in the constitutions of both countries, in documents prepared and approved by Stalin. The paradoxes of this struggle – for compliance with the laws guaranteed by the communist authorities, in the face of their actual practices in which the laws were not applied – are thus clearly visible, as Kurczewski emphasised.

Professor Kurczewski then described Kovalev's situation and achievements in categories presented by eminent Polish and world sociologists such as Maria Ossowska, Florian Znaniecki, Pitirim Sorokin, and Erving Goffman. "The creator of the science of morality and professor at the University of Warsaw, Maria Ossowska, when publishing in 1946 her brochure regarding the model citizen in a democratic system, mentioned several attributes such as perfectionism, civil courage, intellectual honesty, chivalry towards the opponent, a sense of aesthetics, and a sense of humour. All these features seem less thrilling in the democratic system; they come across as so ordinary, as seemingly easy to implement. Today we know this is but an illusion, and just taking a look around is enough to see how rare they are. One might say that

it's just a model, but in a totalitarian system practising any of these virtues separately, let alone combining them in one person, is heroism. Let us take sense of humour, for example. Even this seemingly common human trait threatened death in the totalitarian system. For jokes about Stalin, one was sent to Siberia or prison. And what about perfecting character, cooperation or civil courage? However, hoping for a sense of humour, I would like to recall here a certain technical concept of sociology, which before the Second World War was introduced by the founder of Polish sociology, Florian Znaniecki. In his visionary book *Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości [Contemporary People and the Civilization of the Future]* he writes about supernormalcy, or deviation from the norm upwards, whereby an individual identifies so strongly with their assigned role that they perform it better than the personal model requires. Throughout their lives, such people deviate from the norms adopted in their social environment, rebelling against them and against social functions imposed upon them in all social circles in which they happen to be. In this form of rebellion, the subnormal deviant rejects only the given normative order, trying to break free of it, while the supernormal deviant tries to change the existing order. Both types met in the Soviet labour camps under the Gulag government. In the biographies of the supernormal people, Znaniecki noticed that they would undertake actions on their own, setting their own goals and learning to use the appropriate means for their implementation. These people would often become outstanding, above average, thanks to their persistent self-development. We find here a sociopsychological characteristic of heroism and extraordinariness. Similarly, Znaniecki's contemporary and founder of Russian sociology, Pitirim A. Sorokin, himself a prisoner of Tsarist Russa and later the Bolsheviks, wrote that 'good neighbours' and saints are deviants who rise above the level of moral conduct required by official law. Their action is 'above-legal'. Some of these overly-legal activities do not clash with official law, while others cause conflict with official law and the authorities. In such conflicts, 'good neighbours' and saints become 'subversives', 'heretics', 'criminals' and 'dangerous revolutionaries', and as such they are hunted down, punished, and even eliminated; it is not difficult to see these features in Sergei Kovalev. Nonconformism or hyper-conformism, to cite Znaniecki, is expressed throughout Kovalev's life, starting from his school discussions with teachers to his heroic wrestling with the powerful men of the Russian ship of state and the mighty of the whole world." Taking the above into account, Kurczewski described Sergei Kovalev as the "co-founder of a new ethical-political social institution – of the institution of the dissident." He followed this by listing the major events and stages of Kovalev's dissident past, and noted that the decision of

the University of Warsaw confirmed that the University agreed with the sentence expressed earlier by one of the reviewers, Prof. Zoll, when he acknowledged that values such as democracy, the rule of law, justice, and human rights were equally as important to Sergei Kovalev as well as to the University, to Polish society, and to Polish science.

Then came a speech by the Dean of the Faculty of Applied Social Sciences and Resocialisation, Prof. Wojciech Pawlik, who pointed out that honouring Dr Sergei Kovalev with an honoris causa doctorate was an occasion celebrated by the whole University, by all faculties, because, as he claimed: "human rights, freedom, the rule of law and democracy apply equally to all of us: biologists, psychologists, geographers, mathematicians, philologists, chemists, physicists and anthropologists, etc. [...] because their observance – or lack thereof – concerns us both as academic scholars and as citizens". He continued by reminding that "the dignity of the university derives from many values, one of which is truth and – as scholars – our common striving to discern it. Without the freedom to conduct scientific research, without the freedom to exchange views, and without free scientific discussion – including with students – then the university loses its dignity and sooner or later ceases to be a university, and becomes but an institution serving the world of politics, religion or ideology. Academic freedom, which is a prerequisite for conducting scientific research, our pursuit of truth and making scientific discoveries, is closely related to civil liberties and the type of political order in which we live and work." Prof. Wojciech Pawlik referred to the concept worked out by one of the greatest Polish sociologists, Stanisław Ossowski, who "claimed that learned people should be characterized by a certain quality of 'disobedience in thinking', meaning an autonomy in thinking, critical reflection, and rational, reflective civic disobedience as an expression of positive freedom. Dr Sergei Kovalev presented this 'disobedience in thinking' with great courage and a readiness to resign from academic work or even become imprisoned" – continued Prof. Pawlik, who expressed his gratitude as well as respect for Dr Kovalev on behalf of the academic community.

After this speech, the Honorary Diploma was awarded to Dr. Sergei Kovalev, and the University of Warsaw Choir performed *Gaude Mater Polonia*.

In an address given after receiving the honorary degree, Sergei Kovalev spoke of strong ties connecting his homeland with Poland, stressing that Poland is a mirror for Russia, one in which history that has not been fulfilled in Russia is reflected. He said: "We always had a strong sense of connection with Polish fate. This was not limited to reflection on history. The attitude of my generation to Poland was shaped not only by the memory of ancient tragedies, but also by modern times: Poznań '56, March '68, KOR, or the

revolution of 'Solidarity' in 1980/81. The last three dates remind us of the role that the University of Warsaw played in the history of the Polish opposition. I will mention the names of a few graduates of this university: Jacek Kuroń, Bronisław Geremek, Karol Modzelewski and Tadeusz Mazowiecki. I cannot mention here my friend Adam Michnik, who – as you know – was blacklisted in March '68. Years later, we can say that the Polish revolution of 1980/81, and consequently also the collapse of communism in 1989-91, was organised jointly by the Gdańsk Shipyards and the University of Warsaw."

Following the laureate's acceptance speech, the rector closed the official ceremony, and the Choir sang *Gaudeamus igitur*, after which all participants of the ceremony went for refreshments in the Golden Hall of the Kazimierzowski Palace.

In the afternoon there was a panel discussion entitled *Human rights, democracy and the duties of scholars*, followed by a meeting with the honorary guest, Dr Sergei Kovalev, Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Warsaw. The event was organised by the Faculty of Social Sciences and Resocialisation at the Professor Jan Baszkiewicz Hall. The distinguished panellists together with the honorary doctor attracted an audience of about 150 people.

The first part of the afternoon event, namely the aforementioned panel discussion, was attended by Prof. Małgorzata Fuszara, Prof. Jacek Kurczewski, Prof. Andrzej Rzepliński and Dr Marek Tabin. The panel was led by Prof. Aneta Gawkowska – Vice-dean for Research at the Faculty of Applied Social Sciences and Resocialisation of the University of Warsaw.

Speakers spoke of their experiences in socio-political engagement. As such, they presented themselves that afternoon not so much as scholars, but rather as activists implementing or applying what they teach and what they research, according to the name of the institution they work in, i.e. the Faculty of *Applied* Social Sciences and Resocialization. The speakers took the floor in chronological order of initiating their social activities. The first to speak was Prof. Jacek M. Kurczewski, already an active member of the Polish Sociological Association in the 1970s, at which time it was not just a scientific society – as it was involved in applied analyses and even actively changing society. He was an activist of the democratic opposition, an advisor to Solidarity, a participant in the Round Table talks, a member of the State Tribunal in 1989-1991, and Deputy Speaker of the 1st term of the Sejm (1991-1993). Dr Marek Tabin, who was second to take the floor, was an activist with the democratic opposition, a founding member of the Society for Scientific Courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych), and a co-founder of the underground publishing house, 'Krąg'. He was interned, emigrated to France where he was editor-in-chief of the *Information Bulletin* (a publica-

tion of the Paris Coordination Committee of the Solidarity Trade Union), and he also worked at the Polish Broadcasting Station of Radio Free Europe in 1988-1994. The third panellist to speak was Professor Małgorzata Fuszara, who founded Poland's and Central and Eastern Europe's first *Gender Studies* (Postgraduate Studies on Social and Cultural Gender Identity). She also served as Secretary of State and Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment in 2014-2015. Her activity led to the ratification of the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. She is an active and highly recognised member of the Congress of Women as well as the vice-president of the Congress of Women Association. Finally, Professor Andrzej Rzepliński presented his experience as a well-known human rights activist, member of the Helsinki Committee in Poland, participant in the work of the Center for Civic Legislative Initiatives of Solidarity, as well as the President of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2010-2016, an expert of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE.

The panellists' vivid presentations of their activities were followed by the second part of the afternoon session, namely by the meeting with Dr Sergei Kovalev, which was co-organised by the 'Czarne' publishing house. During Dr Kovalev's dialogue with Marek Radziwon, author of the book *We lived as free people. Interview with Sergei Kovalev*, the laureate shared his memories of the past, talked about the experiences of fighting for human rights and the fight for the truth in practising science in the reality of Soviet communism. He spoke on why he chose the exact sciences and not the humanities for his professional career, as he perceived the latter as too ideological for him at that time. "It seemed to me that in the exact sciences I would find a margin of freedom, and that I would be able to avoid lying. That's how I saw it. And I imagined that I would run away from the swamp into science. Well, it then turned out that you couldn't escape," he said in an interview published in 2017 and presented at the meeting. After the meeting, he signed the dedications of his memoir interview book, talked to readers, and gave a number of interviews.

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